The role of corporate governance and dividend policy as an alignment mechanisms to CEO compensation and firm's performance by Farzan, Yahya
The copyright © of this thesis belongs to its rightful author and/or other copyright 
owner.  Copies can be accessed and downloaded for non-commercial or learning 
purposes without any charge and permission.  The thesis cannot be reproduced or 
quoted as a whole without the permission from its rightful owner.  No alteration or 
changes in format is allowed without permission from its rightful owner. 
 
THE ROLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
DIVIDEND POLICY AS AN ALIGNMENT 
MECHANISMS TO CEO COMPENSATION AND FIRM’S 
PERFORMANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FARZAN YAHYA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
UNIVERSITI UTARA MALAYSIA 
March 2017 
 
 
The Role of Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy as an 
Alignment Mechanisms to CEO Compensation and Firm’s 
Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
FARZAN YAHYA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis Submitted to  
Othman Yeop Abdullah Graduate School of Business 
Universiti Utara Malaysia 
In Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy


v 
 
PERMISSION TO USE 
In presenting this thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for a Post Graduate degree 
from the Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM), I agree that the Library of this university 
may make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for 
copying this thesis in any manner, in whole or in part, for scholarly purposes may be 
granted by my supervisor or in his absence, by the Dean of Othman Yeop Abdullah 
Graduate School of Business where I did my thesis. It is understood that any copying 
or publication or use of this thesis or parts of it for financial gain shall not be allowed 
without my written permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be 
given to me and to the UUM in any scholarly use which may be made of any material 
in my thesis.  
 
Request for permission to copy or to make other use of materials in this thesis in 
whole or in part should be addressed to:  
 
Dean of Othman Yeop Abdullah Graduate School of Business  
Universiti Utara Malaysia  
06010 UUM Sintok  
Kedah Darul Amam 
vi 
 
ABSTRACT 
Public perception of CEO compensation is evidently unfair as inefficient 
compensation structures that violate the rights of shareholders result in principal-agent 
problems. In order to mitigate this issue, theorists argued that executive compensation 
should be aligned with firm performance. Owing to the prevalence of agency conflicts 
in Pakistan, this study investigated the effect of firm performance and characteristics 
on CEO compensation in the capital market of Pakistan. Furthermore, consistent with 
prior theoretical arguments, this study examined the role of dividend policy and 
corporate governance as moderators to ensure their effect on pay-performance link. 
After data cleaning, this study utilized 284 Pakistani- listed companies (PSX) over the 
period 2010 to 2014. The findings from Multiple Linear regression showed that CEO 
compensation is positively aligned to operating performance, market performance, 
firm size and market share, however, no empirical evidence was found regarding the 
effect of growth opportunities on CEO compensation. The findings also indicated that 
family owners align their CEO‘s compensation with operating performance, 
institutional owners with market performance and firm size, and foreign investors 
with market share. Thus, these ownership structures play vital roles in mitigating 
agency conflicts in an organization.  It was also revealed that optimal board size could 
strengthen the pay-performance link. On the other hand, CEO duality and dividend 
policy could distort the pay-performance link. Contrary to theoretical arguments, 
dividend policy cannot act as a substitute control device in the absence of strong 
corporate governance. The role of independent directors as an alignment mechanism 
to operating performance and CEO compensation is evident but due to their lower 
level of representation on the board, they have no influence over other accounting and 
market- based performance metrics. The study provides various theoretical and 
practical implications to improve corporate governance and compensation practices 
especially in the perspective of Pakistan. 
 
Keywords: CEO compensation, firm performance, corporate governance, dividend 
policy. 
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ABSTRAK 
Persepsi orang ramai terhadap ketidakadilan pampasan Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif 
(CEO) adalah jelas disebabkan oleh ketidakcekapan struktur pampasan. Pampasan 
eksekutif banyak melanggar hak pemegang saham sehingga menimbulkan masalah di 
antara prinsipal dengan ejen. Bagi menangani isu ini, ahli teori berpendapat bahawa 
kadar pampasan eksekutif seharusnya sejajar dengan prestasi firma. Merujuk kepada 
pemasalahan konflik agensi di Pakistan, kajian ini menyelidik kesan prestasi firma 
dan ciri-ciri pampasan CEO dalam pasaran modal di Pakistan. Tambahan pula, selaras 
dengan hujah-hujah teori terdahulu, kajian ini meneliti peranan dasar dividen dan 
tadbir urus korporat sebagai pengantara untuk memastikan kesannya pada hubungan 
di antara bayaran dengan prestasi. Selepas saringan data, kajian ini menggunakan 284 
buah syarikat yang tersenarai di Pakistan (PSX) bagi tempoh 2010 hingga 2014. 
Dapatan dari Regresi Garislurus Berganda menunjukkan bahawa pampasan CEO 
didapati sejajar secara positif dengan prestasi operasi, prestasi pasaran, saiz firma dan 
bahagian pasaran. Walau bagaimanapun, bukti empirikal tentang kesan peluang 
pertumbuhan bagi pampasan CEO tidak ditemui. Dapatan kajian juga menunjukkan 
bahawa keluarga pemilik menyelaraskan pampasan CEO dengan prestasi operasi, 
pemilik institusi dengan prestasi pasaran dan saiz firma, dan pelabur asing dengan 
bahagian pasaran. Oleh itu, struktur pemilikan memainkan peranan penting dalam 
mengurangkan konflik agensi dalam sesebuah organisasi. Hal ini juga mendedahkan 
bahawa saiz optimum Lembaga boleh mengukuhkan hubungan di antara bayaran 
dengan prestasi. Sebaliknya, dualiti CEO dan dasar dividen boleh memutarbelitkan 
hubungan di antara bayaran dengan prestasi. Bertentangan dengan hujah-hujah teori, 
dasar dividen tidak boleh bertindak sebagai peranti kawalan gantian dalam ketiadaan 
tadbir urus korporat yang kukuh. Peranan pengarah bebas sebagai mekanisme 
penyelarasan bagi prestasi pengoperasian dan pampasan CEO adalah jelas, tetapi 
kerana kedudukan yang lebih rendah daripada perwakilan dalam Lembaga, mereka 
tidak mempunyai pengaruh ke atas perakaunan lain dan pasaran dengan metrik 
prestasi berasaskan pasaran. Kajian ini memberikan pelbagai implikasi teori dan 
praktikal untuk meningkatkan amalan tadbir urus korporat dan pampasan khususnya 
dalam perspektif negara Pakistan. 
 
Kata kunci: pampasan Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif (CEO), prestasi firma, tadbir urus 
korporat, dasar dividen. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Study 
Over the past few decades, CEO compensation has gained noteworthy attention. 
Much of the attention is largely due to repugnant increase in compensation of 
executives in term of cash and stock bonuses and further fuel by debatable ethical 
practices. Public perception of CEO compensation is evidently unfair, that is why it 
gains enough attention of academic literature and practitioners (Gray & Benson, 2003; 
Lin, Kuo, & Wang, 2013, Wilmers, 2014). Researchers have conducted many studies 
to justify or to condemn the elevation of executive remuneration though most of these 
studies are related to developed countries and there are basic structural and 
institutional differences between developed and developing countries such as 
ownership, control, firm structure, markets, ethical, and business practices (Kashif & 
Mustafa, 2012).  
CEOs are the most persuasive individuals in a firm who can create value or devalue 
the firm performance (Ueng, 2000). However, compensation of executives falls in the 
category of immense controversy due to the principal-agent conflicts. Many 
researchers believe that CEO compensation should be limited as it violated the rights 
of shareholders (Crumley, 2006). Conversely, according to Tosi, Werner, Katz and 
Gomez-Mejia (2000), CEOs are highly compensated owing to their eminent skills as 
they can increase the value of shareholder. Nonetheless, there are different school of 
thoughts regarding executive compensation and firm performance.  
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A number of researchers found positive relation between CEO compensation and firm 
performance (Mintzberg, 1973; Ozkan, 2007; Tai, 2004) though some proved 
negative relationship between these two variables (Balafas & Florackis, 2014; Brick, 
Palmon, & Wald, 2006; Cooper, Gulen & Rau, 2013; Gibbons & Murphy, 1990; 
Tariq, 2010; Tosi, et al. 2000). Therefore, it has become a provocative and indecisive 
issue of the era. Nonetheless, a good issue to dwell into especially in a developing 
capital market.  
However, overly paid compensation cannot be justified in any way. Excessive 
compensation of CEOs can create agency problem as mentioned by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). Managers or executives may use their discretion in many ways for 
their own advantages (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Mueller (2012) argued that CEOs 
might involve themselves in empire building and they avoid investing in positive 
NPV projects. Therefore, organizations failed to distribute enough cash to its 
shareholders due to lack of investment opportunities (Jensen, 1986). Furthermore, 
CEOs may entrenched themselves in strong designations, which create difficulties for 
firms to expel them on their inefficient performance. Thus, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) 
illustrated that executive compensation and agency problem are associated; agency 
conflicts can be reduced if board compensate their executives efficiently and if it will 
not affect shareholder value.   
Callahan (2004) revealed the exponential growth of CEO compensation in his book, 
where he claimed that executive‘s greed for compensation is contributing the cheating 
culture and it has negative influence on society. Lin et al. (2013) used a term ‗fat cat 
problem‘ to define the firms with inefficient performance because of highly paid 
CEOs. Bulk of the problem is due to lack of linkage between firm‘s performance and 
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CEO‘s compensation. Blinder (2009) demonstrated that inefficient compensation 
plans of executives were one the major issues of financial crises in year 2008. Most of 
the CEOs were engaged in excessive risk taking and short-term gambles rather than 
paying attention to company‘s long-term objectives for viable growth (Fotouh, 2010). 
Although, developed countries are trying to overcome this issue but in a developing 
country or emerging economy like Pakistan, there is still a huge controversy in 
resolving agency conflicts.   
Recent cases in Pakistan have revealed the excessive compensation of CEOs 
exclusively in the financial sector. According to Alam (2014), CEOs are not only 
highly paid but they are actually overpaid in Pakistan. The Chairman of financial 
research institution Dr. Siddiqui exposed the unjustifiable elevation in CEO 
compensation by citing different examples. He purported that the CEO of Standard 
Chartered Bank had the highest annual remuneration amounting USD 1.43 million in 
year 2012, which increased up to 34.7 percent from the preceding year 2011. While, 
the compensation of MCB Bank had elevated up to 93.7 percent from year 2011 to 
2012. Additionally, almost 203 percent increase in the compensation of KASB Bank 
CEO had recorded in the year 2012 from the preceding year. The chairman of 
financial research institution condemned, ―financial institutions have been enhancing 
their profitability only to the benefit of their majority shareholders,‖ (Alam, 2014).  
Dr. Siddiqui in a statement also criticize board of financial institutions, ―…without 
sharing profits with depositors, their boards of directors have rewarded top 
managements unjustifiably and increased executive remuneration completely out of 
proportion‖ (Alam, 2014).  Recently, in a general body meeting of a bank in Pakistan, 
shareholders showed much vexation toward overly paid CEOs. They protested that 
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annual compensation of CEO is more than the profit declares by the firm. Regulators 
and central bank of Pakistan are acquainted with this discernment but have not yet 
taken any necessary notice (Subohi, 2013).  
Researchers proposed several models in the past to mitigate agency conflicts and 
excessive CEO compensation problem. One of the effective strategy proposed by 
agency theory is to align the CEO‘s compensation with firm performance as it could 
align the interests of executives with that of shareholders (Grossman & Hart, 1992; 
Jensen & Murphy, 1990). However, if firm does not distribute dividends time to time 
and compensation of executives remain high then it leads to agency conflicts and 
these conflicts could be more severe in case of a country like Pakistan where demand 
of dividends by shareholders are very high (Akhtar, Hunjra, Andleeb, & Butt, 2012). 
Therefore, Emerenciana (2012) suggests strong dividend policy as a solution to this 
problem. Goergen, Renneboog and Da Silva (2005) also view dividends as substitute 
control device which can mitigate managerial agency costs. However, consistent with 
economic intuition and principal agent paradigm, Bhattacharyya‘s model purported a 
different point of view on this notion. The author illustrates that shareholders prefer 
executives who invest in positive NPV projects and if there are no feasible projects 
then they should distribute dividends to shareholders (Bhattacharyya, 2003). 
Accordingly, Bhattacharyya, Mawani, and Morrill (2002) found negative relationship 
between managerial quality and dividend payouts because managers with higher 
productivity would invest more in profitable growth opportunities rather than 
distributing dividends among shareholders.  
Bhattacharyya (2000) also verified this claim in his previous research where he found 
negative relationship between executive compensation and dividend payouts because 
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managers with lower productivity get lower compensation who distributes dividends 
without considering positive NPV projects. Nonetheless, Bhattacharyya‘s model 
omitted the propositions of agency theory and cash flow hypothesis. Organizations 
could restrict managers from overinvestment by paying dividends and these managers 
would approach financial institutions for external source of financing. In this case, 
managers or executives could involve themselves in rational investment decision-
making in order to enhance firm‘s profitability as well as their own compensation 
(Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; Richardson, 2006). Owing to these theoretical and 
empirical arguments, it is purported that strong dividend policy can mitigate agency 
conflicts as it restricts executives from rent extraction.  
Brealey and Myers (2003) have listed dividend policy as one of the unsolved and 
complex issues of finance so dividend policy could not utterly resolve the principle-
agent conflicts. Dividend policy can be utilized as a substitute control device but the 
prior academic literature focused more on efficient corporate governance as main 
control mechanism. For instance, Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) suggests that 
corporations with stronger corporate governance have lesser principal-agent problems 
and executives of these corporation receive lesser or reasonable compensation. In 
addition, the firms with lesser agency conflicts are more likely perform in efficient 
way. Therefore, the study by Li, Moshirian, Nguyen and Tan (2007) demonstrates that 
executives could take advantage of less demanding shareholders or weaker corporate 
governance to achieve excessive compensation packages especially in the developing 
countries. This occurrence previously studied by Boyd (1994) that CEO compensation 
in firms with lower level of board control was not aligned to firm size or profitability.  
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Board control can be enhanced with higher representation of independent directors on 
the board as a prior study by Mishra and Nielsen (2000) discovered positive 
association between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and the percentage of 
independent outside directors. These directors pay the CEOs according to the 
fluctuation in firm performance (Mizruchi, 1983). Nonetheless, agency theory 
opposed suboptimal level of board size or the presence of CEO duality within the 
firm. Higher board size could be associated with higher agency costs, passive 
monitoring and negative firm performance (Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998; 
Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). Moreover, CEO duality enhance CEO‘s discretion and 
the ability to influence pay-setting process (Abernethy, Kuang, & Qin, 2014). Agency 
theory also disapproved concentrated ownership and favored dispersed ownership 
structure as different types of investors could provide different kinds of expertise to 
improve overall organizational effectiveness. For example, institutional investors have 
fiduciary obligations to grow investment returns for their shareholders by maintaining 
substantial investment stakes, thereby, they actively monitor the behaviors of firm‘s 
executives (Abernethy et al., 2014). Therefore, it is posited that corporate governance 
could be stronger if there is optimal level of board size, absence of CEO duality, 
greater representation of independent directors and dispersed ownership structures.  
Owing to the weak legal system in Pakistan, there is also poor corporate governance 
in many firms as compared to the companies of developed countries (Ameer, 2013; 
Javid & Iqbal, 2010; Sheikh & Wang, 2012). Independent directors are practically 
absent (Javid & Iqbal, 2010) and most of the companies are family owned and they 
elected less skillful board of directors based on their personal links in the capital 
market of Pakistan. Consequently, agency conflicts arise as board make decisions in 
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favor of only a specific group (Shah & Butt, 2009). As a result, these issues have 
highlighted in this research to answer the disputable matter of principal-agent problem 
derived from CEO compensation and the results are discussed in the Pakistani 
corporate financial scenario. The focus of this study is to ensure if performance-
related indicators are aligned to CEO compensation and what role corporate 
governance and dividend policy play in fabricating this link in the capital market of 
Pakistan. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
As brought forth from prior discussion, the pro and cons of CEO‘s compensation has 
been widely discussed. Current study revealed that excessive CEO pay affects 
shareholder returns and future operating income negatively (Balafas & Florackis, 
2014). Even during crises period, CEOs compensation in United States has raised to 
approximately 571 percent when average worker wage barely outpaced inflation. As 
mentioned in the study of Anderson, Cavanagh, Hartman, & Leondar-Wright (2001), 
several complaints have registered by shareholders regarding unfair compensation 
practices and prejudice with other workers. For instance, Coco-Cola faced enough 
criticism on executive pay from 83 percent shareholders and they demanded to revise 
the compensation plans (Eavis, 2014). Similarly, Facebook Incorporation‘s 
shareholders also filed complaint regarding unfair executive compensation. They 
accused that this biased compensation results in unjust enrichment, waste of corporate 
assets and breach of fiduciary duty (Odom, 2014).  
Even though, it is a universal issue but recently cases regarding over-paid CEOs have 
observed in Pakistan. Recent financial crises (2008) in KSE has disclosed many 
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malpractices regarding executive compensation practices, which in turn creates 
extreme public uproar and controversy. In year 2002, before tax income of financial 
institutions was USD 0.011 billion and has raised to USD 1.82 billion in the year 
2012 suggesting a significant increase of revenue in the financial sector within a 
decade (Alam, 2014). However, firms had shared very low profit with shareholders 
but compensated top managers with high rewards. Dr. Shahid Hasan Siddiqui, who is 
a Chairman of Research Institute of Islamic Banking and Finance in Pakistan, has 
criticized the unjustifiable increments of financial sector executives. The salaries of 
executives have amplified from 34.7 percent to 203 percent in year 2012 as compared 
to 2011, which is an abnormal enhancement. Chairperson said, ―Financial institutions 
exploit depositors in Pakistan by operating like a cartel‖ (Alam, 2014). 
In developed markets, such as U.S., companies especially related to public sectors are 
required to reveal their CEO-to-ordinary worker pay ratio under Dodd-Frank law. 
This law was designed to prevent excessive CEO compensation. However, in 
Pakistan, the relevant data regarding this ratio is not available but Subohi (2013) 
provided an anecdotal evidence to reveal excessive CEO compensation problem in 
Pakistan. A low level manager or worker may get only USD 20 per month after the 
retirement but the CEO get around USD 75000, which is signal of unjustified 
compensation of executives in Pakistan (Subohi, 2013). Excessive CEO compensation 
is not only the problem of financial sector of Pakistan but also many multinational and 
large local non-financial companies paid their CEOs a very high remuneration. For 
instance, CEO of Nestle Pakistan earned a sum of USD 0.77 million, 
GlaxoSmithKline USD 0.52 million, Pakistan Oilfields Limited USD 0.2 million, 
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Best Cement USD 0.23, and Oil and Gas Development Company USD 0.38 in year 
2014 (Hussain, 2016).  
Continuing the discussion of remuneration, shareholders have also filled resolutions 
to reduce pay disparities, which showed that shareholders are becoming more vocal 
and persistent in quest to remedy the perceived injustices related to CEO pay. For 
instance, the shareholders of British Petroleum (Macalister, Treanor, & Farrell, 2016), 
Renault (Frost, 2016) and Citigroup (Gray & Foly, 2016) revolt against their CEO‘s 
pay.  A resolution, ‗Say on pay‘ was passed few years ago which means shareholders 
have the right to vote on the remuneration of executives. Nevertheless, according to 
Cheffins and Thomas (2001), ‗say on pay‘ can control the sudden jumps in CEO pay 
but it cannot stop the general drift in pay rates. Additionally, according to the Wall 
Street Journal, companies are not in the favor of this rule as the trend of negative 
votes can affect the company performance (Chasan, 2014).   
Owing to the unresolved matter of CEO compensation, this issue has raised principal-
agent problem, in particular the Type I agency problem that is between agents (CEOs) 
and principals (shareholders). This notion is aligned with Brick et al. (2006) study that 
suggest excessive CEO compensation has a relationship with corporate‘s 
underperformance and it creates agency problems. In the view of the fact, executives 
could take different actions for their own welfare, which can leads to shareholders‘ 
disadvantage (Balafas & Floackis, 2014).   
Many studies have discovered negative relationship between firm performance and 
executive compensation (Gibbons & Murphy, 1990; Tariq, 2010; Tosi, et al., 2000). 
In addition, researches on manufacturing and financial sector in Pakistan also 
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illustrated the same negative association between these two variables (Iqbal, Khan, & 
Ali, 2012; Younas, Mehmood, Ilyas, & Bajwa, 2012). Brick et al. (2006) revealed that 
the reason for the negative relation between executive pay and firm performance is 
the mutual back scratching of CEOs with directors defined as boardroom courtesy at 
the expense of honesty, or in cronyism or weak oversight. It reflects the suboptimal 
performance of an administration that puts self-regard beyond shareholder interests 
(Brick, et al., 2006).  
In Pakistan, there is a culture of favoritism and nepotism in organization. Especially 
in public sector, companies hire employees based on personal contacts regardless of 
professionalism or merit practices, which affects the job performance of employees 
(Sadozai, Zaman, Marri, & Ramay, 2012). Furthermore, firm‘s underperformance has 
also discussed by Thomas (2002). He purported that lower level managers and staff 
underperform when they observe injustice in their compensation as compared to 
higher compensation reward of executives. Simultaneously, productivity and 
employees‘ performance affects adversely due to this injustice, which at the end leads 
to decline in firm‘s value (Thomas, 2002). Therefore, it is essential to raise questions 
regarding the uncertain elevation in CEO compensation.  
However, it cannot be hypothesized that CEOs compensations should be bounded, as 
attracting, retaining and rewarding CEOs is vital to the success of a firm. This is the 
reason that some studies relating CEO pay to organizational performance have found 
positive relationship between these two variables (Ozkan, 2007; Tai, 2004). 
Reflecting to an earlier study by Mintzberg (1973) demonstrated that CEO is the most 
important individual of a corporation due to many distinctive traits like decision-
making, information processing and symbolic actions. Therefore, firms cannot neglect 
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the reward system for its executives as it motivates them to perform better. Moreover, 
another reason to pay CEOs a high compensation is to persuade them in chasing more 
risky strategies for better outcomes or payoffs (Bertsch & Mann, 2005). Thus, in order 
to mitigate executive CEO compensation issue and principal-agent problem, efficient 
compensation structures should be designed which could mutually benefit the 
executives and shareholders.  
According to the implications of agency theory asserted by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), evaluating the actions of the agent and firm‘s value is always a complicated 
process. Therefore, to overcome this complexity, various researchers suggested that 
executive pay should aligned with firm‘s performance (Grossman & Hart, 1992; 
Holmstrom, 1979; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Tariq, 2010). An earlier study on the 
matter by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) demonstrated that with the increase in firm 
performance, compensation of CEO should also be increased. Therefore, high pay of 
CEO can be justified with the increase in performance of firm (Tariq, 2010).  
Furthermore, for the support of ‗efficient‘ compensation structure, different firm 
characteristics that can determine executive compensation should also be considered.  
By utilizing market and accounting based measures, Matolcsy and Wright (2011) had 
tested a model regarding compensation structure of CEO, which was established by 
employing firm characteristics to ensure its effect on firm‘s performance. Their 
finding suggested that CEOs who receive compensation inconsistent with their firm 
characteristics show an inferior performance as compared to the firms who pay their 
CEOs consistent with firm characteristics. Therefore, CEO compensation should 
aligned with firm performance as well as various firm characteristics.  
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Pertaining to relationship between executive compensation and firm characteristics, 
study by Tariq (2010) comes into view. His study revealed a strong positive 
relationship between pay of CEO and Firm size. Similar results have concluded by 
Firth, Fung and Rui (2006). As well, some researchers have also considered growth or 
investment opportunities within the context of firm characteristics and found positive 
relationship between investment opportunities (Market to Book value) and CEO 
compensation (Barnes, Harikumar, & Roth, 2006; Tariq, 2010). Furthermore, along 
with size and growth, Pindado, De Queiroz and De La Torre (2010) have also counted 
market share while studying firm characteristics. They purported that regardless of 
enhancement in firm performance, size or growth opportunities, if company only 
creates value for CEO and ignore the value creation for shareholders then agency 
conflicts cannot be resolved.  
Despite the fact that shareholders are against CEO‘s extravagant compensation and 
they do not want to pay more than a CEO‘s aptitude (Crumley, 2006). Seeing that, 
unreasonable and excessive compensation of executives can create biases and 
exploitation in dividend payouts to shareholders (Ali & Anis, 2012). In Pakistan, 
corporates distribute dividend if they have adequate amount after meeting their short-
term needs and expenses (Imran, 2011). Conversely, according to Akhtar et al. 
(2012), shareholders in Pakistan demand dividends either in the form of cash or in the 
form of stocks. In addition, they have resilient desire for dividend even the firm has to 
distribute it by taking loans. Therefore, if CEO compensation remains high and firm 
does not pay dividends to investors then it will leads to principal-agent problems.  
Nevertheless, strong dividend policy can reduce agency costs and eventually mitigate 
principal-agent conflicts. Additionally, dividend-paying firms are more effectual than 
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non-dividend paying firms in terms of incentivizing through compensation. By way of 
dividend paying firms have higher pay-performance sensitivity; therefore, these types 
of firms compensate CEOs according to their performance and firm‘s performance. 
Conversely, disproportionate compensation of non-dividend paying firms can have 
negative future performance (Emerenciana, 2012). Furthermore, if firm will reduce 
dividend payout ratio, stock price will also be dropped (Sar, 2008). Therefore, firms 
try to pay regular dividends to reduce their stock price volatility. In addition, 
Easterbrook (1984) argued that dividend policy is one of the effective ways to reduce 
the agency conflicts in a firm because it can align the interests of managers and 
shareholders. Dividend policy increases the control of capital market, which leads to 
reduction in agency costs (Easterbrook, 1984). The role of dividend policy to mitigate 
agency conflicts is also discussed precisely by agency theory. According to the 
theory, efficient dividend policy can be utilized as a substitute control device when 
governance, board and ownership provisions are unfavorable for shareholders (Haye, 
2014). On that account, dividend policy can play the moderating role between firm‘s 
performance and CEO compensation. Additionally, it can also act as moderator 
between firm characteristics and compensation of CEO, which has been neglected by 
prior studies. Moreover, in the context of Pakistani market, this effect has never been 
studied.  
Even so, dividend policy cannot solely diminish the agency conflicts. Thus, studies 
have anticipated the strong corporate governance structure as a solution for agency 
conflicts because CEOs of firms with more effective governance structure receive 
lesser compensation (Core, et al., 1999; Suherman, Rahma, & Buchdadi, 2011). Good 
governance regulations decrease agency costs, which leads to reasonable CEO 
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compensation and encourage investor welfare (Dicks, 2012). Therefore, Lee (2014) 
pointed out that stronger corporate structure could attenuate the negative relationship 
between future corporate performance and executive compensation. Prior studies have 
considered board characteristics and ownership structure in order to exhibit corporate 
governance mechanisms (Core, et al., 1999; Hashim & Devi, 2009; Singh & Davidson 
III, 2003). Brown and Roberts (2016) also theorized that effective board governance 
combined with proficient ownership structures could mitigate the agency conflicts. 
Although there is a wide range of academic literature on the direct relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and CEO compensation but researchers 
have given less attention to the role of these mechanisms in aligning pay-performance 
link.  
General studies have taken family, institutional and foreign ownership into account 
while testing the link between ownership structure and CEO compensation (Kato & 
Long, 2005). Researchers have provided empirical evidence as well as theoretical 
justification regarding the role of these ownership types in setting CEO‘s pay. For 
instance, in family-controlled firms, CEOs receive lower compensation (Combs, 
Penney, Crook, & Short, 2010; Palmberg, 2009). In case of Pakistan, most of the 
firms are family-owned and dominate the financial landscape. In contrast to the 
assertion of Shah and Butt (2009) that family owners in Pakistan are involved in 
favoritism and nepotism, Javid and Iqbal (2010) posited that family firms bring better 
monitoring and governance practices in Pakistan.  
In addition, Fama and Jensen (1983) presented a theoretical argument that family 
owners have the ability to mitigate classical agency conflicts between managers and 
owners. Therefore, this study is assuming that family ownership can strengthen the 
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pay-performance sensitivity and it can play a positive moderating role between 
performance-related indicators (firm performance, firm size, investment opportunities 
and market share) and CEO compensation. Although agency theorists argued that 
pay-performance link is not applicable in family firms as they are more prone to 
Type-II agency conflicts (between majority and minority shareholders) rather than 
Type-I agency conflicts (between agents and principals) but the study by Michiels, 
Voordeckers, Lybaert and Steijvers (2013) find the pay-performance evidence in US-
based family firms. Owing to the fact that Michiels et al. (2013) conducted their study 
in a developed country whose outcomes cannot be generalized on a developing 
country like Pakistan due to different legal structures and organizational culture, 
another study to test the role of family ownership in aligning performance-based 
measures with CEO‘s compensation in Pakistan is called for.  
Researchers have also asserted theoretical explanations pertaining to the link of 
institutional ownership with CEO compensation. Concerning the role of institutional 
investors in reducing agency problems, Smith and Swan (2014) have investigated the 
negative effect of institutional ownership on executives‘ pay. Researchers found that 
institutional investors possess different expertise and resources by which they can 
reduce the agency conflicts by supervising the actions of managers (Abed, Suwaidan, 
& Slimani, 2014; Lee & Chen, 2011) and they can also constrain CEOs‘ power in 
their pay-setting (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004).  
In order to fulfill their fiduciary obligation to enhance their shareholder‘s wealth, 
institutional investors control the executive‘s behaviors and corporate malpractices 
(Abernethy et al., 2014).Therefore, meta-analysis of van Essen, Otten and Carberry 
(2015) suggested that institutional ownership could positively moderate the 
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relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation. Consequently, by 
considering the previous theoretical and empirical evidences, this study hypothesized 
that institutional ownership can align the interests of executives with that of 
shareholders and thereby play active role in strengthening pay-performance link. 
According to researcher‘s best knowledge, the empirical evidence regarding this 
proposition is non-existent in the perspective of Pakistan. 
This study also incorporated the role of foreign investors in sustaining or developing 
pay-performance link. Contrary to the rent protection and restraining CEO 
overconfidence role of institutional investors, foreign investors pay their CEOs a high 
remuneration. Huang (2010) and Pan, Tian, Ma, Jun and Tang (2009) found positive 
relationship between foreign ownership and CEO compensation. Foreign investors 
pay CEOs a high compensation because they need an individual with effective skills 
who can enhance the firm performance. The evidences found by Javid and Iqbal 
(2010) from Pakistani firms also revealed that foreign investors are capable of 
sustaining better governance and monitoring practices, which is consistent with the 
theoretical argument of Eisenhardt (1989).  
Although foreign investors pay their CEOs comparatively high compensation as 
compared to other investors but it does not mean that they are against optimal 
contracting. There are some prior studies who provided evidences that foreign 
investors could influence domestic firms‘ owners to improve pay-performance link 
(Garner & Kim, 2011; Swatdikun, 2013). This contention was empirically tested by 
Colpan and Yoshikawa (2012) who found positive moderating role of foreign 
investors on the relationship between firm profitability and CEO‘s bonus pay. Along 
with this academic literature, it can be posited that foreign ownership could align the 
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performance-related indicators with CEO compensation. In order to design optimal 
contracting mechanism, prior studies in the context of Pakistan have also ignored the 
role of foreign ownership in pay-performance alignment.  
The effectiveness of overall corporate governance cannot be assessed without 
incorporating the board governance structure. The advocates of optimal contracting 
hypothesis argued that board of directors maximize shareholder value and minimize 
agency costs by actively monitoring the behaviors of executives (Grossman & Hart, 
1983, Holmstrom, 1979). Thus, researchers have illustrated the role of different board 
characteristics in influencing CEO compensation. In relation to a prior study by Fama 
and Jensen (1983), board of directors can diminish the agency problems by exercising 
their power in order to control and monitor management. However, different board 
characteristics could have different effect on CEO compensation. For instance, agency 
theorists have supported the inclusion of greater number of independent outside 
directors on the board. Consistent with agency theory, studies argued that independent 
board of directors could set the CEO compensation efficiently (Conyon, 2006).  
According to Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson (1998), independent directors are 
free of conflicts of interest and they are less sensitive to the influence of top 
management. Therefore, van Essen et al. (2015) suggested the positive moderating 
role of independent directors between firm performance and CEO compensation. 
Consequently, it is hypothesized that independent directors on the board could link 
the CEO compensation effectively with performance-based measures. This study is 
interested in testing this theorization empirically in the context of Pakistan due to lack 
of academic literature in this perspective.  
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Agency theory favored independent directors and optimal board size, however, very 
large supervisory board is not much effective which leads to inefficient CEO 
compensation structures (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). CEOs can easily manipulate and 
control overcrowded board size as they cannot function efficiently (Jensen, 1993; 
Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). Therefore, prior studies found positive relationship between 
CEO compensation and board size (Core et al., 1999; Cyert, Kang, & Kumar, 2002). 
Owing to the fact that higher level of board size could not actively monitor 
executives‘ behavior, studies found negative effect of board size on pay-performance 
link (Fahlenbrach, 2009; Ozkan, 2007). In the light of these theoretical and empirical 
evidences, this study assumes that board size could attenuate the pay-performance 
link. However, optimal board size (seven or eight members) could act as a better 
control mechanism (Jensen, 1993). Therefore, van Essen et al. (2015) revealed 
positive moderating effect of board size on the relationship between firm performance 
and CEO compensation. The aforementioned debate shows that the role of board size 
in aligning CEO pay with performance is inconclusive which calls for further study to 
reveal the definite effect of board size on pay-performance link especially in a 
developing economy like Pakistan.  
Prior studies also evaluated that when CEO‘s influence over the board increases, the 
compensation may also increase (Core et al., 1999; Hallock, 1997). As a result, this 
study has also considered the role of CEO duality as a sub-dimension of corporate 
governance mechanisms because this duality of positions place the CEO in a powerful 
position to oversee the firm direction and operations through which they could also 
influence their own compensation. Agency theory also discouraged the presence of 
CEO duality in efficient board structure as it feeds agency conflicts and leads to 
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CEO‘s opportunistic behavior. CEO‘s discretion and power may increase with CEO 
duality through which they could expropriate shareholder resources for their self-
interest (Peng, Zhang, & Li, 2007).  
Consistent with this argument, Fahlenbrach (2009) found that CEO duality negatively 
affect pay-performance sensitivity. On the other hand, the advocates of stewardship 
theory support the presence of CEO duality in board structure, therefore, Dorata and 
Petra (2008) revealed a positive moderating role of CEO duality between CEO 
compensation and firm performance in U.S. public listed companies. In contrast, van 
Essen et al. (2015) purported that CEO duality do not play a moderating role between 
firm performance and CEO compensation. Owing to these inconsistent arguments, 
there is a need of further study regarding the moderating role of CEO duality in 
aligning performance-based measures with CEO compensation.  
The aim of this study is to ensure the association of performance-based measures 
(operating performance, market performance, firm size, growth opportunities and 
market share) with CEO compensation in the capital market of Pakistan. Furthermore, 
this study is also interested in investigating the role of corporate governance (main 
control mechanism) and dividend policy (substitute control device) in aligning CEO 
compensation with performance-related indicators. There is a lack of academic 
literature especially in the reference of Pakistan, thus, this knowledge gap needs to be 
filled by a new research. 
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1.3 Research Questions 
This study will cover the aspects regarding elevation in CEO compensation by asking 
following central questions:  
1. Is there any significant influence of firm performance on CEO compensation? 
2. Is there any significant influence of firm characteristics on CEO 
compensation? 
3. Does dividend policy can act as moderate influence between firm performance 
and CEO compensation? 
4. Does dividend policy can act as moderate influence between firm 
characteristics and CEO compensation? 
5. Does corporate governance can act as a moderate influence between firm 
performance and CEO Compensation? 
6. Does corporate governance can act as a moderate influence between firm 
characteristics and CEO Compensation? 
1.4 Research Objectives 
Following are the proposed research objectives of this research: 
1. To examine the influencing role of firm performance on CEO compensation 
2. To examine the influencing role of firm characteristics on CEO compensation 
3. To examine the moderating role of dividend policy between firm performance 
and CEO compensation 
4. To examine the moderating role of dividend policy between firm 
characteristics and CEO compensation 
5. To examine the moderating role of corporate governance between firm 
performance and CEO compensation 
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6. To examine the moderating role of corporate governance between firm 
characteristics and CEO compensation 
1.5 Scope of the Study 
This study explores the conventional scope of CEO compensation studies. By 
utilizing the concept of agency theory, managerial power theory and free cash flow 
hypothesis, this study contains quantitative analysis for CEO compensation, firm 
performance, dividend policy, corporate governance and firm specific characteristics 
in the context of Pakistani industry. It is observed that in developing countries like 
Pakistan, firms are suffering from agency conflicts, which further affect their 
performance. Therefore, CEO compensation must be defensible and should be 
capable of creating value for shareholders.  Prior studies regarding CEO 
compensation in Pakistan do not fully explore the simultaneous natures of these 
factors. Moreover, the scope of these studies was also limited. Previous studies have 
collected the data from the firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE), Lahore 
Stock Exchange (LSE) and Islamabad Stock Exchange (ISE), however, this study has 
considered the companies from Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX). Basically, SECP 
merged all these three different stock exchanges (KSE, LSE and ISE) to shape one 
bigger and more efficient stock exchange (i.e. PSX) (Dawn, 2016).  
While studying the relationship between board structure and CEO compensation, 
Anjam (2011) have considered only Lahore Stock Exchange (LSE), which is a small 
stock market as compared to Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX). Moreover, he analyzed 
only year 2009 for the completion of their study. In addition, Iqbal et al. (2012) 
investigated the relationship between CEO Compensation and performance of 
Pakistani banks. The period of their study was 2000 to 2009 and they consider only 
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one sector, i.e. banking sector. In addition, the study by Younas et al. (2012) on the 
relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation employed the period 
from 2006 to 2009. However, this study will cover the period from 2010 to 2014. 
Moreover, to achieve the objectives of this study, data will be collected from all 
sectors listed in Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX). Subsequently, considering the 
omissions of previous literature, this study will define the role of dividend policy and 
corporate governance as moderators to bridge the gap between previous academic 
literatures and to assist practitioners in resolving principal-agent conflicts.  
1.6 Significance of the Study 
Excessive compensation of executives can precipitate or provoke agency conflicts, 
which can further affect an organization negatively. Moreover, weak corporate 
governance and weak dividend policy could lead agency conflicts to worse situation. 
Therefore, the extravagant elevation of CEO compensation is questionable. As CEOs 
are the most effective individuals of a firm, so they are held accountable for firm‘s 
performance. Nonetheless, if firm is not performing well and it is not paying dividend 
to shareholders then the elevation of the compensation cannot be justified. The chief 
contribution of this study is its analysis. This study revealed that if compensation of 
executives is aligned with firm characteristics and performance or the link is 
nonexistent in the companies of Pakistan. Furthermore, this research tested out the 
moderating influence of dividend policy on the relationship between performance-
based measures and CEO compensation. As per best knowledge of researchers, 
previous literature have not yet ensured the moderating role of dividend policy as if it 
can strengthen or weaken the pay-performance relationship.  
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In addition, prior literature demonstrated the effect of corporate governance on CEO 
compensation and agency problem. Therefore, it is expected that corporate 
governance moderate the relationship between independent and dependent variable of 
this study. These results revealed the effect of board and ownership in moderating the 
relationship between firm performance/characteristics and CEO compensation in the 
cultural context of Pakistan. The knowledge of this study could help in resolving 
principal-agent problems and could help practitioners, economists, managers, 
directors and academics to rethink about CEO compensation especially of Pakistan. In 
addition, this study can also help scholars in further studies as this study could 
effectively contribute in the body of knowledge. 
1.6.1 Theoretical Significance  
The model of the study is supported by the agency theory as excessive compensation 
creates principal-agent conflicts. According to agency theory, the dilemma of 
principal-agent occurs when agents (executives) work for their own interests rather 
than increment in principal (shareholder) value. Excessive compensation reflects this 
dilemma. Agency theory also contends that dividends can be employed as a substitute 
control device when ownership, board or governance provisions are unfavorable for 
shareholders. Furthermore, free cash flow hypothesis has utilized to justify the role of 
dividend policy in this study, which suggests that dividends can reduce agency costs 
and free cash flow so that managers could not exploit the funds. Therefore, inclusion 
of dividend policy underpins these two theories. Furthermore, by influencing board or 
pay-setting process, CEOs effectively set their own compensation. Therefore, 
managerial power theory is also vital to discuss in the perspective of this study. It is 
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expected that the variables utilized in the study will contribute and support these three 
theories.   
1.6.2 Practical Significance 
Institutions of Pakistan should improve the compensation practices of CEOs. 
Although, compensation motivates CEOs to perform better but the excessive 
compensation can create severe agency conflicts. Therefore, there must be efficient 
compensation plan. Additionally, considering the role of strong corporate governance 
and dividend policy will suggest some practical implications for the interested 
organizations and researchers. This study could also assist central bank of Pakistan, 
SECP and compensation committees of public private bodies to design an efficient 
plan of compensation by linking it to firm characteristics and firm performance. 
Moreover, the results related to the moderating role of dividend policy and corporate 
governance can also guide practitioners in developing innovative and productive 
compensation plan to reduce agency conflicts in the firms.  
1.8 Organization of the Chapters 
This thesis has organized into five chapters. First chapter is related to introduction. It 
includes background of the study, problem statement, research objectives, research 
questions, scope of the study and significance (theoretical and practical) of the study. 
Second chapter includes literature review regarding dependent, independent and 
moderating variables. Chapter three briefly describes the methodology of the research. 
This chapter consists of research framework, hypothesis development, sampling and 
units of analysis that are employed to evaluate the results. Chapter four is related to 
hypothesis testing and results of the study and lastly, Chapter five elaborates the 
results related to the moderating role of dividend policy and corporate goveinance can 
also guide practitioners in developing innovative and productive compensation plan to 
reduce agency conflicts in the firms. 
1.8 Organization of the Chapters 
This thesis has organized into five chapters. First chapter is related to introduction. It 
includes background of the study, problem statement, research objectives, research 
questions, scope of the study and significance (theoretical and practical) of the study. 
Second chapter includes literature review regarding dependent, independent and 
moderating variables. Chapter three briefly describes the methodology of the research. 
This chapter consists of research framework, hypothesis development, sampling and 
units of analysis that are employed to evaluate the results. Chapter four is related to 
hypothesis testing and results of the study and lastly, Chapter five elaborates the 
discussion, limitations, implications, future recommendations and conclusion of the 
study. 
1.9 Summary of the Chapter 
Excessive elevation of CEO compensation in Pakistan has observed in Pakistan, which 
brings out agency conflicts in the organizations. This chapter identified the problem 
and research gap and thereafter created the researchable objectives and questions to 
precede the study. Furthermore, this chapter ascertains the moderating role of corporate 
governance and dividend policy in the perspective of firm performance, characteristics 
and CEO compensation. Additionally, this chapter involves the scope and significance 
of the study. Significance of the study has further categorized into two domains, 
theoretical significance and practical significance for the ease of related readers. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.0 Introduction 
A constant shifts and modifications in management strategies, policies, outside forces 
and boards over the past several years have transformed the face of executive 
compensation. This chapter reviews the different strands of opinions identified by prior 
researchers, to explain the determinants of CEO compensation and the role of different 
moderators between these relationships. The purpose of the literature is to evaluate 
different CEO pay-setting strategies in different countries and to examine solution for 
agency conflicts proposed by previous studies. The chapter starts with the underpinning 
theories of the study and later discuss the relationship between independent and 
. dependent variables and role of moderating variables between them through previous 
academic literature. 
2.1 Underpinning Theories 
Researchers have utilized different theories to support their argument regarding CEO 
compensation and agency conflicts. However, in the context of this study, four theories 
are considered to underpin the arguments. These theories include agency theory, 
stewardship theory, managerial power theory and free cash flow hypothesis. 
2.1.1 Agency theory 
Agency theory cannot be neglected while discussing executive compensation. 
Although, different theorists (e.g. Berle & Means, 1932; Eisenhardt, 1989) tried to 
propose other approaches in the context of executive pay, but agency theory introduced 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976), remained the focal point of most of the studies. This 
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independent and dependent variables and role of moderating variables between them 
through previous academic literature.  
2.1 Underpinning Theories 
Researchers have utilized different theories to support their argument regarding CEO 
compensation and agency conflicts. However, in the context of this study, four 
theories are considered to underpin the arguments. These theories include agency 
theory, stewardship theory, managerial power theory and free cash flow hypothesis.  
2.1.1 Agency theory  
Agency theory cannot be neglected while discussing executive compensation. 
Although, different theorists (e.g. Berle & Means, 1932; Eisenhardt, 1989) tried to 
propose other approaches in the context of executive pay, but agency theory 
introduced by Jensen and Meckling (1976), remained the focal point of most of the 
studies. This theory argued that separation of ownership and control establishes 
overwhelming power of executives in the firms. With the advent of agency theory, 
researchers started focusing on optimal contracting (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997) 
based on pay-performance, market forces and behavior (Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 
1998; Gomez-Mejia, 1994).  
Agency theory is based on conflicts of interests between the different contracting 
parties including debt holders, the corporate managers and the shareholders (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Moreover, it is also a very worthy addition to organizational theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1989), because it broadens the concept of organizational theory by 
involving principle-agent problem. In academic literature, agency theory is considered 
as a ―black box‖, which enhances the value and profits of the firm. Jensen and 
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Meckling (1976) principals (shareholders) cannot manage operations of all their 
businesses due to diversified portfolio, therefore, they hire manager or executives to 
perform operational duties on their behalf. Additionally, principals also offer some 
decision-making rights to these agents within this contract. Gomez-Mejia and 
Wiseman (1997) demonstrate three fundamental assumptions of agency model, i.e. 1) 
The interests of agents are not aligned with principals, 2) Agents behave according to 
self-interest assumptions, and 3) Agents are risk averse.  
According to aforementioned assumptions, the aim of agency theory is to regulate the 
best contract to administer the relationship between principal and agent. These 
contracts could be of two types, i.e. outcome oriented or behavior oriented. Outcome 
oriented contracts consists of performance-based compensation, e.g. commissions or 
stock options and behavior oriented contracts involves hierarchical governance and 
fixed basic salaries (Eisenhardt, 1989). Usually, there are two types of general agency 
problems. First agency problem involves goal related conflicts between agent and 
principal or it may arises when monitoring and agency costs of principals may 
increase. The second agency problem is related to different risk taking and sharing 
preferences, when agent and principal perceive risks in a different way (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  
In addition, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that agents (CEOs) do not make the 
optimal decisions until and unless they are actively monitored by board and their 
interests are aligned with the interests of shareholders. The theory suggested that 
behaviors of agents can be controlled if their compensation will be align with firm 
performance. Consequently, this study has considered various accounting and market 
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based measures to ensure their association with CEO compensation in the reference of 
Pakistan.  
Agency theory is also in the support of the argument that efficient corporate 
governance restrict CEO‘s opportunistic behavior, mitigate agency conflicts and 
eventually improve the firm performance. In order to incorporate best corporate 
governance practices, board of directors should be composed of a majority 
independent directors and there should be no CEO duality. Moreover, there should be 
optimal level of board size and dispersed ownership structure (Fama, 1980; Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The interests of the CEO may 
dominate shareholders‘ interests in the case of CEO duality, lower level of 
independent directors‘ representation and overcrowded board. When corporate 
governance structures are weak, CEO‘s could influence their own compensation. 
Consistent with agency theory, Bonazzi and Islam (2007) revealed that proper 
monitoring of CEO by board could resolve the agency conflicts and enhance the 
performance.  
Agency theorists are also in the favor of the notion that ownership should be dispersed 
or else majority shareholders may expropriate the rights of minority shareholders. In 
addition, different types of ownerships may have different expertise to deal with the 
certain dilemma within an organization. For instance, family owners have the 
capability to mitigate classical agency conflicts (Adams, Almeida, & Ferreira, 2009; 
Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Palia, Ravid, & Wang, 2008; Villalonga 
& Amit, 2006), institutional owners actively monitor the behaviors of executives 
(Abernethy et al., 2014; Croci, Gonenc, & Ozkan, 2012; Hartzell & Starks, 2003) and 
foreign investors are usually arms-length investors and most of the times play active 
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monitoring role (Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2005; Yoshikawa, Rasheed, & Del Brio, 
2010). Therefore, it is posited that the combined structure of these ownerships could 
develop better corporate governance practices within an organization.   
Consistent with the propositions of agency theory, firms with strong corporate 
governance   could have lesser agency conflicts (Core et al., 1999). However, the 
theory also argued that dividend policy can be utilized as a substitute control device in 
the presence of weak corporate governance mechanisms (Haye, 2014). Thus, in the 
light of agency perspective, this study has incorporated corporate governance and 
dividend policy which could align the interests of executives (CEO compensation) 
with that of shareholders (performance-related measures). Although agency theory is 
an empirically testable, realistic and unique approach but Eisenhardt (1985) suggested 
that other theories should also be used along with agency theory to go beyond the 
economics literature.  
2.1.2 Stewardship Theory 
Oppose to agency theory‘s assumption of managerial opportunistic, Donaldson (1990) 
proposed an alternative theory regarding managerial behavior. All executives or 
managers may not be motivated toward monitory benefits only but they also possess 
sense of responsibility, altruism or achievement. Contrary to the postulation of agency 
theory, Donaldson and Davis (1991) argued that managers want to maintain their 
position as stewards in the organization. Therefore, stewardship theory suggested that 
there are certain situational and psychological factors involve through which some 
executives chase organizational interests even when they conflict with the self-
centeredness, thereby, compensation mechanisms proposed by agency theory could be 
ineffectual in this scenario. Owing to the organizational centered behaviors of these 
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executive, they receive lower level of compensation (Davis, Schoorman, & 
Donaldson, 1997).    
Contrary to the agency perspective, stewardship theory support the CEO duality 
structure on the board. With the unity of command, the decision could be made in a 
faster and efficient manner in the presence of CEO duality (Donaldson & Davis, 
1991). The theory also discouraged the presence of independent outside directors on 
the board due to its assumption that executive directors or managers are self-
motivated and they work in the best interest of shareholders to maximize their returns. 
Non-independent directors have non-financial motives such as strong work ethic, 
satisfaction, recognition and achievement (Muth & Donaldson, 1998).  
In this case, external control and monitoring are unnecessary which increase 
organizational fixed cost. Therefore, according to the theory, independent directors 
are less committed to the organizational goals which eventually decrease the firm‘s 
performance (Muth & Donaldson, 1998). As stewardship theory favors insiders over 
outsiders, therefore, it provide positive postulations for family ownership as compared 
to other types of ownership structures. This theory is included in the study to ensure if 
the corporate governance structures in Pakistan are inclined toward stewardship or 
managerial opportunism.  
2.1.3 Managerial Power Theory 
The managerial power theory was initiated by the concept of Galbraith (1967) who 
coined a term ―managerial capitalism‖ in his book. According to this concept on the 
directional and decisional process, managers get more influence and power than 
shareholders. Researchers further try to focus on the importance and critical points of 
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this theory (Bebchuk & Fried 2004; 2006; Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, 2002; Jensen & 
Murphy, 2010).  
Through managerial approach to executive compensation, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) 
stated that there is ―pay without performance‖. From this approach, it can be 
purported that managerial compensation is not the solution for agency conflicts but it 
is a part of principal-agent problem. In the companies who possess many small 
shareholders, managers influence their own compensation. According to Bebchuk and 
Fried (2003), managers are awarded well when firm performance increase but they 
are not punished when they perform low due to dispersed ownership. Therefore, 
managerial power theory suggests that executive compensation is not the ultimate 
implementation to align the interests of managers and shareholders. This theory 
contradicts the agency theory.  
Managerial power approach is associated with rent extraction. The managers who get 
more power get more rents. Bebchuk et al. (2002) defined rents as the compensation 
received under optimal contracting. Under this theory, managers receive 
compensation by manipulating stakeholders and shareholders, which is not associated 
to firm performance. Therefore, this theory is valuable to consider in this study as 
results from previous study by Younas et al. (2012) related to CEO compensation in 
Pakistan has supported managerial power theory. In the absence of pay-performance 
link, excessive CEO compensation and high CEO power, the explanation of 
managerial power theory can be utilized to explain the phenomenon.  
32 
 
2.1.4 Free Cash Flow Hypothesis  
Free cash flow is the excess funds that remain in the company‘s balance, after all the 
activities that keep the company running. These excess funds or free cash flow can be 
utilized for future investment or this amount can be paid to equity and debt holders of 
the company. However, managers or executives can misuse or manipulate these funds 
by increasing their remuneration. These managers can also invest these funds in 
negative NPV projects (Emerenciana, 2012).  Jensen (1986) has introduced free cash 
flow hypothesis in which he argued that the use of debts could decrease agency costs 
or free cash flow because funds for new projects can be acquired from other financial 
institution like banks that have a better position in the administrating of corporate 
activities.  
In addition, overinvestment problem can also be caused by free cash flow. For 
Instance, Richardson (2006) found that when free cash flow are high there are 
probability of overinvestment by managers as he revealed high correlation between 
free cash flows and overinvestment. Moreover, high amount of free cash flow means 
the company has high agency costs. Managers can use free cash flow for empire 
building or overinvestment, which further effect shareholder value negatively. 
Additionally, paying dividends to shareholders is also the solution for agency 
conflicts as it leads to lower free cash flows and lower agency costs (Emerenciana, 
2012).  Easterbrook (1984) also purported that dividend can be utilized to avoid 
misusing funds by executives. To meet the needs of new investment opportunities, 
executives approach capital market for funds. This effort would impose a discipline 
on the managers and thus reduce the cost of monitoring the managers or executives. 
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Consistent with this hypothesis, dividends can reduce agency conflicts and could also 
be utilized as a substitute control device.  
2.2 CEO Compensation  
There are number of players involve in a modern corporate structure such as 
shareholders and managers to improve team effort (Brealey & Myers, 2003). In a 
previous study by Jensen and Meckling (1976), an issue regarding the conflict of 
interest between owners and managers was identified. These authors also tried to 
propose some strategies to resolve these conflicts. In the business world, principals 
who either lack necessary skills to operate business functions or they are not willing 
to manage them may hire an individual who is skilled and has good ideas to produce 
and distribute the product in the capital market. Nonetheless, it does not mean that 
concerns of both of the parties are same; they may be different and could cause 
agency conflicts (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Managers could be risk-averse or they 
avoid involving themselves in profitable projects because of additional efforts but 
shareholders want to maximize their wealth through these projects.  
Various theories can be found in academic literature which discussed how top 
managers and executives should be compensated. For instance, tournament theory 
was presented by Lazear and Rosen (1981) in which they did not consider high 
executive compensation as a dilemma. They purported that CEO has the highest rank 
in the company and take pay as a prize. Sub-ordinates or lower level managers should 
consider CEO‘s disproportionate pay as the motivation. They need to work hard, win 
the tournament and be promoted. The disproportionate size of CEO‘s pay motivate 
other employees to make more achievements and reach the final level (Rosen, 1986). 
Tournament theory revealed positive effect of compensation gap on firm 
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performance. This theory argued that greater compensation gap between employees 
and CEO is essential because it align the interest between agents and principals and 
eventually lower the monitoring costs.  
Contrary to the assumptions of tournament theory, equity theory argued that managers 
should rewarded according to their effort and contribution toward the firm (Gerhart, 
Minkoff, & Olsen, 1995). These executive should compare their return-contribution 
ratio to efforts of insiders and outsiders of the firm in order to receive their 
compensation. Nonetheless, the feeling of inequity may emerge, if CEO observe a 
higher compensation of other CEO‘s in same industry and with the same capabilities 
(Gerhart et al., 2005). Although there are numerous theories which explain the 
determinants of executive compensation by agency theory is still dominant in 
academic literature. Previous studies in this context tried to build a link between CEO 
compensation and its determinants.  
Gomez-Mejia, Tosi and Hinkin (1987) explored the impact of ownership structure on 
executive compensation. They developed a two-factor model by utilizing performance 
measures of 17 companies listed on the S&P‘s. They posited that dominant owners 
with major shareholding can influence executive compensation. In addition, outside 
blockholders also have the motivational and discretion to align the compensation of 
CEO with firm performance. On the similar notion, Carr (1997) also examined the 
determinants of CEO compensation in small firms. He considered the sample size of 
31 companies and found risk, profitability and sales as the key determinants of CEO 
compensation. Carr (1997) also employed certain board and ownership variables but 
did not find their significant role in aligning pay-performance link.  
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With regard to executive compensation, the study of Core et al. (1999) is very 
prominent. They explored the association between ownership structure, board 
characteristics and executive compensation. They investigated 205 US public listed 
firms and found that ownership and board structure have significant impact on CEO 
compensation. Core et al. (1999) revealed that weak corporate governance structures 
influence stock return and operating performance negatively and also give rise to 
agency conflicts. A study by Elloumi and Gueyié (2001) was also reviewed in which 
they tried to find the association between investment opportunity set and CEO 
compensation through 415 Canadian firms. They asserted that firms with greater 
investment opportunities, pay their CEO‘s a higher compensation.  
Gu and Kim (2009) employed US airlines firms to examine the determinants of CEO 
compensation. They assessed that firm size and revenue efficiency are the important 
predictors of CEO compensation. Larger sized firms pay a higher compensation to 
their CEOs and the presence of positive link between revenue efficiency and CEO 
compensation exhibits pay-performance principle in airline industry of United States. 
Lee and Chen (2011) also investigated the determinants of CEO compensation in 
Taiwan public listed firms. By applying panel data analysis, they asserted that firm 
risk, firm age and R&D expenditures have significant negative relationship with CEO 
compensation, however, performance, institutional ownership, board size and firm 
size have positive influence over CEO compensation.  
The study by Wang, Frostburg and Providence (2013) employed 1622 firms and 
found that firm size, investment opportunities, accounting earning performance and 
international diversification have positive effect on CEO compensation. Abed et al. 
(2014) considered 266 Jordanian listed companies under investigation to analyze the 
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determinants of CEO compensation in Amman Stock Exchange. They argued that 
CEO tenure, board size and firm size have positive influence in the variation of CEO 
compensation. Nonetheless, negative relationship between CEO compensation and 
CEO age was demonstrated by their results. In brief, most of the studies have 
considered ownership structures, board characteristics, firm performance and firm 
characteristics to explain the variation in CEO compensation. Nonetheless, owing to 
weak financial disclosure policy in Pakistan, this study has chosen the factors for 
which the data is publicly available in the context of Pakistan.  
2.3 Firm Performance 
The pay-performance link is thought to be crucial because the separation between 
management and ownership in firms gives rise to agency conflicts in which managers 
chase self-regard over the shareholder value (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Consistent 
with agency theory, many researchers propose that efficient compensation design can 
resolve this problem (Bizjak, Lemmon, & Naveen, 2008; Gabaix & Landier, 2008; 
Hall & Liebman, 1998; Himmelberg & Hubbard, 2000; Kaplan, 2008; Kaplan & 
Rauh, 2010). The relation between CEO compensation and firm performance has 
been a topic of extensive controversy in previous academic literature. Researchers 
found mixed empirical results pertaining to their relationship (e.g. Ang, Cole, & Lin, 
2000; Cole & Mehran, 1998; Grossman & Hart, 1983; Himmelberg, Hubbard, & 
Palia, 1998; Holmstrom, 1979; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Saunders, Strock, & Travlos, 
1990).  
There are a number of studies, which provide empirical evidences in relation to CEO 
pay alignment with performance. By employing 75 executives from Standard and 
Poor‘s financial data for the period 1981 to 1986, Abowd (1990) found that increased 
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performance sensitivity in compensation leads to better market-based and economic 
performance. Similarly, based on 299 UK listed firms, Conyon and Freeman (2004) 
found positive relationship between market performance and CEO compensation. 
Through quantile regression model analyzed on non-financial firms, a current study 
by Li, Yang and Yu (2015) examines the positive impact of CEO compensation on 
firm performance in the higher earning quantile level firms.  
Correspondingly, by utilizing the sample of 30 U.S. restaurant firms, Dalbor, Oak and 
Rowe (2010) found evidence relating compensation alignment with performance. In 
the same U.S. industry, Demirer and Yuan (2013) revealed that compensation only in 
the form of bonuses and non-equity positively affects restaurant firm performance. In 
addition, Ghosh (2010) employed cross-section data to explore the link between firm 
performance and CEO compensation on Indian manufacturing firm for the year 2007. 
He observed the significant pay for performance sensitivity estimates but magnitude 
was smaller.  
In contrast, many researchers determine evidences that are consistent with ―skimming 
view‖ or managerial power vis-à-vis executive compensation. On that account, Core 
et al. (1999) employed 205 publicly traded U.S. firms to reveal a negative association 
between excessive executive compensation and subsequent market and operating 
performance. Parallel to this study, on the basis of executive compensation datasets of 
1441 Standard and Poor's firms, Brick et al. (2006) found empirical evidence 
persistent with cronyism hypothesis. Moreover, they suggest that excessive 
compensation leads to value destruction and it is an indication of agency conflicts in a 
firm.  
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Along the same lines, Malmendier and Tate (2009) coined a term, ―superstar CEOs‖ 
for those chief executives who extract and enjoy the bulk of compensation. In line 
with managerial power theory, they also found underperformance of firm‘s market 
and accounting performance due to these superstar CEOs. Furthermore, over the 
period from 1998 to 2010, Balafas and Florackis (2014) examine the ex-post 
consequences of CEO compensation for shareholder value with a sample size of 1787 
U.K. listed firms. Through panel data regressions, they ascertain the negative 
relationship of excess CEO compensation with future operating performance and 
short-term subsequent returns of firm. Likewise, Cooper, Gulen and Rau (2013) also 
found the negative affect of excess CEO compensation on future shareholder return 
by utilizing a sample size of NASDAQ, AMEX and NYSE firms.  
Additionally, Banker, Darrough, Huang and Plehn-Dujowich (2013) establish a 
fundamental two-period principal-agent model with adverse selection and moral 
hazard from the period 1993-2006. They determine a positive relationship of CEO 
salary with future performance. However, they purported that current bonus has a 
negative relationship with both future and past performance as bonus include adverse 
selection problems and moral hazards which detach agents into contracts with 
different levels of risk. However, in the context of developing countries, majority of 
the studies revealed no association of firm performance with CEO compensation. For 
instance, with a sample size of 46 Kenyan listed firms, Erick, Kefah and Nyaoga 
(2014) found no significant association between CEO compensation and firm 
performance.  
By the same token, most of the studies conducted in a transitional economy like 
Pakistan do not find any relation between CEO compensation and firm performance.  
39 
 
By computing common effect model on 114 KSE listed companies, Shah, Javed and 
Abbas (2009) found no significant relationship of firm performance variables with 
CEO compensation. Similarly, Anjam (2011) also discovered that listed firms in 
Pakistan have no association with firm performance.  However, holding the 
managerial power theory, Younas et al. (2012) revealed negative association of CEO 
compensation with firm performance by performing fixed effects regression on 151 
KSE listed companies. Therefore, it can be concluded from previous studies that 
agency conflicts in Pakistan prevails due to absence of pay-performance link, back 
scratching and cronyism. There is only one study by Yahya and Ghazali (2015) which 
revealed positive association of operating and market performance with CEO 
compensation in the financial sector of Pakistan. However, it is still not clear if other 
sectors of Pakistani capital market have aligned their CEO‘s compensation with firm 
performance. This study proposed that CEO compensation should be aligned with 
both operating and market performance indicators, therefore, both measures are 
considered in the study.   
2.3.1 Operating Performance 
Operating performance measures are designed to assess various characteristics of a 
firm‘s central operations. These measures evaluate the firm‘s efficiency, liquidity and 
the ability to use resources to generate sales. Higher value of these ratios indicates 
efficiency of firm to generate high level of cash flows as well as revenues (Fabozzi & 
Markowitz, 2002). There are only a hand full of studies who separately discussed the 
effect of operating and market performance on CEO compensation (Balafas & 
Florackis, 2014; Cooper, Gulen, & Rau, 2010; Core et al., 1999; Ju & Ge, 2010; 
Malmendier & Tate, 2009; Raithatha & Komera, 2016).  
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Directors believe that the best measure of firm performance is shareholder return 
while CEOs consider accounting-based operating measures more effectual because 
CEO‘s could directly influence operating performance rather than stock returns 
(Donatiello, Larcker, & Tayan, 2016). Majority of U.S. based firms have tied their 
CEO‘s compensation with market-based performance measures to align the interests 
of shareholders and management, however, some companies believe that these 
measures reflect little operating efficiency and can be influenced by buybacks. In this 
case, operating performance measures are more suitable (Brettell, Gaffen, & Rohde, 
2015).  
Nonetheless, there is a possibility that CEOs could indulge in myopic acts and 
manipulate accounting-based measures to enhance their equity-based incentives 
(Denis, Hanouna, & Sarin, 2006; Harris & Bromiley, 2007). Owing to the earning‘s 
manipulation evidences from Pakistan (Iqbal, Khan, & Ahmed, 2015; Tabassum, 
Kaleem, & Nazir, 2014), this study suggests that CEO compensation should also be 
aligned with market-based measures in Pakistan.  
2.3.2 Market Performance  
Market performance can be simply defined as the behavior of an asset or security in 
the marketplace. It is also the indication of organizational contribution toward 
economic welfare optimization (Huang, 2007). Aligning market performance with 
CEO compensation could testify the postulation of optimal contracting in a 
competitive market for managerial talent (Frydman & Jenter, 2010). Calcagno and 
Heider (2007) believed that the share price aggregates speculators‘ dispersed 
information and thereby assess the performance of executives before the 
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materialization of firm‘s long-term performance which is a major advantage of 
market-based compensation.  
The preferences of different organizational stakeholder groups could be different but 
their ultimate goals is to enhance their market returns. These shareholders want their 
CEOs to enhance their market returns, therefore, they are in the favor of linking 
CEO‘s pay with market performance despite of the different managerial perspective 
(Veliyath & Bishop, 1995). Accounting-based measures are backward-looking and 
historical and usually do not take risk, cost of capital and intangible assets into 
account.  
Furthermore, these measure may encourage earnings manipulation, short-term 
decisions and can be distorted by inflation (Aliabadi, Dorestani, & Balsara, 2013), on 
the other hand, efficient market hypothesis suggested that stock prices fully reflect all 
available information (Fama, 1970). Although self-centered executives may fool the 
market by propping up their share prices through various techniques and then cash out 
their equity holdings (Hall, 2003) but still market performance measures cannot be 
manipulated easily by managers. Therefore, this study is in favor of the argument that 
CEO‘s compensation should also be aligned with market performance.  
2.4 Firm Size  
Larger firms need more efficient, costly and talented administration (Rosen, 1982). 
Therefore, numerous authors found that large size of firm is positively correlated with 
executive compensation (Baker, Jensen, & Murphy, 1988; Banghøj, Gabrielsen, 
Petersen, & Plenborg, 2010; Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome, & Weintrop, 2007; Gomez-
Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, & Makri, 2003; Ke, Petroni, & Safieddine, 1999; Young & 
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Tsai, 2008). In a competitive market or efficient firm, CEO compensation is 
determined and it reflects the size of corporations affected by aptitude (Gabaix, 
Landier, & Sauvagnat, 2014). Researchers found that firm size is one of the major 
determinants of CEO compensation. For instance, through meta-analysis, Tosi et al. 
(2000) show that firm size comprise over and above 40 percent of the variance in total 
compensation of CEO. 
Baker et al. (1988) revealed that CEO compensation increase when CEOs increase the 
firm size even if the firm‘s market value decreases due to increase in size. However, 
Murphy (1999) demonstrated that the pay-size link has destabilized over time. 
Moreover, by examining U.S. public firms, Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) determined 
that increase in firm size leads to increase in CEO compensation. Nevertheless, they 
have not observed reduction in CEO pay with decrease in firm size. In addition, they 
also concluded that even with irrational decisions, compensation of CEO escalates 
with firm size. In like manner, the study of Nourayi and Mintz (2008) which consists 
of 1446 Standard and Poor‘s listed companies also provide evidence that firm size is a 
significant explanatory factor for the compensation of CEO despite performance and 
CEO‘s tenure.  
In addition, Abed et al. (2014) found positive relationship between compensation of 
CEO and firm size in Jordanian corporations. Similarly, Conyon (2014) determined a 
positive correlation between firm size and executive pay. Additionally, Siglar (2011) 
employ 280 New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) listed firms from the period 2006 to 
2009 and concludes that firm size is a most significant determinant of CEO 
compensation. However, in case of technology companies listed in NYSE, Nulla 
(2012) has not found any association between firm size and CEO compensation. 
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Brenner and Schwalbach (2003) illustrated positive relationship between firm size and 
CEO compensation in German firms though they revealed negative relationship in the 
perspective of UK firms. Moreover, Aduha (2011) found negative relationship 
between firm size and CEO compensation in Kenyan listed firms. He suggests that 
negative correlation is due to the capping of executive compensation to ensure 
maximization of returns to shareholders. 
Prior evidences show that the prosperity to grow firm size is related to agency 
conflicts (Jensen, 1986) because CEOs try attain large targets to enhance firm size, 
which is a sign of empire building (Darrough, Guler, & Wang, 2014). Moreover, 
according to Grinstein and Hribar (2004) executives obtain large targets, which 
subsequently diminish the economic value of goodwill, consequently, compensation 
committee can respond more pessimistically toward executives who attain large 
targets as compared to those CEOs who focus on small targets. Consequently, it is 
assumed that strong link between firm size and CEO compensation is itself a cause of 
agency conflicts. Therefore, previous studies pertaining to relation between CEO 
compensation and firm size revealed significant positive relationship between these 
two variables (Hussain, Obaid, & Khan, 2014; Iqbal, et al., 2012; Shah, et al., 2009). 
This study does not discourage the alignment of CEO compensation with firm size as 
large firms need managerial talent to sustain in the competitive market, however, their 
pay should not be solely associated with firm size. Moreover, the effect size on the 
relationship between firm size and CEO compensation should not dominate the other 
performance metrics.   
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2.5 Growth Opportunities  
Growth opportunities can be deemed as future possibilities for investments, which 
should be magnificent for the firm. Therefore, firms with high growth opportunities 
and operational complexity demand high quality CEOs (Chalmers, Koh, & Stapledon, 
2006). Consequently, several researchers proved that the firms with higher growth or 
investment opportunities, pay their CEOs a high level of compensation (e.g. Elloumi 
& Gueyié, 2001; Kim & Suh, 1993; Sloan, 1993; Wang et al., 2013). 
Additionally, Baber, Janakiraman and Kang (1996) evaluated the results from 1,249 
publicly traded U.S. firms that firms with greater investment opportunities have 
stronger pay-performance link. Furthermore, based on the results of 217 firms, Ittner, 
Lambert and Larcker (2003) found positive relationship between stock-based 
compensation and growth compensation. However, Yermack (1995) revealed a 
negative relationship as he argued that high growth corporations do not just rely on 
short-term performance so they favor equity-based compensation to ensure long-term 
performance.  
Similarly, John and John (1993) also argued that companies with higher growth or 
investment opportunities pay their CEOs a high level of compensation. In addition, 
consistent with agency theory, Conyon and He (2008) found positive relationship 
between growth opportunities and CEO compensation by employing 1481 Chinese 
listed companies. However, Smith and Watts (1992) argued that CEO monitoring in 
the firms with higher growth opportunities is not a simple job because managers are 
familiar with the value of growth opportunities confidential information. Therefore, 
firms offer high compensation to the CEOs to retain the information in the company. 
The relationship between growth opportunities and CEO compensation is not widely 
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studies topic in Pakistani reference. There is only one study by Yahya and Ghazali 
(2015) who found that CEO compensation in financial sector of Pakistan is positively 
aligned with growth opportunities.  
2.6 Market Share  
Despite of widened opportunities in developing economies, further obstacles in 
maintaining and developing competitive and customer captivity has increased. Over a 
decade ago, the competition was not much tough, however, now managers, executives 
and firms need to work harder to gain greater market share. Moreover, the price for 
top talent rises, if demand for market share increases and supply of executive talent 
remains limited. Increased competition affects the pay incentives which firms provide 
to their managers and may also affect overall pay structure (Ferreira, 2015).  
It is observed that these days some corporations are aligning market share with their 
CEOs compensation. For instance, General Motors has reshaped their executive 
compensation based on market share (Phillips, 2014). However, according to 
WorldatWork (2007, p. 298), if managers will be compensated for increasing market 
share then the firm can get higher market share but at the cost of reduced shareholder 
value and reduced incomes. Furthermore, Ross, Westerfield and Jordan (2008) argued 
that only managers of the low-cost producers in the industry could get successful in 
enhancing market share in the long-run. Therefore, it can also be purported that if 
executive compensation is aligned with market share, the company would be cost-
effective. Previously, while discussing firm characteristics for their study, Pindado et 
al. (2010) also employed market share along with size and growth. Nevertheless, 
according to author‘s best knowledge, no previous study has discussed the direct 
relationship between market share and CEO compensation.  
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2.7 Corporate Governance 
Previous studies show that strong corporate governance plays an important role in 
diminishing agency conflicts and aligning pay with performance. For instance, Core 
et al. (1999) measures the amount of cross-sectional variation in CEO compensation 
with ownership and board characteristics. They found that due to weak corporate 
governance CEOs earn higher compensation based on 205 publicly traded U.S. firms. 
Moreover, they also suggest that weak corporate governance leads to agency conflicts 
and can negatively affect the operating and market performance. Parallel to this study, 
many researchers explain corporate governance mechanisms with ownership structure 
and board characteristics (e.g. Bekiris, 2013; Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Tusiime, 
Nkundabanyanga, & Nkote, 2011).  
2.7.1 Board Characteristics  
Through literature review, three characteristics of board have been evaluated to 
pursue this study due to their stronger influence on CEO compensation and principal-
agent problem. These three characteristics include board independence, board size and 
CEO duality.  
2.7.1.1 Board Independence  
Researchers have denoted board independence as the percentage of independent 
directors on the board (e.g. Davidson III & Rowe, 2004; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; 
Rechner & Dalton, 1986, p. 89; Wang, 2014; Wang, Zhao, & Wei, 2006). Agency 
theorists have argued that company board should include independent board of 
directors (Zahra & Pearce, 1989) because they are free of conflicts of interest and less 
sensitive to the influence of corporate insiders (Dalton et al., 1998). 
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Moreover, studies have revealed a dynamic role of independent directors in resolving 
agency conflicts through efficient executive pay setting. By utilizing 362 from 2001 
to 2004 and 492 from 2005 to 2007 Chinese listed firms, Zhu, Tian, Gang and Ma 
(2009) found that independent board directors generate a stronger association between 
firm performance and executive compensation. Similarly, Conyon and He (2011) 
determined that firms with greater independent directors have stronger pay-
performance link. By employing 1381 Chinese public listed companies, they also 
purported that independent directors can replace the CEO if they perform poorly.  
Moreover, while studying the determinants of CEO compensation in 20 U.K. public 
listed companies from the period 2008 to 2010, Buigut, Soi and Koskei (2015) 
discovered that increase in independent board directors could decrease the level of 
CEO compensation. However, on contrary, Wan (2003) do not find any association of 
independent directors with corporate performance or executive compensation in U.S. 
public listed firms. In addition, a study conducted by Capezio, Shields and O‘Donnell 
(2011) through a random sample of 283 S&P 500 listed companies, revealed that 
proportion of independent directors on the board are not effective in lowering the cash 
compensation or increasing the incentive based compensation. Moreover, they also 
discussed that independent directors do not moderate the relationship between CEO 
compensation and stock returns.  
 Nonetheless, a recent meta-analysis of 219 U.S. based studies by van Essen et al. 
(2015) suggests that independent directors can positively moderate the relationship 
between CEO compensation and firm performance as CEOs receive lower 
compensation in case of powerful board and the pay-performance link would be 
tighter in that case. In the same lines, Chee-Wooi and Chwee-Ming (2010) also 
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suggested that independent directors strengthen the pay-performance relationship if 
they are in majority. The aforementioned debate derived the argument that 
independent directors provide effective monitoring role and eventually moderate the 
relationship between performance-related indicators (firm performance and 
characteristics) and CEO compensation.   
2.7.1.2 Board Size  
According to van Essen et al. (2015), board size has the greatest effect on CEO 
compensation after firm size. In the academic literature, it is argued that ascribe to 
peer culture, board of directors seek to evade the conflicts with CEO. Jensen (1983) 
argued that to fulfil the functions of board, board size is a crucial determinant of board 
effectiveness. Additionally, he also suggested that there should be at least eight 
members of board to function effectively. However, due to large board size, problems 
regarding decision-making or CEO monitoring can arise (Fama, 1980; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Moreover, low firm performance and free rider problems can also 
be caused by large board size (Ghosh, 2003). Board size can be enlarged if firm 
involve only knowledgeable or skilled people or if firm needs external resources, e.g. 
funding or budget (Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999). Otherwise, it is better 
for a firm to have smaller board size as Jensen (1993) argued that CEOs could easily 
manipulate the board member if they are larger.  In addition, according to Yermack 
(1995), CEOs can be fired for poor performance and pay-performance linked is 
tighter if there is smaller board size. The study by Petra and Dorata (2008) also 
supported that argument by analyzing logistic regression on 237 publicly traded US 
firms. They revealed that the companies, who do not have more than nine boards of 
directors, pay their CEOs a lower level of compensation.  
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In line with this context, Ali and Teulon (2014) analyzed 290 SBF 120 Index 
companies from the period of 2009 to 2011 and found a positive relationship between 
CEO compensation and board size. Ozkan (2011), Core et al (1999) and Sapp (2008) 
also supported this argument. Correspondingly, Mertens and Knop (2010) concluded 
their results from 75 firms of Netherland for the period 2006-2008 that overcrowded 
or larger board members are ineffective which leads to CEOs excessive 
compensation. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) described different reasons for the 
ineffectiveness of large board size. They argued that larger board members feel less 
focused or less responsible regarding executive compensation or other firm‘s affairs.  
Furthermore, board members are less cohesive due to their larger size and it is 
difficult to gather a major portion of board to monitor or challenge the matters of 
CEO or vice versa. A recent study by Reddy, Abidin and You (2015) also found 
positive effect of board size on CEO compensation but negative effect on firm 
performance in the listed companies of New Zealand. 
There are inconclusive empirical and theoretical evidences relating to the effect of 
board size on pay-performance link. For instance, by utilizing 1,648 firms U.S. public 
firms traded on the NASDAQ, AMEX and NYSE, Cyert et al. (2002) proposed a 
theoretical agency model and suggests that there is an indirect effect of board size on 
the strong relationship between firm size and executive compensation. The meta-
analysis of van Essen et al. (2015) also proposed that board size strengthen the link 
between CEO compensation and firm performance. However, Fahlenbrach (2009) and 
Ozkan (2007) proposed a negative effect of board size on pay-performance 
sensitivity. Owing to these inconsistent results, this study is intended to explore the 
moderating role of board size on the pay-performance link in the relevance of 
Pakistan.  
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2.7.1.3 CEO Duality 
CEOs can influence the board if the governance is weak as there are some evidences, 
which shows that if the influence of CEOs increases over board then their 
compensation can be increased (Hallock, 1997; Core et al., 1999). Chairperson of the 
company leads the board of directors. In many firms, CEOs also serves as the 
chairperson of the board, which is called ―CEO Duality‖. This duality of positions 
makes the CEOs capable of supervising, controlling and managing the firm. In CEO 
duality, CEOs are responsible of compensating top management, supervising the 
hiring/firing process, agenda setting and board meetings (Dorata & Petra, 2008). 
However, agency theorists are not in the favor of CEO duality as it can escalate the 
agency issues. In addition, in these dual positions, CEOs gain all the decision-making 
powers, which can only benefit the specific owners and harm the shareholder value 
(Finkelstein & D‘Aveni, 1994).  
Core at al. (1999) found that CEO duality is an indicator of weak governance, which 
can leads to high CEO compensation. It is also negatively associated with size and 
performance. Some other studies support this argument and found positive 
relationship between CEO compensation and duality (see Cyert et al., 2002; Grinstein 
& Hribar, 2004; Jensen, 1993; van Essen et al., 2015). Furthermore, Vemala, Nguyen, 
Nguyen and Kommasani (2014) revealed significant positive relationship between 
CEO duality and CEO compensation in both pre and post-crises period while 
analyzing Fortune 500 listed firms.  
However, some studies do not find any significant relationship between CEO duality 
and firm performance. For example, Amba (2013) examined 39 firms from the year 
2010 to 2012 and found no significant effect of CEO duality on firm performance. 
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Likewise, Chen (2014) also found insignificant relationship between CEO duality and 
firm performance in EU listed firms. Moreover, meta-analysis of van Essen et al. 
(2015) suggests that CEO duality cannot moderate the relationship between CEO 
compensation and firm performance. Nonetheless, contrary results have found by 
previous empirical studies, e.g.  Fahlenbrach (2009) investigated the effect of CEO 
duality in U.S. public listed firms from the year 1994-2004 revealed significant but 
negative effect of CEO duality on pay-performance sensitivity.  
On the other hand, Dorata and Petra (2008) selected a sample of 143 non-merging 
firms and 77 merging firms and found a positive moderating role of CEO duality 
between firm performance and CEO compensation. Owing to these inconclusive 
empirical evidences, the role of CEO duality on pay-performance link is debatable. 
Agency theory and managerial power theory proposed adverse effect of CEO duality 
on pay-performance link while the advocates of CEO duality assume positive role of 
CEO duality in aligning pay-performance link. The research outcomes evaluated from 
developed countries cannot be generalized on a transitional economy like Pakistan 
due to cultural and structural difference. Thus, this study will further look into the role 
of CEO duality in tying CEO‘s pay with performance metrics.  
2.7.2 Ownership Structure   
Prior studies have shown the relationship between ownership structure and CEO 
compensation or ownership structure and firm performance. Moreover, due to major 
influence of family, foreign and institutional ownership, this study includes these 
three types.   
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2.7.2.1 Family Ownership  
Family control is the leading ownership structure around the world and there are 
significant portion of family firms in all publicly traded firms. However, researchers 
revealed crucial differences between non-family and family controlled firms 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Dyer & Whetten, 2006). Furthermore, researchers also gave 
attention pertaining to compensation practices and agency conflicts in family owned 
firms. Despite of agency theorists assumption that managers act in their own self-
interest (Eisenhardt, 1989), followers of stewardship theory argued that some 
managers can sacrifice their greed and interest for the welfare of organization (Davis, 
Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). In case of family-member CEOs, researchers 
labelled them as stewards. For instance, the results of Gomez-Mejia et al. (2003) 
support stewardship theory. By using a sample of 253 family-controlled firm, they 
found that CEOs act like stewards if they are member and also receive lower 
compensation in exchange of greater socio-emotional wealth and job security.  
In addition, Croci et al. (2012) investigated 754 firms in 14 countries of Europe. They 
found that family control curbs the fraction and the level of CEO total compensation. 
However, no significant effect of family control on excessive compensation has 
ensured by these researchers. They also suggest that family control firms do not 
employ CEO compensation to manipulate or expropriate capital from minority 
shareholders. With regard to family ownership, Combs et al. (2010) supports agency 
theory and through a sample of S&P 500 firms they revealed that if additional family 
members are represented on the board or in the management then family-member 
CEOs accept lower compensation. However, they discovered that if CEO is the lone 
family member then he accepts higher compensation.  
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Pertaining to agency conflicts in family firms, Barontini and Bozzi (2010) analyzed 
the 175 Italian firms and found worse stock and accounting performance due to 
excessive CEO compensation, which could therefore interpreted as a form of rent 
extraction. They also ascertain that instead of agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders, family firms of Italy have prevalent agency conflicts between minority 
shareholders and family owners. The reason for paying high compensation to CEOs in 
family firms is for the extraction of private benefits by the family members or it may 
be premium for the loyalty. Moreover, in the context of family firms, agency theorists 
claim that pay-performance link is not applicable. 
However, contrary results have found by Michiels et al. (2013). By employing a 
sample of 529 family firms of U.S., they suggest that performance-based measures 
play a vital role in compensating CEOs. Nonetheless, slighter stronger pay-
performance relationship among non-family CEOs has purported. Michiels et al. 
(2013) have utilized ownership as a moderating variable in their study. Chrisman, 
Chua, Kellermanns and Chang (2007) also revealed that family owners try to build 
link between CEO compensation and firm performance. Similar evidence was 
advanced by Graziano and Rondi (2016). On the other hand, Connelly, Limpaphayom 
and Sullivan (2010) provided evidence from Thai listed firms that firms with higher 
level of family ownership align director‘s compensation with firm performance but 
not managerial compensation.  
Although there are a wide range of studies related to direct association between 
family ownership and CEO compensation, however, studies have neglected the 
moderating role of family ownership on the relationship between performance-based 
measures and CEO compensation. Thus, consistent with the proposition of Fama and 
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Jensen (1983) that family owners have the ability to mitigate classical agency 
conflicts, this study assumes that family ownership in corporate governance structure 
could be effective mechanism in aligning CEO compensation with firm performance 
and other metrics. This study is more inclined toward alignment effect of family 
owners rather than entrenchment effect as suggested by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2003).   
2.7.2.2 Institutional Ownership   
In the past 20 years, dramatic increase and involvement of institutional investors in 
the firms is the most crucial corporate governance changes (Useem, 1996). 
Institutional ownership is considered as one of the efficient mechanism for monitoring 
firm performance and compensation as it can mitigate the principal-agent problem by 
supervising actions of managers (Abed et al., 2014). They can also constrain CEOs 
power in their pay-setting (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; David, Kochhar, & Levitas, 
1998). By different resources and expertise, institutional investors have the capability 
to monitor the CEO compensation effectively (Lee & Chen, 2011).  
Agency theorists are also in the favor of institutional ownership due to its effective 
monitoring benefits as it plays a significant role in aligning CEO compensation with 
performance (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Moreover, institutional investors can 
pressurized the managers to work in the best interest of the firm and shareholders as 
these investors give keen attention on their role of influencing, disciplining and 
monitoring managers (Cornett, Marcus, Saunders, & Tehranian, 2007).  
Therefore, through Hong Kong listed firms, Cheng and Firth (2005) purported a 
negative association between CEO compensation and institutional ownership as these 
investors offer better monitoring in the case of CEO pay-setting policy. Furthermore, 
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Hartzell and Starks (2003) studied 1914 S&P firms and revealed that existence of 
institutional investors could affect CEO compensation negatively and it is positively 
related to pay-performance sensitivity. However, contradictory results were found by 
Smith and Swan (2014). Additionally, while studying Taiwan listed companies, Lee 
and Chen (2011) revealed positive relationship between CEO compensation and 
institutional ownership.  
However, due to different organizational culture, results can be varied from country to 
country and efficiency of the firm depends on the activeness of investors. Therefore, 
Victoravich, Xu and Gan (2013) suggest that active institutional investors have 
strongest impact on CEO compensation though grey or passive investors have little 
impact. Recently, meta-analysis of van Essen et al. (2015) found lower compensation 
of CEOs in the presence of institutional investors. Moreover, they also suggest 
positive moderating role of institutional ownership between executive compensation 
and firm performance. Studies by Dharwadkar, Goranova, Brandes and Khan (2008), 
Feng, Ghosh, He and Sirmans (2010) and Ozkan (2011) also purported that 
institutional investors strengthen pay-performance sensitivity.  
Ivanova (2017) considered institutional investors as the stewards of the organizations 
because they possess fiduciary duty to enhance their clients‘ return, thus, they actively 
participate in organizational decisions and monitor the opportunistic behaviors of 
executives (Abernethy et al., 2014). In the light of these theoretical and empirical 
arguments, this study is in support of the explanation that institutional investors can 
bring better monitoring practices, restrain executives from exploitation of 
shareholders‘ resources and thereby align their CEO‘s compensation with firm 
performance indicators.  
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2.7.2.3 Foreign Ownership 
Around the globe, almost every country allows the foreign investors to be a part of 
their firms. Foreign investors usually possess effective skills who emphasis on firm 
performance and hire highly skilled managers with international experience (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999). These efficient managers demands high 
compensation, therefore, foreign investors pay them a high salary but also try to pay 
compensation consistent with firm performance. In line with this argument, by 
employing a mixed method (qualitative and quantitative) on Chinese listed firms, Pan 
et al. (2009) found positive relationship between CEO compensation and foreign 
ownership.  
Parallel to Pan et al. (2009) study, Randøy and Nielsen (2002) found the positive 
relationship between foreign ownership and CEO compensation. However, their 
sample size was composed of 104 Swedish and 120 Norwegian publicly listed firms. 
Similarly, Mäkinen (2007) utilized a sample of 62 Finnish firms listed in Helsinki 
Stock Exchange and found same results. Although most of the researchers found 
positive relationship between CEO compensation and foreign ownership but foreign 
investor also reduce the power of CEOs (see Abrahamson & de Ridder, 2010). On the 
other hand, Kato and Long (2005) interpret their results differently. By taking the 
companies from Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, they inferred that firms 
strengthen the pay-performance link to attract more capital from foreign investors.  
Furthermore, foreign investor could be less capable of monitoring as compared to 
institutional investors due to cultural differences. For instance, while analyzing 
Swedish listed firms, Collin, Gustafsson, Smith and Petersson (2012) purported that 
foreign investors cannot perform or monitor well in the sense of influencing CEO as 
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they do not understand the business culture of Sweden. Collin et al. (2012) favors 
institutional investors over foreign owners due to less efficient monitoring capability 
of foreign investors that leads to weak corporate strategy. While studying pay-
performance link, Balasubramanian, Barua and Karthik (2015) also purported that 
foreign investors cannot effectively set their CEO‘s pay.  
Conversely, according to David, Yoshikawa, Chari and Rasheed (2006), foreign 
investors can affect the strategic decisions of the firms in which they have invested 
regardless of their smaller portion of share in the firm. These investors want to 
achieve their financial objectives. Therefore, they try to link the firm profitability with 
CEO compensation closely. Accordingly, using a sample size of 200 largest Japanese 
manufacturing firms, Colpan and Yoshikawa (2012) found that foreign investors 
exhibit a positive moderating effect on the relationship between bonus pay and firm 
profitability. Likewise, the studies by Garner and Kim (2011), Paskelian, Bell and 
Omer (2012) and Swatdikun (2013) also argued that foreign investors align the 
interests of management and shareholders by tying their pay with CEO‘s 
compensation. Consistent with these arguments, this study also assumes that foreign 
investors positively moderate the pay-performance link in Pakistan.  
2.8 Dividend Policy 
Financial theorists assumed that dividend pay-outs is the best solution to resolve the 
agency conflicts. Investors always demand reward for their investments, by this 
means, higher dividends satisfy the demand of these investors (Michael, 2013). 
However, Finnerty (1986) observed from New York stock exchange listed companies 
that younger or family firms do not pay dividends to their shareholders. Nevertheless, 
they pay common dividends in their life cycle at some occasion. Finnerty (1986) also 
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advised that firms should maintain and view the dividend policy by considering the 
shareholder wealth maximization and investment opportunities need. The outcome 
model of La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) created a link 
between dividend payouts, agency costs and minority shareholders‘ protection. They 
purported that minority shareholders demand dividends by pressurizing corporate 
management to reduce the excessive cash available in the company.  
In addition, agency costs exists in a corporation where there is high amount of 
available free cash flow which further leads to lower shareholder value, 
overinvestment or empire building by executives or majority shareholders. Therefore, 
it is suggested that to reduce agency costs and free flows, firms should pay dividends 
(Emerenciana, 2012; Richardson, 2006). Moreover, according to Twu (2010), 
dividends are the perpetual ways to lessen the free cash flows, as dividends are very 
sticky. Once the firm started paying dividends, then it cannot be stopped until and 
unless it is unquestionably mandatory. Owing to the fact that value of shares drops 
with the reduction in dividend payouts.  
Inversely, supported by the evidence from 438 S&P 500 firms, Emerenciana (2012) 
revealed that dividend paying companies exhibits more rent extraction, pay their 
CEOs a higher compensation and possess lower pay-performance sensitivity. Another 
view point on the relationship between compensation and dividends has presented by 
Bhattacharyya, Mawani and Morrill (2008). They suggest that high quality executives 
have superior ability to find investment opportunities as compared to low quality 
executives. High quality executive invest in positive NPV projects leaving a smaller 
amount of wealth to issue dividends to shareholders. Owing to this quality of 
executives and their addition in the value of firm, they receive higher compensation. 
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Unfortunately, there is a lack of empirical evidence regarding the moderating role of 
dividend policy on the relationship between firm performance metrics and CEO 
compensation. Thus, consistent with the agency perspective that dividend policy can 
act as a substitute control device in the absence of strong corporate governance (Haye, 
2014), this study proposes that strong dividend policy build a tight pay-performance 
link. While studying dividend policy, most of the prior researchers have considered 
dividend pay-out as well as dividend yield. Therefore, both indicator are employed to 
accomplish the study‘s objectives.  
2.8.1 Dividend Pay-out  
Dividend payout also indicates the shareholder‘s return. It specify how much a 
company retained for cash reserves, paying off debt and growth purposes and how 
much a company paid to its shareholders (Bernstein, & Wild, 1998). It is observed 
that companies pay steady dividend at maturity level. The growth-oriented and new 
enterprises may not have very low payout ratio because they prefer to invest in growth 
opportunities and new product development (Baker, 2009). Analysts divided the 
dividend payouts into loss-making (less than 0 percent), good (0 to 35 percent), 
healthy (35 to 55 percent), high (55 to 75 percent), very high (75 to 95 percent), 
unsustainable (95 to 150 percent) and very unsustainable (more than 150 percent).  
Investors should invest in the firms with healthy payout rather than very high payout 
because it may provide them short-term benefits but they face loses at later stage 
(Dunn, 2011). Prior academic literature postulated that agency costs can be mitigated 
with dividend payouts due to two main reasons. First, dividend payouts increase 
liquidity risk so managers make rational investment decisions (Zwiebel, 1996). The 
second reason is the capability of dividend payouts to restrict management from 
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overinvestment (Tirole, 2010). Dividend payouts are highly associated with cash flow 
of the firm and managers could have more control over payout rather than yields.  
2.8.2 Dividend Yield  
Dividend yield can be described as the percentage return of an investment. This return 
can be in any type of distribution including dividends and interests. The ratio of 
dividend yield may indicate how well a firm can sustain its dividend rate. Generally, 
investors get attracted toward firms with higher dividend yield. Nonetheless, the 
higher dividend yield is not the guarantee of organizational sustainability because the 
higher ratio means either the company‘s stock price is falling or it is raising the 
payout size. Sometimes lower level of dividend yield are good for investors if the 
share price is rising (Dunn, 2011). Despite of managerial and investors perception, 
this study aims to mitigate agency conflicts from organization, therefore, it is 
proposed that payment of dividends could restrict opportunistic behavior of managers 
and majority shareholders (Lepetit, Meslier, & Wardhana, 2017) result in lower level 
of agency conflicts.  
2.9 Summary of Literature Review 
Literature review is written with the perspective of prior researchers. This chapter 
acknowledged four theories (agency theory, stewardship theory, managerial power 
theory, free cash flow hypothesis) in the relevance to the scope of this research. 
Agency theory is the focal point of the study which explains pay-performance link 
and the moderating role of corporate governance and dividend policy. Nonetheless, 
owing to different theoretical perspectives, stewardship theory and managerial power 
theory are also incorporated as alternative theories in case of opposite results. Cash 
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flow hypothesis is added to provide further explanation regarding dividend policy as 
substitute control device. Empirical literature pertaining to the relationship between 
independent variables and dependent variables is discussed. CEO compensation is the 
dependent variable of this study while firm performance (operating and market 
performance) and characteristics (firm size, growth opportunities and market share) 
are the independent variables. Furthermore, corporate governance and dividend policy 
are considered as moderating variables. Various knowledge gaps are identified 
through prior literature.  
For instance, only a hand full of studies have discussed operating and market 
performance separately while building their link with CEO compensation. Moreover, 
the empirical association between market share and CEO compensation is absent in 
previous academic literature. Studies have provided theoretical explanation regarding 
the corporate governance and dividend policy as control mechanisms but the 
empirical studies on this area are rare. By considering the propositions of prior 
literature into account, this study proposed that corporate governance (main control 
mechanism) and dividend policy (substitute control mechanism) can strengthen the 
pay-performance link and eventually mitigate the agency conflicts. 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter is composed of proposed methodology to pursue the further study. 
Research methodology is assumed as backbone of the research as it strengthens the 
base of the research. Chapter three is divided into many sections in order to improve 
the clarity and readability. Section 3.1 is related to research framework in which 
theortical and conceptual model of the study is discussed. In Section 3.2, hypotheses 
are developed with theoretical and empirical evidences. Section 3.3 discusses the 
measurement of the variables considered in this study with brief justification. Section 
3.4 includes sampling and population of the study. Section 3.5 is related to statistical 
tests and techniques utilized in the study. Section 3.6 explains operational model of 
the study and Section 3.7 concisely discusses the definition of the variables. Lastly, 
Section 3.8 presents summary of the chapter.  
3.1 Research Framework  
One of the main reasons of agency conflicts is excessive compensation practices 
(Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). Therefore, most of the researchers argued that CEO 
compensation should be aligned with firm performance and characteristics (Bowie, 
Silberglied, & Williams, 2014; Copper, et al., 2010; Grossman & Hart, 1983; Jensen 
& Murphy, 1990; Richey, 2013) in order to avoid agency conflicts (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Consequently, this study has considered firm performance and firm 
characteristics as independent variables and CEO compensation as dependent variable 
in the framework (see Figure 3.1).  
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In the academic literature, there is a standing debate over the solutions of agency 
problems. Core et al. (1999) suggests that stronger corporate governance can reduce 
the agency conflicts.  Researchers have pondered efficient owner structure and board 
characteristics as the dimensions of strong corporate governance. Accordingly, Sun 
and Cahan (2009) posit that board of directors play a vital role in aligning CEO 
compensation with firm performance, as well linking the interest of executives with 
shareholders. Therefore, corporate governance is demonstrated as a moderator in the 
model of the study. In addition, efficient dividend policy can also resolve the conflicts 
between managers and shareholders (Emerencana, 2012). In the absence of weak 
corporate governance mechanisms, dividend policy can be utilized as substitute 
control device (Haye, 2014). Thus, this study hypothesized that dividend policy can 
act as a moderating variable between firm‘s performance, characteristics and CEO 
compensation.  
Employing these moderating variables are justifiable with the proposition of Baron 
and Kenny (1986). They argued that moderating variable can be employed if there is 
inconsistent relationship between predictor and criterion variable. Owing to 
inconsistent relationship between performance-related metrics and CEO 
compensation especially in the relevance of Pakistan, utilizing corporate governance 
mechanisms and dividend policy as moderating variable could provide robust effect 
of existing model. Consistent with the theoretical debate and focus of the study, the 
framework of the study is demonstrated in Figure 3.1 
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Figure 3.1 
Moderating role of Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy between firm performance, characteristics and CEO compensation 
Source: Author‘s own elaboration 
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3.2 Hypothesis Development  
Consistent with principal-agent paradigm, Jensen and Murphy (1990) define pay-
performance sensitivity as the change in CEO compensation has a relationship with 
change in shareholder value. Stronger the pay-performance sensitivity, lower would 
be the agency conflicts. In addition, Thevenoz and Bahar (2007) argued that 
executives would be responsible for their actions, if pay is linked to firm performance. 
Wallsten (2000) argued that CEOs should be punished if their decision causes low 
market value of the firm. Similarly, according to Hartzell and Starks (2003), there 
should be strong link between CEO compensation and firm performance. Sun, Wei 
and Huang (2013) studied U.S. insurance industry in relation to pay-performance link. 
They found positive relationship between operating performance and CEO 
compensation. Furthermore, in a previous study by Deckop (1988) related to 
determinants of CEO compensation, evaluated that CEO compensation was positively 
associated to profit (measured as percentage to sales). In the reference of Pakistan, 
Yahya and Ghazali (2015) also found positive association of operating and market 
performance with CEO compensation. Therefore, consistent with agency theory that 
there should be tight pay-performance link, it is hypothesized that operating and 
market performance should be aligned to firm performance. Accordingly, following 
hypotheses are formulated: 
H1: Operating performance has a positive relationship with CEO Compensation 
H2: Market Performance has a positive relationship with CEO Compensation  
Most of the researchers found that increase in firm size leads to increase in CEO 
compensation. Based on Fortune 500 firms, Riahi‐Belkaoui and Pavlik (1993) 
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concluded that firm size has an effect on CEO compensation. Similar results were 
purported by (Vemala et al., 2014). By the same token, Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) 
found that firm size is positively correlated with CEO compensation in U.S. public 
listed companies. Furthermore, Mäkinen (2007) found that there is high pay-for-firm 
size elasticity in Finland firms. The meta-analysis of van Essen et al. (2015) revealed 
that firm size is the major determinant of CEO compensation. Studies conducted in 
the capital market of Pakistan also revealed positive link between firm size and CEO 
compensation (Lone, Hasan, & Afzal, 2015; Usman, Akthar, & Akthar, 2015; Yahya 
& Ghazali, 2015). In the light of prior theoretical and empirical debate, the hypothesis 
for this study is developed as follows:  
H3: Firm Size has a positive relationship with CEO Compensation 
Prior studies have also considered growth opportunities as a strong determinant of 
CEO compensation. CEOs receive high compensation in the firms with growth 
opportunities to keep this information confidential (Smith & Watts, 1992). Consistent 
with agency theory, Barnes et al. (2006) observed that corporations with greater 
growth opportunities pay their CEOs a high salary. Furthermore, Conyon and He 
(2008) also found the positive correlation between executive compensation and 
growth opportunities in Chinese firms. Theorists argued that compensation of CEOs 
should also be aligned to growth opportunities or else they will involve themselves in 
value destructing activities. The studies regarding pay-growth link are not widely 
discussed in the capital market of Pakistan. There is only one study by Yahya and 
Ghazali (2015) who ensured positive association between growth opportunities and 
CEO compensation in financial sector of Pakistan. Consequently, consistent with 
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previous literature and agency theory, the hypothesis has established in a following 
way: 
H4: Growth opportunities have a positive relationship with CEO compensation 
According to the best knowledge of the researcher, empirical evidence regarding the 
relationship between CEO compensation and market share is absent in prior academic 
literature.  However, it is assumed that the firms with larger market share compensate 
their CEOs highly as one of the attribute of a CEO is to gain competitive advantage. 
While discussing firm characteristics, Pindado et al. (2010) also consider market share 
along with growth opportunities and firm size in their study. The study by Ferreira 
(2015) argued that compensation of managers may rise when the demand for gaining 
market share rise and when there are less talented executives in the market. Some 
multinational organizations have tied their CEO‘s pay with market share (Phillips, 
2014) because it increase cost-effectiveness of the firm (Ross et al., 2008). Owing to 
these practical and theoretical applications for pay-share link, this study ought to test 
the following hypothesis: 
H5: Market share has a positive relationship with CEO compensation 
The meta-analysis of Tosi et al. (2000) related to performance metrics and CEO 
compensation suggested that moderator variables between them might play a crucial 
role. Pertaining to previous academic literature, the relationship between CEO 
compensation and board independence has discovered. According to Boyd (1994), 
board of directors are responsible for overseeing the CEOs as efficient compensation, 
keen governance and superior control can push the CEOs to enhance the firm 
performance and to fulfill the demands of shareholder. Studies also revealed that high 
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level of independent directors on the board can also help in reducing agency conflicts. 
With reference to this argument, Bebchuk, et al. (2002) discussed that independent 
directors have more power to prevent the CEOs from rent-seeking. A recent study on 
UK public limited companies by Buigut et al. (2015) confirmed that there is a 
significant relationship between decrease in CEO compensation and percentage of 
independent directors. Moreover, independent directors effectively monitor the 
opportunistic behavior of executives and link their compensation efficiently with firm 
performance (Chee-Wooi & Chwee-Ming, 2010; van Essen et al., 2015).  
Therefore, this study assumed that board independence could play a moderating role 
between CEO compensation and its performance-related determinants. However, 
previous studies have taken board independence as a moderating though in another 
way, e.g. between top management and team heterogeneities (Angriawan, 2008), 
between corporate entrepreneurship and firm performance (Burkemper, 2014) and 
between CEO duality and firm performance (Hsu, Wang, Tsai, & Lu, 2012).  
Nevertheless, van Essen (2015) suggests that independent directors can moderate the 
relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance. Chee-Wooi and 
Chwee-Ming (2010) also found that independent directors improve pay-performance 
link. Consistent with the agency theory, this study proposes that independent directors 
can restrict executives from rent extraction and self-centeredness and thereby, align 
their compensation with performance-related indicators. Owing to lack of this 
evidence especially in the context of Pakistan, following hypotheses are developed to 
fill the knowledge gap in academic literature: 
H6: Board independence positively moderates the relationship between operating 
performance and CEO compensation 
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H7: Board independence positively moderates the relationship between market 
performance and CEO compensation 
H8: Board independence positively moderates the relationship between firm size and 
CEO compensation 
H9: Board independence positively moderates the relationship between growth 
opportunities and CEO compensation 
H10: Board independence positively moderates the relationship between market 
share and CEO compensation 
Prior studies have found inconclusive evidence on the relationship between executive 
compensation and board size due to two varying point of views. On the one hand, 
resource dependence theory argued that larger board size probably has an extensive 
level of proficiency and skills. Conversely, agency theory purported that overcrowded 
board size becomes ineffectual in accomplishing and coordinating their role of 
monitoring (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). Some researchers have observed no relation 
between board size and CEO compensation (Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2007; Tariq, 2010).  
However, contradictory to these studies, Banghøj et al. (2010) claimed that board size 
is the only corporate governance characteristic that explains variations in executive 
compensation. Similar results have concluded by Ali and Teulon (2014) by using a 
sample of 290 SBF 120 Index companies. Nonetheless, Anjam (2011) found negative 
relationship between CEO compensation and board size in Pakistani listed companies. 
Owing to two different perspective on the association between board size and CEO 
compensation, researchers found mixed evidence regarding their effect on pay-
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performance link. For instance, Cyert et al. (2002) and van Essen et al. (2015) found 
positive while Fahlenbrach (2009) and Ozkan (2007) found negative effect of board 
size on pay-performance link. However, this study is in support of agency perspective 
so it is proposed that large board size play an ineffective monitoring role and 
therefore, could weaken the pay-performance link. Previously, board size has tested as 
moderator between firm performance and other board characteristics (Bathula, 2008), 
between firm performance and R&D spending (Ren, Chandrasekar, & Li, 2012), 
between top management team tenure and corporate illegal activity (Williams, Fadil, 
& Armstrong, 2005). Seeing that board size is extensively used as moderating 
variable in prior academic literature, this study is also interested in testing it in the 
reference of Pakistan. Therefore, the following hypotheses in the context of this study 
are worth testing: 
H11: Board size negatively moderates the relationship between operating 
performance and CEO compensation 
H12: Board size negatively moderates the relationship between market performance 
and CEO compensation 
H13: Board size negatively moderates the relationship between firm size and CEO 
compensation 
H14: Board size negatively moderates the relationship between growth opportunities 
and CEO compensation 
H15: Board size negatively moderates the relationship between market share and 
CEO compensation 
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With regard to CEO duality, several researches have reviewed. Most of the studies are 
available in the reference of CEO duality‘s effect on firm performance. With the 
empirical evidence on Egyptian listed firms, Elasyed (2007) found no impact of CEO 
duality on firm performance. However, he suggested that the impact could be varied 
from industry to industry. Same results have purported by Chen, Lin and Yi (2008). 
Nonetheless, an earlier study by Alexander, Fennell and Halpern (1993) argued that 
CEO duality plays a vital role in affecting the firm‘s value. A single person being the 
CEO and the Chairman could improve the value of a firm. Moreover, CEO duality 
eliminates the cost between two. In addition, the evidence from Toronto Stock 
Exchange determines significant relationship between CEO compensation and CEO 
duality roles (Nulla, 2013). These arguments are consistent with stewardship theory.  
However, agency theory is not in the favor of CEO duality as it feeds agency issues. 
Consistent with the theory, Core et al. (1999) claimed that weak corporate governance 
includes CEO duality. Previous studies have provided mixed evidence relating to the 
impact of CEO duality on pay-performance link. For instance, van Essen et al. (2015) 
suggests that CEO duality cannot moderate the relationship between CEO 
compensation and firm performance. However, Dorata and Petra (2008) employed a 
random sample of US publicly traded firms and observed that CEO duality moderates 
the positive association between firm performance and CEO compensation. On the 
other hand, Fahlenbrach (2009) found adverse effect of CEO duality on pay-
performance sensitivity. This study views CEO duality as a barrier toward 
organizational effectiveness in line with agency perspective. Therefore, it is proposed 
that CEO duality could distort the link between performance-related measures and 
CEO compensation. Consistent with agency theory, it is hypothesized that: 
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H16: CEO duality negatively moderates the relationship between operating 
performance and CEO compensation 
H17: CEO duality negatively moderates the relationship between market performance 
and CEO compensation 
H18: CEO Duality negatively moderates the relationship between firm size and CEO 
compensation 
H19: CEO duality negatively moderates the relationship between growth 
opportunities and CEO compensation 
H20: CEO duality negatively moderates the relationship between market share and 
CEO compensation 
Prior studies revealed that ownership structure exerts a significant effect on CEO 
compensation. Barontini and Bozzi (2010) inspected the reason of agency conflicts in 
Italian listed firms. They demonstrated that family firms thoroughly pay their CEOs 
more than other firms do. They also found rent extraction in CEOs of family firms 
and negative relationship between their excess compensation and future firm 
performance. However, in Italian family firms, they found Type II agency conflicts 
(between majority and monitory shareholders). They purported that family owners 
pay their CEOs a high compensation to extract their private benefits.  
Contrary to Barontini and Bozzi (2010), Combs at al. (2010) argued on the basis of 
agency theory that family-member CEOs accept lower compensation if other family 
members are also on the board or management. However, if CEO is the sole family 
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member then he or she extracts high compensation. Similar results were observed by 
Gomez-Mejia et al. (2003) that family CEOs accepts lower compensation as 
compared to outside CEOs. Although, classical agency theorists assumes that pay-
performance link is not pertinent in the context of family firms but Michiels et al. 
(2013) found significant role of performance measures with CEO compensation in 
privately held family firms. Similarly, Chrisman et al. (2007) also postulated that 
family owners link their CEO‘s compensation with firm performance. In order to 
empirically test this assumption that family owners could mitigate classical agency 
conflicts (Fama & Jensen, 1983), this study has formulated following hypotheses: 
H21: Family ownership positively moderates the relationship between operating 
performance and CEO compensation 
H22: Family ownership positively moderates the relationship between market 
performance and CEO compensation 
H23: Family ownership positively moderates the relationship between firm size and 
CEO compensation 
H24: Family ownership positively moderates the relationship between growth 
opportunities and CEO compensation 
H25: Family ownership positively moderates the relationship between market share 
and CEO compensation 
Correspondingly, in terms of expertise, large institutional owners have stakes in a 
number of firms, along with proficient executives to manage their investments. 
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Therefore, institutional investors or owners are more effective than discrete individual 
proprietors in pay setting or inducing compensation arrangements (Shleifer & 
Vishney, 1997). By linking the institutional ownership and agency theory arguments, 
it is anticipated that the larger the holding of institutional investors, the greater their 
influence will be on CEO compensation (John, Makhija, & Ferris, 2014). Moreover, 
Ozkan (2007) found the negative relationship between CEO compensation and 
institutional ownership in the large UK firms. Likewise, Hartzell and Starks (2003) 
found same results though they also argued that institutional ownership is positively 
related to pay-performance sensitivity.  
Therefore, Ahmad and Jusoh (2014) suggests that involvement of institutional 
investor in controlling and monitoring the operations of firms is beneficial in 
diminishing principal-agent problems in an organization as they revealed positive 
relationship between firm performance and institutional ownership in Malaysian 
public sector firms. Consistent with these theoretical and pragmatic arguments, van 
Essen et al. (2015) suggests that institutional investors can positively moderate the 
relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance. Similarly, many 
researchers also argued institutional investor monitor CEO‘s opportunistic behavior 
effectively and eventually align their pay with performance metrics (see Dharwadkar 
et al. 2008; Feng et al., 2010; Ozkan, 2011). Therefore, following hypotheses will 
contribute effectively toward body of knowledge especially in the context of Pakistan: 
H26: Institutional ownership positively moderates the relationship between operating 
performance and CEO compensation 
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H27: Institutional ownership positively moderates the relationship between market 
performance and CEO compensation 
H28: Institutional ownership positively moderates the relationship between firm size 
and CEO compensation 
H29: Institutional ownership positively moderates the relationship between growth 
opportunities and CEO compensation 
H30: Institutional ownership positively moderates the relationship between market 
share and CEO compensation 
In almost every country, government policies allowed firms to issue shares to foreign 
shareholders because these investors are capable of improving firm performance 
efficiently (Jusoh, 2015; Phung, & Mishra, 2016). Foreign investors are conscious 
about firm performance and strongly emphasis on hiring highly qualified CEOs with 
international experience (La Porta et al., 1999). Therefore, these skilled CEOs may 
demand high compensation. Nonetheless, foreign shareholders also attention to 
aligning CEO compensation with firm performance (Pan et al., 2009). Owing to the 
fact that foreign investors hire competent CEOs with high compensation, many 
researchers found positive relationship between CEO compensation and foreign 
ownership (Mäkinen, 2007; Pan et al., 2009). Abrahamson and De Ridder (2010) also 
established the same relationship; however, from a sample of Stockholm Stock 
Exchange they exhibits that CEO power will reduce through the involvement of 
foreign ownership.  
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Therefore, the chances of rent extraction by CEOs could be reduced. Furthermore, 
Yoshikawa et al. (2010) studied the moderating role of foreign ownership and argued 
that foreign investors reduce cash bonus payments and actively monitor the 
executives‘ behaviour. In line with this argument, some other researchers also argued 
that foreign investors positively affect pay-performance sensitivity (Colpan & 
Yoshikawa, 2012; Garner & Kim, 2011; Paskelian et al., 2012; Swatdikun, 2013). 
Therefore, it is recognized that the role of foreign ownership is dynamic to discuss in 
the standpoint of this study. Thus, the hypotheses are developed accordingly: 
H31: Foreign ownership positively moderates the relationship between operating 
performance and CEO compensation 
H32: Foreign ownership positively moderates the relationship between market 
performance and CEO compensation 
H33: Foreign ownership positively moderates the relationship between firm size and 
CEO compensation 
H34: Foreign ownership positively moderates the relationship between growth 
opportunities and CEO compensation 
H35: Foreign ownership positively moderates the relationship between market share 
and CEO compensation 
According to Jensen‘s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis, firms distribute dividends to 
shareholders to reduce free cash flow so that executives do not invest in negative NPV 
projects or misuse the resources. Additionally, La Porta et al. (2000) also argued that 
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firms distribute dividends when agency problem is mitigated. Based on agency 
paradigm, Bhattacharyya (2003) developed a model in which he argued that 
executives differ in their capability of identifying positive NPV projects. Shareholders 
prefer that executives should invest in positive NPV projects and if there are no 
profitable projects, shareholders prefer that executives should pay out dividends. In 
this argument, Bhattacharyya (2003) assumed that high quality executives have access 
to positive NPV projects, so shareholders compensate them highly. Therefore, he 
verified the negative relationship between dividend payouts and executive 
compensation. Consist results were found by Bhattacharyya et al. (2008) in Canadian 
firms. Additionally, in the case of dividend yield and executive compensation, 
Eichholtz, Kok and Otten (2008) determined negative relationship between these two 
variables in the UK property industry. However, they found weak pay-for-
performance rule in these firms. On the other hand, according to Carrel (2010), paying 
dividends subjects firms to certain checks and balances as dividends make executives 
more liable to shareholders.  
Correspondingly, Zoan (2014) argued that holding on to yield might lead to excessive 
compensation so dividends bring more discipline to executive decision-making 
ability. Despite of the argument of Emerenciana (2012) that dividend paying firms 
have lower level of pay-performance sensitivity, this study have put the postulation in 
another way. Consistent with agency theory, this study argued that dividend policy 
can be utilized as a substitute control in the absence of strong corporate governance 
(Haye, 2014) and thereby mitigate agency conflicts. Therefore, in order to test this 
proposition in the relevance of capital market of Pakistan, following testable 
hypotheses are generated: 
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H36: Dividend payout positively moderates the relationship between operating 
performance and CEO compensation 
H37: Dividend payout positively moderates the relationship between market 
performance and CEO compensation 
H38: Dividend payout positively moderates the relationship between firm size and 
CEO compensation 
H39: Dividend payout positively moderates the relationship between growth 
opportunities and CEO compensation 
H40: Dividend payout positively moderates the relationship between market share 
and CEO compensation 
H41: Dividend yield positively moderates the relationship between operating 
performance and CEO compensation 
H42: Dividend yield positively moderates the relationship between market 
performance and CEO compensation 
H43: Dividend yield positively moderates the relationship between firm size and CEO 
compensation 
H44: Dividend yield positively moderates the relationship between growth 
opportunities and CEO compensation 
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H45: Dividend yield positively moderates the relationship between market share and 
CEO compensation 
3.3 Measurement of Variables  
Measurement of the variables are adopted from the prior related studies. Total salary 
and benefit of CEO are considered to measure CEO compensation though the log of 
this value is more preferred by prior studies to move the data toward linearity and 
normality (Bachan, 2008; Barnes, et al., 2006; Bivens & Mishel, 2013). In order to 
measure operating performance, this study has considered ROS/ operating margin 
(Awang, et al., 2010; Dehning & Stratopolous, 2002). Most of the prior studies have 
considered ROA or ROE to measure accounting-based operating performance. Very 
few studies have employed operating margin to build its link with CEO compensation 
(Awang, et al., 2010; Dehning & Stratopolous, 2002). Thus, employing operating 
margin is more appropriate in this sense because executives could have more control 
over this metric.  
Prior studies have measured market performance with different proxies such as stock 
market return, stock price, Tobin‘s Q and P/E ratio. Researchers and analysts argued 
that P/E ratio is a good indicator for market performance because it provide future 
insight for a specific security (Adams & Periton, 2007). Tobin‘s Q is not considered 
in this study to assess market performance because it could have cause 
multicollinearity with M/B ratio. Therefore, P/E ratio is employed as a proxy of 
market performance (Leong, et al., 2009; Williams & Naumann, 2011). 
Previous literature have suggested many proxies for firm size such as log of sales, log 
of assets, log of market capitalization and log of total employees (Dang, & Li, 2015). 
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This study employed log of sales because it also reflect product market competition 
(De Andres, et al. 2005; Raheman & Nasr, 2007). In order to assess growth or 
investment opportunities many studies have considered market to book value ratio. 
Although investment opportunity set (IOS) is better and advanced proxy but the data 
for real options is not publically accessible in the reference of Pakistan (Alti, 2006; 
Fich & Shivdasani, 2005). Identifying an adequate measure of market share could be 
difficult but most of the researchers have measured it by comparing a firm‘s total 
sales with total sales of industry (Banker, et al., 2013; Kaydos, 1998; Khorana & 
Servaes, 2012).  
Prior studies have measured dividend policy by utilizing both dividend payout and 
dividend yield (Al Masum, 2014; Hashemijoo, et al., 2012; Okafor, et al., 2011) 
because rational investors evaluate both of these proxies before making an 
investment. Ownership structures are measured with the percentage of holdings by 
family, institutional and foreign investors respectively in the firm (see Table 3.1). 
Board independence is measured by number of independent directors, board size with 
total number of board and CEO duality with a dummy variable. For ease of 
readability, measurements of variables are demonstrated in the table. Following Table 
3.1 shows the list of variables, their specific measurements and the authors who 
utilized these measurements in their previous studies (Alti, 2006; Fich & Shivdasani, 
2005).  
Table 3.1  
Measurement of Variables 
Variable Measurement Proxy or Ratio Employed by 
CEO 
Compensation 
CEO Salary 
and Benefits 
Log of CEO's salary 
and Benefits 
(Bachan, 2008; Barnes, 
et al., 2006; Bivens & 
Mishel, 2013) 
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Firm 
Performance 
Operating 
Performance 
ROS = Operating 
Margin: Operating 
profit/ Sales 
(Awang, et al., 2010; 
Dehning & Stratopolous, 
2002) 
Market 
Performance 
Price to earnings 
ratio 
(Leong, et al., 2009; 
Williams & Naumann, 
2011) 
Firm 
Characteristics  
Firm Size Log of Sales 
(De Andres, et al. 2005; 
Raheman & Nasr, 2007) 
Growth 
Opportunities 
Market to book 
value: Market 
Capitalization/ Book 
value of equity 
(Alti, 2006; Fich & 
Shivdasani, 2005) 
Market Share Total sales/ total 
sales of industry 
(Banker, et al., 2013; 
Khorana & Servaes, 
2012) 
Dividend 
Policy 
Dividend Pay-
out 
Total Annual 
Dividends per Share 
/Diluted Earnings 
per Share 
(Al Masum, 2014; 
Hashemijoo, et al., 2012; 
Okafor, et al., 2011) 
 
 
 
Dividend 
Yield 
Dividend per Share/ 
Price per Share 
Corporate 
Governance 
 
Ownership Structure 
Family 
Ownership 
Percentage of stock 
held by Family 
members 
(Pindado, et al., 2008) 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Percentage of stock 
held by institutions 
(Blume & Keim, 2012) 
Foreign 
Ownership 
Percentage of stock 
held by foreign 
investors 
(Bircan, 2011) 
Board Characteristics 
Board 
Independence 
Percentage of 
Independent 
directors on the 
board 
(Abidin, et al., 2009; 
Hermalin & Weisbach, 
2001) 
Board Size 
The number of 
directors on the 
board 
(Abidin et al., 2009; 
Booth, et al., 2002) 
CEO Duality 
Dummy Variable:   
1 if CEO is also 
chairman, 0 
otherwise 
(Booth et al., 2002; 
Dorata & Petra, 2008) 
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3.4 Sampling 
Sekaran (1992) pointed out that a careful selection of data for analysis is very 
important part of a good research. According to Hair (2007), if the population is small 
then whole population should be considered in the study. However, for large 
population, small sample would be sufficed if carefully chosen which represents 
population (Hair, 2007). There are 558 companies listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange 
(PSX) with a market capitalization of USD 95 billion. As this study is intended to 
capture the picture of entire capital market of Pakistan, all companies listed on 
Pakistan Stock Exchange are considered. However, through data cleaning process, 
some companies are eliminated from the data due to unavailability of data or lack of 
disclosure.   
Additionally, previous studies on CEO compensation in Pakistan have covered the 
period up to year 2012. Thus, this study has considered the period from 2010 to 2014 
in this study. The data before 2010 is not available for most of the companies because 
many companies were dissolved in year 2008 due to financial crises. Accordingly, the 
expected total year-firm observations of the study was 2790 (5×558), nonetheless, due 
to lack of disclosure and missing data, this study was able to collect only 1420 
observations (5×284). In addition, data was collected from annual reports of 
companies. Furthermore, corporate transparency has increased with the advent of 
corporate governance code of 2012, which bound the Pakistani listed firms to disclose 
the information regarding CEO compensation and board of directors. Therefore, 
information regarding corporate governance, dividend, firm characteristics and 
performance can be extracted from annual report of firm.  
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3.5 Statistical Tests 
This study will employ two statistical software to analyze the results, i.e. Microsoft 
Excel and SPSS. These statistical packages are user-friendly and can perform basic 
functions easily. Through these statistical applications, following tests are performed: 
3.5.1 Identification of Outliers 
Outliers are those observations, which are particularly different from other 
observation due to their unique characteristics. Existence of outlier in the data can be 
due to data entry error, an unanticipated extraordinary event or an extra ordinary event 
that has an explanation (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006). However, 
Tabachnick and Fidell (1996) argue that these outliers can be questionable as they can 
misrepresent or mislead the results. There are two methods for identifying outliers in 
the data, i.e. statistical and graphical methods (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Outliers 
that are unattached cases from the rest of data can be identified by using histogram in 
graphical method.  
On the other hand, Mahalanobis distance proposed by Mahalanobis (1936) can be 
computed to detect outliers in a statistical procedure. Hair et al. (2006) suggest 
utilizing Mahalanobis D2 measure in multivariate analysis. Tabachnick and Fidel 
(2007) defined outliers as individuals who have such extreme scores on an individual 
variable, or on a set of variables, that they will distort the overall results. Furthermore, 
Cook‘s distances by Cook (1977) can also be calculated to further recognize the 
outliers. Cook‘s distances are measures of influence and cases with influence scores 
of more than one are suspected of being outliers (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).  
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3.5.2 Identification of Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity issue has adverse effect on assumptions and usage of regression 
analysis. This study will utilize tolerance value and variance inflation factor (VIF) to 
identify the existence of multicollinearity issue among the predictor variables. 
According to Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson (2010) tolerance value is the 
variability in a variable that is not accounted for other variable. In addition, the VIF 
indicator is the proxy and corresponding to the tolerance value. Tolerance value 
should be more than 0.01 and VIF should be less than 10 to indicate that there is no 
multicollinearity issue among independent variables and they are not highly 
correlated.  
3.5.3 Normality 
One of the assumptions of regression analysis is to ensure normality for the fitness of 
data. Statisticians have suggested many ways to test the normality of the data. 
However, this study selects normality plots, kurtosis and skewness value to interpret 
the outcomes. This study employed the normal distribution method of skewness ratio 
between + 2 to – 2 at 0.05 alpha values range suggested by Hair, Anderson, Tatham 
and Black (1998). Moreover, this study also employed histogram and normal Q-Q 
plot to validate normality of data. However, if the data would be abnormal then 
transformation method can be employed to transform the data into normality (Hair, et 
al., 1998).  
3.5.4 Testing the Linearity, Homoscedasticity and the Independence of Errors 
This study utilizes the scatterplot of the residuals with the intention of inspecting the 
independence of errors, homoscedasticity and linearity. Hair et al. (2010) 
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recommended that linearity, independence of errors and homoscedasticity is 
confirmed and verified if there is no clear indication of association between predicted 
values ad residuals.  
3.5.5 Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
Ordinary least square (OLS) is a statistical technique for evaluating the unidentified 
parameters in a regression model. The model fits would be better if the sum of the 
squares of the difference between observed and predicted response is smaller. 
However, OLS estimator can provide unbiased estimates only when regressors are 
exogenous and the errors are serially uncorrelated and homoscedastic (Rao, 2009). In 
addition, OLS is the maximum likelihood estimator if the errors are normally 
distributed. Furthermore, OLS is the best linear unbiased estimator according to 
Gauss-Markov theorem. The usefulness of data of OLS technique can be enhanced 
with data transformation methods (Fox, 2002) and grouped explanatory variables 
(Hutcheson & Moutinho, 2008). Therefore, the hypotheses of this study can be tested 
with OLS method. The study will try to remove all biases and anomalies from the data 
in order to evaluate un-biased estimates.  
Before undertaking multiple linear regression, this study analyzed Pearson correlation 
to achieve the objectives of the study and to fulfill the basic process. Multiple linear 
regression is analyzed to evaluate the variation in dependent variable due to change in 
independent variables and moderating variables. Regression analysis is most widely 
used statistical analysis (Hair et al., 2010). In order to carry out multiple regressions, 
Hair et al. (1998) reported that the ratio should not be less than 5:1, with a favorable 
level of 15-20 observations for each independent variable. Hair et al. (2010) suggested 
that the ideal number of observations is 20:1. However, this study has enough 
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observations to fulfill the assumptions. Moreover, through SPSS first step would be 
ensuring the amount of variance accounted for model and its significance.  
3.6 Operational Models 
The general model that is tested through statistical analysis is as follows: 
CEOit  = a0 + β1 FPit  + β2 FCit + β3 CGit + β4 CGFPit  + β5 CGFCit  + β6 DIVit + β7 
DIVFPit                       + β8 DIVFCit + 
eit……………..………………………………………… (eq. 1)  
Where 
CEOit  = CEO Compensation in time by annually data 
FPit  = Firm performance (including dimensions) in time by annually data 
FCit  = Firm characteristics (including dimensions) in time by annually data 
CGit = Corporate Governance (including dimensions) in time by annually data 
DIVit = Dividend policy (including dimensions) time by annually data 
CGFP = Interactions for each firm performance dimensions with each corporate 
governance dimensions 
CGFC = Interactions for each firm characteristics dimensions with each corporate 
governance dimensions 
DIVFP = Interactions for each firm performance dimensions with each dividend 
policy dimensions 
DIVFC = Interactions for each firm characteristics dimensions with each dividend 
policy dimensions. 
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3.7 Definitions of Terms 
3.7.1 CEO Compensation 
CEO compensation is the remuneration paid to CEOs including basic salary, 
incentives and other benefits. Previously researchers have utilized log of total CEO 
compensation to measure this variable (Bachan, 2008; Barnes, et al. 2006; Bivens & 
Mishel, 2013). Log has been utilized to transform skewed data into normal. Moreover, 
taking log in this case is justifiable because CEO compensation cannot be negative.  
3.7.2 Operating Performance 
It is the measure of profitability in term of sales revenue. Operating margin ratio or 
return on sales ratio can be utilized to measure operating performance. Many authors 
have utilized it in their studies (e.g. Awang, Asghar, & Subari, 2010; Dehning & 
Stratopolous, 2002; Gray, & Cannella, 1997). Higher performance margin, higher will 
be the operating performance. 
3.7.3 Market Performance 
It is the behavior of security or company performance in the marketplace. Researchers 
have measured the market performance through price-earnings ratio or P/E ratio (e.g. 
Leong, Pagani, & Zaima, 2009; Williams & Naumann, 2011). Higher P/E ratio will 
indicate the better market performance of the firm.  
3.7.4 Firm Size 
Size of the company can be determined in term on its assets, sales or number of 
employees. However, this study have chosen log of sales to indicate firm size because 
previous studies have considered sales more relevant in the context of CEO 
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compensation (De Andres, Azofra, & Lopez, 2005; Raheman & Nasr, 2007). Greater 
value indicates larger firm size.  
3.7.5 Growth or Investment Opportunities 
New investment or projects that have potential to grow in near future along with 
profits are termed as growth or investment opportunities for investors. Researchers 
employed market to book value ratio to indicate growth opportunities (Alti, 2006; 
Fich & Shivdasani, 2005). High value of this ratio means that company has greater 
growth opportunities.  
3.7.6 Market Share 
A portion holds by the company in the market or sector is called market share. Market 
share can be measured by total sales of the company divided by total sales of the 
industry (Banker, Darrough, Huang, & Plehn-Dujowich, 2013; Khorana & Servaes, 
2012). 
3.7.7 Dividend Policy  
The policy of company to pay cash or common dividend to shareholders is called 
dividend policy. Researchers have measured this policy through dividend payouts and 
dividend yield (e.g. Al Masum, 2014; Hashemijoo, Ardekani, & Younesi, 2012; 
Okafor, Mgbame, & Chijoke-Mgbame, 2011). The dividend payout ratio is the 
amount of dividends paid to stockholders relative to the amount of total net income of 
a company and dividend yield is a measure of what percentage an investor is earning 
in the form of dividends.  
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3.7.8 Family Ownership 
It is the total percentage of stocks hold by family members (Pindado, Requejo, & 
Torre, 2008).  
3.7.9 Institutional Ownership 
The total percentage of stocks hold by institutional investors can be used to indicate 
institutional ownership (Blume & Keim, 2012).  
3.7.10 Foreign Ownership 
The total percentage of shares own by foreign investors can be termed as foreign 
ownership (Bircan, 2011).  
3.7.11 Board Independence 
Independent board has a majority of outside non-executive directors have no or 
minimal stakes in the organization and they have no affiliation with top executive 
directors of the organizations. Therefore, board independence is indicated as 
percentage of independent directors on the board (Abidin, Kamal, & Jusoff, 2009; 
Hermalin & Weisbach, 2001). 
3.7.12 Board Size 
The number of board of directors is the proxy of this variable (Abidin et al., 2009; 
Booth, Cornett, & Tehranian, 2002).  
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3.7.13 CEO Duality 
When CEO also holds the position of chairman then it is called CEO duality. 
Researchers measured it as a dummy variable, 1 if CEO is also a chairman; 0 
otherwise (Booth et al., 2002; Dorata & Petra, 2008).  
3.8 Summary of the Chapter 
Chapter three is regarding proposed methodology to conduct the study. This chapter 
has discussed the theoretical and conceptual framework of the study supported by 
underpinning theories. Directional hypotheses are also developed in this study with 
theoretical and empirical evidence from prior academic literature.  The justification of 
measurements of the variables along with the authors who previously utilized them 
are also mentioned. In addition, all companies listed on KSE listed companies are 
selected for data collection. The chapter also discussed the units of analyses and 
statistical techniques accordingly, e.g. diagnostic tests and multiple linear regression. 
Last but not the least, operational model and definition of terms are elaborated 
concisely.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
4.0 Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to analyze the data and interpret the results 
pertaining to the model of this study. In the model, various determinants of CEO 
compensation has been tested along with different moderating variables. In order to 
construe clarity on how the data analysis is made, this chapter is separated into 
different sections. Section 4.1 is related to data cleaning. Section 4.2 illustrates the 
descriptive analysis of the data. The process of data screening and validity has been 
shown in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 discusses and review the multiple regression 
analysis. Section 4.5 is regarding the results of hypothesis testing and summary of 
these analysis. Lastly, the chapter is concluded with the summary of the chapter in 
Section 4.6. 
4.1 Data Cleaning 
The data has been collected from the annual reports of companies listed on Pakistan 
Stock Exchange because these companies fall under the jurisdiction of Security and 
Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) and Code of Corporate Governance 
(2012). Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) has been divided into several sector as shown 
in Table 4.1. This study has selected the period from 2010 to 2014 because due to 
financial crisis in year 2008, the companies were able to sustain in year 2010. Annual 
reports were downloaded from the relative websites of the companies. The 
information regarding CEO compensation was mentioned in the notes of annual 
reports. The values to estimate operating performance, firm size and market share 
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were stated in income statement. Moreover, earning per share was also available on 
income statement though book value of equity was extracted from balance sheet. 
However, KSE website was consulted to extract the share price and market 
capitalization to calculate market performance and growth opportunities.   
The information pertaining to dividend was mentioned in Director‘s report to 
shareholders and in the notice of annual general meeting. The data regarding 
ownership structure was available in the ―Categories of Shareholders‖. Moreover, 
information to evaluate board characteristics was stated in the Statement of 
Compliance with the Code of Corporate Governance and Company profile. Almost 
every company listed on KSE was considered. There are almost 558 total companies 
listed on KSE but due to many reasons only the data of 284 companies was available. 
For instance, some of the companies were established after 2010. Some companies 
faced severe deficit and they postponed their operation due to which their annual 
reports were not available. In addition, the companies with different issuance data and 
fiscal year are also excluded from the data. Table 4.1 further illustrates the description 
of available sample.  
Table 4.1 
Descriptive of Available Sample 
Details No. of Firms 
Total Companies 558 
Data unavailable from 2010 to 2014 (167) 
Total 391 
Missing Data (53) 
Total 338 
Different Fiscal Year (54) 
Total Sample 284 
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4.2 Descriptive Statistics  
The descriptive statistics of this study has been illustrated in Table 4.2. The table 
shows the minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation values of all dependent, 
independent and moderating variables from the year 2010 to 2014. The total number 
of observations for every variable are 1420 derived from five years data of 284 KSE 
listed companies. It is revealed from the Table 4.2, on average, the compensation of 
CEOs in Pakistan is 16,106,684 Rupees (USD 154,013). Nonetheless, the minimum 
value shows that some companies have not paid their CEOs any compensation due to 
severe deficit and the maximum compensation has been paid to the CEO of Standard 
Chartered Bank. Previous studies in the context of Pakistan have presented the 
descriptive statistics of CEO compensation in natural logarithm, however, this study 
has demonstrated the descriptive statistics before any transformation for normality to 
make the interpretation realistic.  
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Table 4.2 
Descriptive Statistics 
           N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
CEO Compensation 1420 0.00 277516.00 16106.68 25263.09 
Operating Performance 1420 -98.93 20.48 -0.06 3.44 
Market Performance 1420 -1205.00 14060.00 18.50 377.31 
Firm Size 1420 3.50 20.90 14.97 2.11 
Growth Opportunities 1420 -31.98 2534.88 5.09 81.71 
Market Share 1420 0.00 0.94 0.08 0.14 
Dividend Payout 1420 -193.55 16.67 0.11 5.18 
Dividend Yield 1420 0.00 1.31 0.04 0.07 
Family Ownership 1420 0.00 0.99 0.23 0.26 
Institutional Ownership 1420 0.00 0.99 0.45 0.32 
Foreign Ownership 1420 0.00 0.89 0.05 0.15 
Board Independence 1420 0.00 0.78 0.10 0.14 
Board Size 1420 4.00 21.00 8.02 1.50 
CEO Duality 1420 0 1 0.23 0.42 
Table 4.2 also shows that the average operating performance is negative (i.e. -.0621) 
which means the overall operating efficiency or pricing strategy of KSE listed 
companies is not effective. Additionally, most of the companies are also not able to 
satisfy their creditors as well as shareholders due to inadequate operating cash flow. 
The companies also possess higher financial risk and incompetency to pay their fixed 
costs (Heintz & Parry, 2016). The minimum (-98.93) and maximum (20.48) values 
are illustrating worst and highest operating performance accordingly. A comparison 
with previous studies in the context of Pakistan cannot be made because these studies 
have utilized net profit margin, ROA, ROE or other performance indicators rather 
than operating margin or ROS to conclude their results.  
The market performance has been measured through price to earnings ratio which 
indicates the expected price of a share on the basis of its earning. Table 4.2 
demonstrates that the average P/E ratio of KSE listed companies is 18.51 which is a 
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good indicator of overall future performance. It can also be purported that investors 
could be interested in financing more for the shares of KSE listed companies. 
Minimum value shows the poor market performance of Siemens Pakistan Ltd. and the 
maximum value shows the highest price to earnings ratio of Lotte Pakistan who is a 
chemical manufacturer. Nonetheless, investors need to evaluate other performance 
indicators because this ratio can be manipulated by management with specific 
accounting techniques as it is based on earnings per share (Riggs, 2007).  
According to the author‘s best knowledge, previous study which has investigated 
overall KSE listed companies is not available. However, a study by Afza and Tahir 
(2012) ensured the determinants of price to earnings ratio in chemical sector of 
Pakistan and found an average 7.204 P/E value from year 2005 to 2009 which is 
lower than the P/E ratio of current study. Similarly, Arslan and Zaman (2014) have 
taken 111 non-financial KSE listed companies into account and presented 8.82 mean 
value of P/E ratio from year 1998-2009. It can be postulated that the overall market 
performance has enhanced after year 2009. The literature regarding the utilization of 
P/E ratio in the context of Pakistan is very scarce so further comparison is difficult.  
Natural logarithm of sales was analyzed to measure firm size. On average, the 
companies listed on KSE have achieved a firm size of 14.97 with a minimum value of 
3.5 and a maximum value of 20.90. Previously, Abbas, Bashir, Manzoor and Akram 
(2013) also computed firm size with natural log of sales and found a mean of 13.88 
which is closer to this study. Moreover, growth opportunities has been determined 
through market to book ratio. The book value of company‘s equity indicates the 
historical financing and operating decisions by managers. On the other hand, the 
market value reflects these decisions along with shareholders‘ collective expectations 
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and assessment about the firm‘s future cash flow generating investment opportunities. 
Therefore, higher market to book value ratio indicates that the company possess 
higher growth opportunities (Ryan, 2007).  
Table 4.2 indicates that on the average, there are positive growth opportunities 
(M=5.09) with a minimum value of -31.98 and a maximum value of 2534.88. These 
results are different than the results of previous studies because of different time 
period and limited number of companies investigated by those studies. For instance, 
Hijazi and Tariq (2006) revealed negative growth opportunities (M=-0.0172) in 
cement sector of Pakistan from year 1997-2001. On the other hand, Bushra and Mirza 
(2015) analyzed 75 Karachi listed companies from year 2005 to 2010 and found 1.7 
mean value for market to book value ratio.  
In case of market share, it varies from less than 1 percent to 94 percent. The sector 
with greater number of companies contained diversified market share. On the other 
hand, there is greater market share of a company which lies in the sector with less 
number of companies. Furthermore, the results for dividend payout and dividend yield 
are also demonstrated in the Table 4.2. The growth-oriented firms which aim to 
reinvest in new market, products and services for further expand usually hold low or 
even zero dividend payout ratio. In contrast, mature or established companies pay the 
dividends regularly to satisfy the shareholders and to sustain their share price. The 
minimum value for the dividend payout in the table shows negative ratio due to loss 
faced by the companies. For instance, Siemens Pakistan Ltd. paid their shareholders 
DPS of 120 despite of their negative earnings per share (-0.62) in year 2012, however, 
it was considered as outlier by Cook‘s distance which was excluded from core 
analysis. On the average, the dividend payout ratio is close to 0.11 and dividend yield 
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is almost 0.04. These results are close to the study of Bushra and Mirza (2015) who 
found a mean value of 0.7 dividend payout and 0.06 dividend yield for the 75 
companies listed on KSE.  
In accordance with ownership structure, this study has considered three types of 
ownerships, i.e. family ownership, institutional ownership and foreign ownership. On 
the average, there is almost 23 percent family ownership in KSE along with minimum 
0 percent and maximum 99 percent. The studies who have considered the data prior to 
the implementation of revised Code of Corporate Governance (2012) purported that 
most of the companies in Pakistan are family-owned (Shah & Butt, 2009). 
Nevertheless, after the revised Code, the family ownership has been reduced as shown 
in the Table 4.2. This notion has been supported by the study of Bushra and Mirza 
(2015) who found 34 percent average family ownership. 
The largest ownership in Pakistan Stock Exchange is institutional ownership (M = 
0.45) with the minimum zero and maximum 99.1 percent institutional ownership. 
However, the mean value regarding this ownership type varies across studies due to 
their limited sample size or older data. For instance, Bushra and Mirza (2015) found 
49 percent average institutional ownership. On the other hand, Kamran and Shah 
(2014) investigated 372 KSE listed companies over the period 2003 to 2010 and 
found 36 percent institutional ownership. Tahir, Saleem and Arshad (2015) have 
carried out their study with a limited sample size of 26 KSE listed companies from 
year 2008 to 2013 and evaluated 26 percent average institutional ownership. 
However, Table 4.2 shows that foreign ownership is lowest in Pakistan Stock 
Exchange (M = 0.05).  
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Before the implementation of revised Code of Corporate Governance (2012), 
independent directors were almost absent in Pakistan. However, after the circulation 
of this Code, the importance of independent directors have been emerged. 
Nevertheless, still some companies do not include independent directors as the 
minimum value shows in Table 4.2 is zero percent though the maximum value is 78 
percent. On the average, KSE is comprised of 10 percent independent directors. 
Although, this percentage is low at this instance but it is expected that Security and 
Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) will enforce companies regarding the 
maximum representation of independent directors on the boards in near future. 
Previous studies in the perspective of Pakistan supported the argument that before the 
implementation of revised Code, independent directors in KSE were very minimal. 
For instance, Iftikhar-ul-Amin, Iftikhar and Yasir (2013) revealed only 2.83 average 
independent directors in 40 KSE listed companies over the period 2006 to 2010.  
Most of the researchers and agency theorists favor smaller board over larger board 
size. Jensen (1993) prefer smaller board size which emerges from organizational and 
technological change and eventually leads to downsizing and cost cutting. In case of 
larger board size, some directors may tag along as free-riders and may increase the 
agency problems (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). Although, most of the researchers 
did not mention any specific or optimal board size in their studies but Lipton and 
Lorch (1992) argued that board size between seven to eight members could take 
effective decisions. This study has evaluated that the average board size in KSE is 
eight which can be considered as optimal board size. Additionally, the minimum 
board size is 4 and the maximum is 21.  
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These results are similar to the study of Chugtai and Tahir (2015) who also found 8.34 
average board size in Pakistan over the period 2009 to 2013. Furthermore, very close 
results (M=7.9) have been postulated by Daud, Qazi and Atta-Ur-Rahman (2015) 
while analyzing 30 companies listed on KSE from 2007 to 2011. Table 4.2 also 
specifies that there is almost 23 percent (M=.23) CEO duality in Pakistan Stock 
Exchange. Although, the revised Code of Corporate Governance (2012) has 
discouraged the duality of positions but still some family firms contain CEO duality. 
Nonetheless, it is expected that CEO duality will be vanished from Pakistan in near 
future as per the strict guidelines of SECP.  
4.3 Data Screening and Validity 
This study has utilized multiple regression analysis to fulfill the objectives of the 
research. However, before analyzing the data, some assumptions need to be satisfied, 
i.e. outliers, normality, linearity, Multicollinearity, autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity. Therefore, the analyses has been conducted accordingly.  
4.3.1 Identification of Outliers  
Outliers are those observations, which are particularly different from other 
observation due to their unique characteristics. Existence of outlier in the data can be 
due to data entry error, an unanticipated extraordinary event or an extra ordinary event 
that has an explanation (Hair et al., 2006). However, Tabachnick and Fidell (1996) 
argue that these outliers can be questionable as they can misrepresent or mislead the 
results. Tabachnick and Fidel (2007) defined outliers as value that have such extreme 
scores on an individual variable, or on a set of variables, which eventually distort the 
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overall results. There are several methods to identify the potential outliers 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).  
Outliers that are unattached cases from the rest of data can be identified by using 
histogram in graphical method. On the other hand, Mahalanobis distance proposed by 
Mahalanobis (1936) can be computed to detect outliers in a statistical procedure. 
Furthermore, Cook‘s distances by Cook (1977) can also be calculated to further 
recognize the outliers. Cook‘s distances are measures of influence and cases with 
influence scores of more than one are suspected of being outliers (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 1996).  
This study has utilized Cook‘s distance to identify the outliers because Mahalanobis 
distance was evaluating too much outliers and also it was increasing the variance of 
some regression coefficients. Pardoe (2012) purported that the observations with a 
Cook‘s distance less than 0.5 are rarely so influential. There were some potential 
observations in the model with the Cook‘s distance greater than 0.5 which were 
removed accordingly. Table 4.3 shows the Cook‘s distance statistics for the model 
(CEO compensation). The analysis has detected almost 170 outliers which were 
removed from the main dataset. Accordingly, the final observations for the model are 
1250 (see Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3 
Cook’s Distance Statistics 
  Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Cook's Distance 0 0.039 0.001 0.002 1250 
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4.3.2 Identification of Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity is also known as collinearity which means two or more explanatory 
or independent variables are highly correlated in a multiple regression model. With a 
substantial degree of accuracy, one can be linearly predicted from the others in case of 
perfect multicollinearity. Multicollinearity issue has adverse effect on assumptions 
and usage of regression analysis. This study has utilized Pearson‘s Correlation, 
tolerance value and variance inflation factor (VIF) to identify the existence of 
multicollinearity issue among the predictor variables. According to Hair et al. (2010) 
tolerance value is the variability in a variable that is not accounted for other variable. 
In addition, the VIF indicator is the proxy and corresponding to the tolerance value. 
Tolerance value should be more than 0.1 and VIF should be less than 10 to indicate 
that there is no multicollinearity issue among independent variables and they are not 
highly correlated.  
Table 4.4 demonstrates that there is no issue of multicollinearity as no tolerance value 
is higher than 0.1 and also all VIF values are lower than 10 in all three models. 
Additionally, this issue has also confirmed through Pearson‘s correlation. Researchers 
argued that there could be the problem of multicollinearity if the correlation among 
independent variables is above 0.9 (Hair et al., 2010; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
Table 4.5 illustrated that all the correlation coefficients are below 0.9 with the highest 
correlation (-.69) between institutional and family ownership. Therefore, no issue of 
multicollinearity has been confirmed.  
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Table 4.4 
Collinearity Statistics  
Variables Tolerance VIF 
Operating Performance 0.39 2.57 
Market Performance 0.18 5.66 
Firm Size 0.27 3.76 
Growth Opportunities 0.43 2.33 
Market Share 0.33 2.99 
Board Independence 0.70 1.42 
Board Size 0.61 1.64 
CEO Duality 0.74 1.35 
Family Ownership 0.40 2.50 
Institutional Ownership 0.39 2.54 
Foreign Ownership 0.58 1.73 
Dividend Payout 0.14 7.02 
Dividend Yield 0.12 8.60 
OPBI 0.67 1.49 
MPBI 0.57 1.77 
SizeBI 0.41 2.47 
GOBI 0.59 1.70 
MSBI 0.41 2.46 
OPBoard 0.71 1.40 
MPBoard 0.57 1.77 
SizeBoard 0.27 3.74 
GOBoard 0.51 1.98 
MSBoard 0.29 3.44 
OPCEOD 0.61 1.64 
MPCEOD 0.50 1.98 
SizeCEOD 0.30 3.36 
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GOCEOD 0.55 1.80 
MSCEOD 0.32 3.16 
OPFamO 0.31 3.25 
MPFamO 0.30 3.36 
SizeFamO 0.17 5.94 
GOFamO 0.33 3.02 
MSFamO 0.19 5.19 
OPInstO 0.31 3.25 
MPInstO 0.29 3.51 
SizeInstO 0.15 6.54 
GOInstO 0.33 3.08 
MSInstO 0.18 5.67 
OPForO 0.57 1.75 
MPForO 0.55 1.82 
SizeForO 0.34 2.95 
GOForO 0.56 1.77 
MSForO 0.34 2.94 
OPDPR 0.43 2.32 
MPDPR 0.25 4.05 
SizeDPR 0.24 4.17 
GODPR 0.39 2.60 
MSDPR 0.29 3.42 
OPDY 0.21 4.83 
MPDY 0.13 7.70 
SizeDY 0.19 5.26 
GODY 0.13 7.91 
MSDY 0.29 3.43 
Note: OPBI= Interaction of operating performance with board independence, MPBI= Interaction of 
market performance with board independence, SizeBI= Interaction of firm size with board 
independence, GOBI= Interaction of growth opportunities with board independenc e, MSBI= 
Interaction of market share with board independence, OPBoard= Interaction of operating performance 
with board size, MPBoard= Interaction of market performance with board size, SizeBoard= Interaction 
of firm size with board size, GOBoard= Interaction of growth opportunities with board size, MSBoard= 
Interaction of market share with board size, OPCEOD= Interaction of operating performance with CEO 
duality, MPCEOD= Interaction of market performance with CEO duality, SizeCEOD= Interaction of 
firm size with CEO duality, GOCEOD= Interaction of growth opportunities with CEO duality, 
MSCEOD= Interaction of market share with CEO duality, OPFamO= Interaction of operating 
performance with family ownership, MPFamO= Interaction of market performance with family 
ownership, SizeFamO= Interaction of firm size with family ownership, GOFamO= Interaction of 
growth opportunities with family ownership, MSFamO= Interaction of market share with family 
ownership, OPInstO= Interaction of operating performance with institutional ownership, MPInstO= 
Interaction of market performance with institutional ownership, SizeInstO= Interaction of firm size 
with institutional ownership, GOInstO= Interaction of growth opportunities with institutional 
ownership, MSInstO= Interaction of market share with institutional ownership, OPForO= Interaction 
of operating performance with foreign ownership, MPForO= Interaction of market performance with 
foreign ownership, SizeForO= Interaction of firm size with foreign ownership, GOForO= Interaction of 
growth opportunities with foreign ownership, MSForO= Interaction of market share with foreign 
ownership, OPDPR= Interaction of operating performance with dividend payout, MPDPR= Interaction 
of market performance with dividend payout, SizeDPR= Interaction of firm size with dividend payout, 
GODPR= Interaction of growth opportunities with dividend payout, MSDPR= Interaction of market 
share with dividend payout, OPDY= Interaction of operating performance with dividend yield, 
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MPDY= Interaction of market performance with dividend yield, SizeDY= Interaction of firm size with 
dividend yield, GODY= Interaction of growth opportunities with dividend yield, MSDY= Interaction 
of market share with dividend yield.  
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Table 4.5 
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients 
 
CEO OP MP Size GO MS BI Board CEOD FamO InstO ForO DPR 
CEO 1 
            
OP .108** 1 
           
MP .211** -.141** 1 
          
Size .563** -.293** .089** 1 
         
GO -.274** -0.016 -.454** -.208** 1 
        
MS .539** -.103** .173** .688** -.222** 1 
       
BI -.320** -.102** -.159** -.185** .124** -.140** 1 
      
Board -.274** .070* -.108** -.269** .144** -.232** .111** 1 
     
CEOD -.295** -.088** -.158** -.124** .136** -.142** .192** .228** 1 
    
FamO -.365** -.105** -.161** -.236** .139** -.304** .218** .145** .208** 1 
   
InstO .390** .100** .096** .237** -.112** .245** -.197** -.185** -.265** -.690** 1 
  
ForO -.293** -.138** -.106** -.283** .128** -.265** .144** 0.02 .129** .224** -0.016 1 
 
DPR -.254** -.117** -.253** -.198** .245** -.246** .066* .082** .083** .183** -.142** .132** 1 
DY 0.039 -.105** .146** -0.041 -.123** -0.039 -0.024 -.071* -0.01 0.039 0.018 -0.032 .449** 
Note: CEO= CEO Compensation, OP= Operating performance, MP= Market performance, Size= Firm size, GO= Growth opportunities, MS= Market share, 
BI= Board independence, Board= Board size, CEOD= CEO duality, FamO= Family ownership, InstO= Institutional ownership, ForO= Foreign ownership, 
DPR= Dividend payout ratio, DY= Dividend yield. **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-
tailed).
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4.3.3 Normality 
One of the assumptions of regression analysis is to ensure normality for the fitness of 
data. According to Kline (1998), normality means that the distribution of the error (or 
residual) is normally distributed. Statisticians have suggested many ways to test the 
normality of the data. However, this study has selected normality plots along with 
kurtosis and skewness value to interpret the outcomes. Primarily analysis 
demonstrated that most of the variables were not normally distributed. Researchers 
argued that if the data would not be normal then transformation methods could be 
employed to transform the data into normality (Hair et al., 1998).  
Box-Cox power transformation has been utilized to transform the skewed data toward 
normality. Box and Cox (1964) proposed a power transformation tool with the 
intention of reducing anomalies such as heteroscedasticity, non-normality and non-
additivity. This technique use an adequate exponent (optimal Lambda) to transform 
data within the normality curve. An online tool is available which has been developed 
by Wessa (2016) to evaluate the optimal Lambda. All skewed variables were further 
transformed by using QI Marcos for Microsoft Excel. Table 4.6 has illustrated the 
variables along with their respective optimal Lambdas. Nonetheless, Box-Cox 
transformation does not deal with zero and negative values, therefore, variables with 
zero values were transformed to Log(X+c) and negative values were transformed to 
positive values by using larger Lambda (i.e. λ=2).  
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Table 4.6 
Optimal Lambda for Box-Cox Transformation 
Variables Optimal Lambda 
CEO Compensation 2 
Operating Performance 0.01 
Market Performance 0 
Firm Size 0 
Growth Opportunities -1.37 
Market Share 0.12 
Dividend Payout -2 
Dividend Yield -2 
Family Ownership 1.4 
Institutional Ownership 2 
Foreign Ownership -1.12 
Board Independence -2 
Board Size -1.01 
The data can be usually considered normally distributed if the kurtosis is less than 10 
and the value of skewness is less than 10. Table 4.7 exhibits the skewness and 
kurtosis values for all variables. All variables can be considered reasonably normal as 
the kurtosis values of these variables are less than 10 and the skewness values are 
lower than three except one variable, i.e. Dividend yield. The skewness and kurtosis 
of this variable is not satisfying the criteria for normality. However, it is argued that 
modest violations of univariate normality does not distort the model if it is violating 
the skewness value but not outliers (Hair et al., 2010).  
Katz (2011) also argued that in case of large number of observations, the data as a 
whole can be considered normal or a little deviation cannot affect the overall model. 
Gliner, Morgan and Leech (2011) argued that only dependent variables used in a 
parametric analysis needs to be normally distributed. Thus, it is assumed that the 
inclusion of dividend yield will not distort the model. Furthermore, histogram has also 
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been utilized to ensure the normality assumptions. For CEO compensation model, 
most of the data lies within normality curve (see Figure 4.1).  
Table 4.7 
Testing Normality for the Model 
Variables N 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
CEO Compensation 1250 0.034 0.069 0.022 0.138 
Operating Performance 1250 -0.132 0.069 2.523 0.138 
Market Performance 1250 -0.072 0.069 2.148 0.138 
Firm Size 1250 -0.030 0.069 0.133 0.138 
Growth Opportunities 1250 -0.193 0.069 -1.181 0.138 
Market Share 1250 0.024 0.069 0.146 0.138 
Board Independence 1250 -0.860 0.069 -0.455 0.138 
Board Size 1250 -0.429 0.069 2.699 0.138 
CEO Duality 1250 1.417 0.069 0.007 0.138 
Family Ownership 1250 0.258 0.069 -1.517 0.138 
Institutional Ownership 1250 -0.594 0.069 -0.957 0.138 
Foreign Ownership 1250 -0.937 0.069 -0.897 0.138 
Dividend Payout 1250 -1.808 0.069 2.971 0.138 
Dividend Yield 1250 -6.213 0.069 58.135 0.138 
 
 
Figure 4.1 
Histogram for CEO Compensation  
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4.3.4 Linearity  
One more important assumption of multiple regression is the linear relationship 
between dependent and independent variables. In case of non-linearity, the outcomes 
of regression analysis will under-estimate the true relationship which could increase 
the Type I and Type II error. Usually, it can be purported that the linearity assumption 
is fulfilled if a relationship between all variables which can be graphically described 
by a straight-line passing through the data cloud (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
Researchers have described various methods to detect non-linearity (see Berry & 
Feldman, 1985; Cohen & Cohen, 1983; Pedhazur, 1997). Nevertheless, this study has 
utilized Normal P-P Plot to examine the residual plots. Figure 4.2 shows that the 
associations between predicted values and residuals are not clear and most of the data 
lies on the straight line, thus, it confirms that there is no issue of non-linearity.   
 
Figure 4.2 
Normal P-P Plot for CEO Compensation 
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4.3.5 Autocorrelation  
In statistics, the autocorrelation is the cross-correlation of a signal with itself at 
different points in time. There are many ways to detect the issue of autocorrelation 
through many statistical tools, however, Durbin-Watson test has been utilized in this 
study to evaluate the autocorrelation in the residuals. The Durbin-Watson value can 
be lied between 0 and 4 though the value around 2.6 indicates strong negative series 
issue of autocorrelation and the value below 1.4 shows the existence of strong positive 
series problem of correlation (Kazmier, 1996). Table 4.8 shows the Durbin-Watson 
statistic for the model. The value of Durbin-Watson is very close to 2 (i.e. 1.99), 
therefore, it is postulated that there no issue of autocorrelation in any model.  
Table 4.8 
Durbin-Watson Statistics 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
CEO 
Compensation 
0.773 0.598 0.58 2.7257 1.988 
4.3.6 Heteroscedasticity 
The last assumption for multiple regression is the homoscedasticity which means 
criterion variable should shows an equal degree of variance throughout the 
explanatory variables‘ range. It can be assumed that there is no issue of 
heteroscedasticity if the criterion variable does not focus on the limited range of the 
predictor variables. On the other hand, if there is no homoscedasticity then it could 
make insignificant variables seem significant by making the coefficient estimate to be 
underestimated (Hair et al., 2010). This study has detected the independent of errors 
and homoscedasticity through scatterplot. Figure 4.3 has revealed no clear association 
between the predicted value and the residual. The scatterplots are not inclined toward 
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any specific pattern. Therefore, it can be posited that there is no problem of 
heteroscedasticity in any model.  
 
Figure 4.3  
Scatterplot for CEO Compensation 
4.4 Hypothesis Testing  
This section has demonstrated the results of the regression analysis for the CEO 
compensation model. This analysis exhibits the acceptance or rejection of the 
hypotheses of this study. Various groups of hypothesis are explained, H1-H2- firm 
performance, H3- firm size, H4- growth opportunities, H5- market share, H6-H20-  
moderating role of board characteristics, H21-35- moderating role of ownership 
structure and H36-H45- moderating role of dividend policy. The results of regression 
analysis are accordingly elaborated in further table, nonetheless, before interpreting 
the results, a brief summary of model has been described in the Table 4.9.  
Table 4.9 
Summary of the Regression Analysis 
Details Values 
N 1250 
R Square 0.598 
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Adjusted R Square 0.580 
F Statistics 33.569 
p (ANOVA) 0.000 
Note: N= Number of observations; p-value is significant at the 0.001 level 
Table 4.9 explains the observations, goodness of fit and significance of the model. 
The analysis demonstrates that the R2 for the CEO compensation model is 59.8 
percent which means the independent and moderating variables explain almost 59.8 
percent of the variance of CEO compensation. In addition, the model of CEO 
compensation is also significance (F = 33.57, p < 0.001).  
Table 4.10 
Regression Analysis for CEO Compensation Model (Direct Effect of Performance 
Measures) 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t p 
          B         S.E.            Beta 
(Constant) -91.272 17.065 
 
-5.349 0.000** 
Operating Performance 60.648 5.421 0.329 11.188 0.000** 
Market Performance 0.145 0.072 0.088 2.020 0.044* 
Firm Size 0.028 0.003 0.401 11.284 0.000** 
Growth Opportunities 0.068 0.081 0.023 0.840 0.401 
Market Share 5.227 1.062 0.156 4.92 0.000** 
Note: * p < .05; ** p < 0.01 
4.4.1 Effect of Firm Performance on CEO Compensation (H1-H2) 
This study makes an attempt to ensure the impact of operating and market 
performance on CEO compensation. The results of regression analysis has validated 
the positive and significant effect of operating performance on CEO compensation (β  
= 60.65, p = 0.000) as demonstrated in Table 4.10.  This result illustrates that CEO 
compensation is positively aligned to operating performance in Pakistan so this study 
accepts the first hypothesis (H1). An increase in operating performance (operating 
margin) leads to increase in CEO compensation of the companies listed on Pakistan 
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Stock Exchange. The result implies that pay-for-performance sensitivity in term of 
operating performance is strong which supports the notion that high performing 
executives get higher compensation. Most of the previous studies investigated other 
accounting-based performance measures like ROA, ROE, net profit margin etc., 
therefore, the exact comparison cannot be made. However, a positive and significant 
relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation can be found in 
various previous studies (see Anderson & Bizjak, 2003; Brick et al., 2006; Chalmers 
et al., 2006; Fallatah, 2015; Ittner et al., 2003; Ozkan, 2007).  
Prior studies in the perspective of Pakistan exhibited contrary results because prior to 
the implementation of revised Code of Corporate Governance (2012) in Pakistan, 
CEO compensation was not aligned with firm performance. These studies revealed no 
association between CEO compensation and firm performance measured by 
accounting-based performance indicators (Anjam, 2010; Lone et al., 2015; Shah et al., 
2009). In addition, contrary to agency theory, researchers also find negative 
relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance (see Usman et al., 
2015; Younas et al., 2012). There is only one study by Yahya and Ghazali (2015) who 
revealed the results consistent with this study.  
The second hypothesis (H2) has also been accepted in the light of regression analysis 
as there is significant and positive impact of market performance on CEO 
compensation (β = 0.145, p = 0.044). These results are consistent with the results of 
Yahya and Ghazali (2015). The relationship between price-earnings ratio and CEO 
compensation is almost absent in previous academic literature as most of them have 
measured the market performance with either Tobin‘s Q or stock market returns to 
ensure their effect with CEO compensation. For instance, Yermack (1995) found 
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positive relationship between CEO compensation and stock market returns and Frye 
(2004) revealed positive association between Tobin‘s Q and CEO compensation. In 
addition, Vemala et al. (2014) also found that Tobin‘s Q and stock market returns 
were positively aligned to CEO compensation in both pre-crisis and post-crisis period. 
The result of this study are contrary to the study of Al-Matar, Al-Swidi and Fadzil 
(2014) who found insignificant relationship between Tobin‘s Q and CEO 
compensation. On the other hand, Yang, Dolar and Mo (2014) found significant but 
negative relationship between stock-based performance and CEO compensation. 
Nonetheless, the results of Duru and Iyengar (2001) are close to the outcomes of this 
study because they also revealed the positive association of accounting and market 
performance with CEO compensation. Therefore, it can be assumed that revised Code 
of Corporate Governance (2012) has tried to establish pay-performance link in 
Pakistan.  
4.4.2 Effect of Firm Size on CEO Compensation (H3) 
The third hypothesis is related the impact of firm size on CEO compensation. As per 
the expectations, firm size has a significant and positive effect on CEO compensation 
(β = 0.028, p = 0.000) as demonstrated in Table 4.10. The results are consistent with 
the argument that firm size is a major determinant of executive pay as in larger firm 
CEOs get more compensation (Gayle, Golan, & Miller, 2015; Tosi et al., 2000, van 
Essen et al., 2015). There are several previous studies who also found positive 
relationship between executive compensation and firm size (e.g. Chen, Cheung, 
Stouraitis, & Wong, 2005; Conyon, 2006; Dogan & Smyth, 2002; Doucouliagos, 
Haman, & Askary, 2007; Méndez, García, & Rodríguez, 2011; Vemala et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, throughout prior studies related to Pakistan, firm size was the only 
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variable which was aligned to CEO compensation (see Lone et al., 2015; Shah et al., 
2009; Usman et al., 2015, Yahya & Ghazali, 2015).   
However, contrary results are found by Nulla (2013) who found negative impact of 
firm size on CEO bonus and CEO salary. Some researchers are not in the favor of the 
notion that firm size should be the major determinant for CEO compensation. For 
instance, Murphy (1985) revealed that executives sometimes intentionally increase the 
firm size for their personal prestige and compensation even if it harms the 
shareholders‘ interest which could leads to agency conflicts in a firm. Therefore, the 
variation in CEO compensation should not be explained by firm size excessively. This 
argument has been satisfied by the regression analysis as the effect of firm size is not 
very large. 
4.4.3 Effect of Growth Opportunities on CEO Compensation (H4) 
It was hypothesized that growth opportunities have a significant relationship with 
CEO compensation in H4, however, the result for this hypothesis is insignificant (β = 
0.068, p = 0.401). In contrast to the propositions of agency theory, it is revealed that 
CEO compensation in Pakistan is not aligned with growth opportunities. Opposite to 
the result of this hypothesis, there are numerous previous studies who have validated 
that companies with higher growth opportunities pay significantly higher 
compensation to their CEOs (Barnes et al., 2006; Conyon & He, 2008; Gabaix & 
Landier, 2008; Smith & Watts, 1992; Yahya & Ghazali, 2015). Nonetheless, the 
outcome of this study is close to the studies of Abrahamson and De Ridder (2010), 
Fallatah (2015) and Tariq (2010), who also do not revealed any significant 
relationship between CEO remuneration and growth opportunities measured by 
market-to-book ratio.  
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However, according to agency theory perspective, if the agent‘s (CEO) goals are not 
aligned with the objectives of principals (shareholders) then they could expropriate 
their resources. For instance, if the growth opportunities will not be aligned to CEO 
compensation then CEOs could misuse the free cash flow and could indulge 
themselves in value-destroying activities to enhance their personal wealth. The 
empirical evidence regarding the value-destructing actions of managers can be 
observed in previous academic literature (Chun et al. 2005; Gul, 2001). 
4.4.4 Effect of Market Share on CEO Compensation (H5) 
This study evaluates a positive and significant impact of market share on CEO 
compensation (β = 5.227, p = 0.000) as shown in Table 4.10, therefore, this study 
accepts the fifth hypothesis (H5). According to researcher‘s best knowledge, there is 
no previous study till date which validated the empirical relationship between CEO 
compensation and market share except the study of Yahya and Ghazali (2015) who 
also found similar results. Nonetheless, this results can be elaborated with previous 
theoretical contributions. For instance, Balsam (2002, p. 7) proposed that managerial 
compensation should be tied to managerial efforts including market share.  
According to Ferreira (2015), high competition in the market may affect the 
managerial pay structures and Raith (2003) found a causal relationship between 
managerial compensation and market competition. With the increase in competition, 
the demand for gaining market share increase and the supply of executive talent 
remain limited so in that case the price of top talent may increase. Thus, if the 
remuneration of executives will be aligned to market share then they will work harder 
to gain and maintain the market share to enhance their perks in the compensation 
packages. Therefore, it is postulated that there is efficient market or high market 
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competition in Pakistan which induced firms to align their CEO‘s compensation with 
market share.  
 
 
Table 4.11 
Regression Analysis for CEO Compensation Model (Direct and Moderating Effect of 
Board Characteristics) 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
          B             S.E.           Beta 
(Constant) -91.27 17.07  -5.35 0.000*** 
Board 
Independence 
-0.229 0.061 -0.082 -3.765 0.000*** 
Board Size -23.229 5.103 -0.107 -4.552 0.000*** 
CEO Duality -1.206 0.22 -0.117 -5.486 0.000*** 
OPBI 0.192 0.1 0.043 1.925 0.055* 
MPBI 0.114 0.104 0.027 1.094 0.274 
SizeBI -0.339 0.11 -0.089 -3.074 0.002*** 
GOBI 0.122 0.102 0.029 1.198 0.231 
MSBI 0.124 0.117 0.03 1.057 0.291 
OPBoard 0.277 0.099 0.061 2.794 0.005*** 
MPBoard -0.099 0.118 -0.02 -0.833 0.405 
SizeBoard 0.13 0.119 0.039 1.091 0.276 
GOBoard -0.149 0.109 -0.035 -1.365 0.172 
MSBoard 0.1 0.123 0.028 0.814 0.416 
OPCEOD -0.353 0.106 -0.078 -3.325 0.001*** 
MPCEOD 0.037 0.108 0.009 0.347 0.728 
SizeCEOD -0.367 0.155 -0.079 -2.359 0.018** 
GOCEOD -0.354 0.107 -0.081 -3.304 0.001*** 
MSCEOD 0.063 0.14 0.015 0.453 0.651 
Note: OPBI= Interaction of operating performance with board independence, MPBI= 
Interaction of market performance with board independence, SizeBI= Interaction of firm size 
with board independence, GOBI= Interaction of growth opportunities with board 
independence, MSBI= Interaction of market share with board independence, OPBoard= 
Interaction of operating performance with board size, MPBoard= Interaction of market 
performance with board size, SizeBoard= Interaction of firm size with board size, GOBoard= 
Interaction of growth opportunities with board size, MSBoard= Interaction of market share 
with board size, OPCEOD= Interaction of operating performance with CEO duality, 
MPCEOD= Interaction of market performance with CEO duality, SizeCEOD= Interaction of 
firm size with CEO duality, GOCEOD= Interaction of growth opportunities with CEO 
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duality, MSCEOD= Interaction of market share with CEO duality; * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p 
< .01 
4.4.5 Moderating Role of Board Independence (H6-H10) 
Agency theorists argued that the board should be comprised of independent directors 
to ensure superior control and monitoring over agents (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Furthermore, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) independent board of directors could 
weaken the CEO‘s bargaining power. These director abstain the CEOs from rent 
extracting in the form of remuneration. There are various studies who have ensured 
the effect of independent directors on CEO compensation empirically. For instance, 
Core et al. (1999) found that independent director desist CEOs to withdraw a high 
level of compensation. Consistent with this argument, this study also assesses the 
significantly negative impact of board independence (percentage of independent 
directors) on CEO compensation (β = -0.229, p = 0.000). Similar results were found 
by Fallatah (2015). Nonetheless, studies posited that the percentage of independent 
directors on the board should be at least 60 percent to efficiently monitor the CEOs or 
to fire them in case of their poor performance (Weisbach, 1988).  
Despite of only 10 percent (on average) representation of independent directors on the 
board in Pakistan Stock Exchange (as discussed in Table 4.2), they are capable of 
aligning CEO‘s compensation with operating performance (β = 0.192, p = 0.055). 
Although the p-value is weak significant but H6 can be accepted. This result is 
consistent with the argument of van Essen et al. (2015) who also anticipated that the 
board independence positively moderate the pay-performance link. Nevertheless, the 
role of independent directors in Pakistan are ineffective as an alignment mechanism to 
market performance and CEO compensation (β = 0.114, p = 0.274), resulting in 
rejection of H7. There is a possibility that the discretion and empowerment of 
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independent directors could be enhanced with their greater representation on board as  
a previous study by Chee-Wooi and Chwee-Ming (2010) purported that pay-
performance link can be reinforced by independent director if they are more than 50 
percent.  
In the light of regression results, H8 has also been rejected. Board independence has 
significant but negative moderating effect on the relationship between firm size and 
CEO compensation (β = -0.339, p = 0.002). It could be due to the substantial control 
over CEOs to extract their remuneration by increasing the firm size to enhance their 
personal wealth (Murphy, 1985). Thus, it is suggested that independent directors may 
weaken the pay-size link to refrain the CEOs from rent extraction. The ninth 
hypothesis (H9) is also rejected because there is insignificant moderating effect of 
board independence between growth opportunities and CEO compensation (β = 
0.122, p = 0.231). Owing to the limited number of independent directors their 
influence on linking growth opportunities with CEO compensation is also ineffective. 
The regression analysis also provides evidence regarding the insignificance of H10. 
The results show that there is insignificant moderating effect of board independence 
on the association between market share and CEO compensation (β = 0.124, p = 
0.291). In general, the results suggested that the representation and participation of 
independent directors in Pakistani stock market should be enhanced so they would be 
able to align the interest of principals and agents.    
4.4.6 Moderating Role of Board Size (H11-H15) 
There are several previous studies who considered board size as one of the crucial 
determinant of corporate governance mechanism as well as CEO compensation (Abed 
et al., 2014; Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; Fallatah, 2015; Jensen, 1993). Studies also 
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revealed that monitoring ability of the board of directors become susceptible and 
weak with the increase in board size (Core et al., 1999; Lee & Chen, 2011). 
Moreover, it becomes a challenging situation to control the action of CEOs if there is 
larger board size (Cahan, Chua, & Nyamori, 2005). Nonetheless, opposite to these 
arguments, this study found a negative and significance impact of board size on CEO 
compensation (β = -23.229, p = 0.000). This result is consistent with the study of 
Rashid (2013) who also found similar relationship in Pakistan. Nonetheless, the result 
is contrary to the previous numerous studies who found positive relationship between 
CEO compensation and board size (Ali & Teulon, 2014; Core et al., 1999; 
Fahlenbrach, 2009; Guest, 2008; Lee & Chen, 2011; Ozkan, 2007, van Essen et al., 
2015).  
However, there is another point of view present in the previous academic literature 
which is consistent with outcome of this study. For instance, according to Ezzamel 
and Watson (1998), board of directors can monitor the action of the top management 
effectively. It is also argued that larger board size is associated with the quality of 
internal governance mechanism and due to more experience and time as compared to 
small board, they can monitor the actions of managers more effectively (Lipton & 
Lorsch, 1992). Larger board can also effectively protect shareholders‘ interests (Zahra 
& Pearce, 1989). Thus, it is purported that board of directors in Pakistan restrict CEOs 
to extract high level of remuneration.  
Jensen (1993) asserted that board size comprise of up to seven or eight members 
could control the CEO and function more adequately. As documented in Table 4.2, 
the average number of board members in KSE are not too large (M = 8). Therefore, 
the result for H11 shows positive and significant moderating effect of board size on 
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the relationship between operating performance and CEO compensation (β = 0.277, p 
= 0.005). Nonetheless, these results are consistent with resource dependence theory 
rather than agency theory, therefore, this study rejects H11.  This result is consistent 
with the outcome of van Essen et al. (2015) who also found positive impact of board 
size on pay-performance link in their meta-analysis.  
Nonetheless, Fahlenbrach (2009) and Ozkan (2007) documented that board size has 
negative effect on pay-performance sensitivity. In Pakistan, board of directors can 
strengthen the link between operating performance and CEO compensation. 
Nevertheless, they are not effective as alignment mechanism in case of market 
performance (β = -0.099, p = 0.405), firm size (β = 0.13, p = 0.276), growth 
opportunities (β = -0.149, p = 0.172), and market share (β = 0.1, p = 0.416). Taking 
into consideration of regression results, H12, H13, H14 and H15 have been rejected.  
4.4.7 Moderating Role of CEO Duality (H16-H20) 
This study shows a significant negative impact of CEO duality on CEO compensation 
(β = -1.206, p = 0.000). Most the previous studies found the results opposite to the 
outcome of this study. These studies found positive relationship between CEO duality 
and CEO compensation (Nulla, 2013; Vemala et al., 2014; Ya‘acob, 2016). Agency 
theorists proposed that duality of positions represent ineffective board monitoring 
over managers and eventually leads to CEO entrenchment (Kim, Al-Shammari, Kim, 
& Lee, 2009) and higher inherent risk (Dickins, 2010).  
On the other hand, the supporters of the CEO duality argued that they provide single 
focal point for company leadership. Moreover, CEOs with duality of positions have 
clear focus for operations and objectives (Anderson & Anthony, 1986; Stoeberl & 
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Sherony, 1985). Furthermore, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) argued that CEO 
duality can be beneficial if firm require strong leaderships and its operations need 
quick decisions. Contrary to agency theory, stewardship theory is the advocate of 
CEO duality. According to Ghazal (2015), many researchers have been quick to 
disapprove the advantages of CEO duality. When CEOs are given higher level of 
responsibility, they act as stewards on behalf of their respective shareholders and 
firms. Therefore, it is purported that CEOs with duality of positions in Pakistan are 
either stewards who withdraw less remuneration and distribute more to their 
shareholders or due to the lower profitability in the firms with CEO duality, they have 
no option other than extracting lower compensation.  
The results for the moderating role of CEO duality is consistent with agency theory 
perspective that it adversely affect the pay-performance link. For instance, the 
regression analysis shows that there is significant negative moderating effect of CEO 
duality between operating performance and CEO compensation (β = -0.353, p = 
0.001) which leads to acceptance of H16. It is purported that CEO duality weakens 
the pay-performance link which could leads to agency conflicts in an organization. 
Fahlenbrach (2009) also found that CEO duality is an indicator of high CEO power 
and weak corporate governance so it adversely affect the pay-performance sensitivity. 
However, contrary results were found by Dorata and Petra (2008) and Dey, Engel and 
Liu (2011). Dorata and Petra (2008) found positive moderating role of CEO duality 
on the association between CEO compensation and firm performance. Similarly, Dey 
et al. (2011) revealed that pay-performance sensitivity are higher in the firms with 
CEO duality.  
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Nonetheless, the result for the moderating effect of CEO duality between CEO 
compensation and market performance is insignificant (β = 0.037, p = 0.728). 
Previously, van Essen et al. (2015) also asserted same results that CEO duality has no 
moderating effect on the pay-performance link. The results also accept the H18 by 
validating that CEO duality significantly and negatively moderate the relationship 
between firm size and CEO compensation (β = -0.367, p = 0.018). These results are 
supported by managerial power theory that CEOs with duality of position gain power 
and distort the pay-setting process by weakening the pay-performance relationship. In 
addition, although there is no direct relationship between growth opportunities and 
CEO compensation but CEO duality can further weaken the relationship between 
growth opportunities and CEO compensation (β = -0.354, p = 0.001). CEO duality 
restrict the firms to align the CEO compensation with growth opportunities so the 
study also accepts H19. The last hypothesis for the moderating role of CEO duality 
(H20) is also rejected because it does not significantly moderates the relationship 
between market share and CEO compensation (β = 0.063, p = 0.651). The overall 
results suggested that CEO duality is either ineffective or adversely affect the pay-
performance link. 
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Table 4.12 
Regression Analysis for CEO Compensation Model (Direct and Moderating Effect of 
Ownership Structure) 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
  B         S.E.            Beta 
(Constant) -91.27 17.07  -5.35 0.000*** 
Family Ownership -0.102 0.144 -0.021 -0.711 0.477 
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.34 0.102 0.097 3.325 0.001*** 
Foreign Ownership -0.223 0.08 -0.067 -2.779 0.006*** 
OPFamO 0.522 0.155 0.111 3.362 0.001*** 
MPFamO 0.085 0.152 0.019 0.556 0.578 
SizeFamO 0.195 0.193 0.045 1.012 0.312 
GOFamO 0.01 0.141 0.002 0.068 0.946 
MSFamO -0.19 0.189 -0.042 -1.006 0.314 
OPInstO 0.133 0.159 0.028 0.84 0.401 
MPInstO 0.39 0.144 0.093 2.706 0.007*** 
SizeInstO 0.396 0.208 0.089 1.904 0.057* 
GOInstO 0.106 0.139 0.025 0.764 0.445 
MSInstO -0.352 0.205 -0.075 -1.721 0.085* 
OPForO -0.111 0.11 -0.024 -1.008 0.313 
MPForO -0.283 0.122 -0.057 -2.319 0.021** 
SizeForO -0.086 0.123 -0.022 -0.698 0.485 
GOForO -0.205 0.103 -0.049 -1.992 0.047** 
MSForO 0.443 0.128 0.109 3.46 0.001*** 
Note: OPFamO= Interaction of operating performance with family ownership, MPFamO= 
Interaction of market performance with family ownership, SizeFamO= Interaction of firm 
size with family ownership, GOFamO= Interaction of growth opportunities with family 
ownership, MSFamO= Interaction of market share with family ownership, OPInstO= 
Interaction of operating performance with institutional ownership, MPInstO= Interaction of 
market performance with institutional ownership, SizeInstO= Interaction of firm size with 
institutional ownership, GOInstO= Interaction of growth opportunities with institutional 
ownership, MSInstO= Interaction of market share with institutional ownership, OPForO= 
Interaction of operating performance with foreign ownership, MPForO= Interaction of market 
performance with foreign ownership, SizeForO= Interaction of firm size with foreign 
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ownership, GOForO= Interaction of growth opportunities with foreign ownership, MSForO= 
Interaction of market share with foreign ownership; * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
4.4.8 Moderating Role of Family Ownership (H21-H25) 
This study asserted that there is no significant impact of family ownership on CEO 
compensation (β = -0.102, p = 0.477). Family ownership does not predict any 
variation in the CEO compensation in Pakistan. This result is consistent with the study 
of Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Oreland (2008). In contrast, some studies posited 
that family ownership and control reduce the CEO compensation (Block, 2008; Croci 
et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003; McConaughy, 2000; Palmberg, 2009). This 
view has been supported by alignment effect in optimal contracting theory that family 
owners monitor the CEO compensation packages more effectively. Moreover, the 
CEOs in family firms are usually risk-averse who take less risk and accept lower 
remuneration in exchange of job security (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003). 
On the other hand, some studies who found positive relationship between CEO 
compensation and family ownership support managerial power theory (Chen et al., 
2005; Haid & Yurtoglu, 2006). However, this study does not support managerial 
power theory or optimal contracting theory with regard to the association between 
family ownership and CEO compensation. Owing to the dominance of institutional 
investors and the reduction of family ownership in Pakistan, family owners do not 
actively participate in the pay-setting process of CEO remuneration.  
Previous theorists and researchers assumed that pay-performance link is not relevant 
in family firms due to the nonexistence of separation between control and ownership. 
Therefore, there are no agency costs involved in these firms, however, some studies 
revealed the existence of agency conflicts in these organizations due to self-control 
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and lack of minority shareholder protection issues (Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, & Dino, 
2005; Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003). Chrisman et al. (2007) stated that in 
practice, many family firms tried to align the pay of managers with their performance. 
Thus, this study also make an attempt to test the moderating role of family ownership 
between operating performance and CEO compensation in H21. As the result of this 
hypothesis is significant (β = 0.522, p = 0.001), so it is purported that family 
ownership strengthen the link between operating performance and CEO 
compensation.  
Consistent to this outcome, previously, Michiels et al. (2013) also found that there is a 
moderating effect of family ownership on pay-for-performance relationship. Family 
owners usually align the pay of their managers with performance to resolve the 
agency issues regarding self-control and parental altruism (Michiels et al., 2013). 
However, the regression results also revealed that family ownership is effective in 
aligning only the operating performance with their CEO‘s remuneration. Table 4.12 
shows insignificant results for the moderating effect of family ownership between 
market performance and CEO compensation (β = 0.085, p = 0.578). Similarly, family 
ownership also does not moderate the relationship between firm size and CEO 
compensation (β = 0.195, p = 0.312). In the same lines, family owners in Pakistan are 
also incapable of aligning the CEO‘s compensation with growth opportunities (β = 
0.01, p = 0.946) and market share (β = -0.19, p = 0.314). Consequently, the results of 
this study rejected H22, H23, H24 and H25.  
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4.4.9 Moderating Role of Institutional Ownership (H26-H30) 
The result exhibited in Table 4.12 for the impact of institutional ownership on CEO 
compensation is positive and significant (β = 0.34, p = 0.001). This outcome is 
consistent with previous studies, such as studies by Croci et al. (2012), Fernandes, 
Ferreira, Matos and Murphy (2012), Khan, Dharwadkar and Brandes (2005), 
Kiamehr, Asa'di Moghaddam, Alipour and Hajeb (2015), Lee and Chen (2011), 
Victoravich, Xu and Gan (2013). The findings of their studies suggested that 
institutional investors are willing to pay a higher compensation to the CEOs for their 
efforts. However, it is not supported by the argument that institutional investors in 
Pakistan are efficient in constraining managerial power (Chen & Firth, 2005; Hartzell 
& Starks, 2003; Khalatyan & Jouri, 2010; Ozkan, 2007; van Essen et al., 2015).  
Researchers also found that institutional investors can effectively monitor the 
executives and mitigate the agency conflicts by influencing positively on pay-
performance relationship. However, this study does not discovered any significant 
moderating role of institutional ownership in aligning operating performance with 
CEO compensation (β = 0.133, p = 0.401) resulting in the rejection of H26. These 
results are contrary to the studies of Dharwadkar et al. (2008), Feng et al. (2010), 
Hartzell and Starks (2003), Ozkan (2011) and van Essen et al. (2015) that find 
negative influence of institutional ownership on CEO compensation and positive 
influence on pay-performance relationship. 
The results of this study are consistent with Gallagher, Smith and Swan (2006) who 
found that institutional investors pay higher level of remuneration to their CEOs 
which leads to lower level of pay-performance sensitivity. On the other hand, this 
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study found positive and significant moderating effect of institutional ownership on 
the association between market performance and CEO compensation (β = 0.39, p = 
0.007) leading to acceptance of H27. It is purported that institutional investors in 
Pakistan are more concerned about aligning their CEO‘s compensation with market 
performance rather than operating performance. This outcome can be justified with 
the studies of Ozkan (2011) and van Essen et al. (2015). Institutional investors in 
Pakistan are also effective in aligning their CEO‘s compensation with firm size (β = 
0.396, p = 0.057) resulting in the acceptance of H28. Nevertheless, their monitoring 
role as an alignment mechanism to growth opportunities and CEO compensation is 
ineffectual (β = 0.106, p = 0.445) due to which this study rejects H29. Contrary to the 
supposition of this study, institutional investors distort the link between market share 
and CEO compensation (β = -0.352, p = 0.085), therefore, the study rejects H30.  
There is a possibility that the focus of these investors is to increase shareholder value 
(WorldatWork, 2007) despite of cost effectiveness or competitive advantage (Ross et 
al., 2008). Nonetheless, executives‘ talent can be assessed by their ability to enhance 
market share, thus, aligning CEO‘s compensation with market share could help an 
organization to survive in a competitive market environment (Jung & Subramanian, 
2017). Overall, the results suggested that institutional investors in Pakistan are 
concentrating only on market performance and firm size, they should coordinate their 
monitoring efforts by effectively align their CEO‘s compensation also with other 
performance indicators to mitigate agency conflicts. It is possible that institutional 
investors are not very effective in Pakistan due to their political connections (Wahab 
& Rahman, 2009) or concentrated passive institutional investors (Almazan, Hartzell, 
& Starks, 2005). 
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4.4.10 Moderating Role of Foreign Ownership (H31-H35) 
The results from Table 4.12 demonstrated that the impact of foreign ownership on 
CEO compensation is significantly negative (β = -0.223, p = 0.006) which validated 
the postulation that the main objective of foreign investors is to decrease excessive 
CEO compensation (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, & Thomas, 2008). It is also purported that 
foreign investors actively monitor CEO‘s actions and constrain them from 
expropriating shareholder wealth. Result of this study is also in tandem to the study of 
Lee and Kim (2009) who revealed that foreign ownership and stockholding is 
associated with lower agency costs. On the other side of story, Pakistan is thriving to 
attract foreign investment as there are least restrictions on foreign ownership as 
compared to other emerging markets (Akram, 2015), thus, it is possible that firms 
may decrease excessive CEO compensation in order to attract foreign investors. 
Nonetheless, this result is not consistent with the argument that foreign investors pay 
high compensation in order to retain CEOs with exclusive knowledge and experience 
(Cao, Pan, & Tian, 2011; Huang, 2010; La Porta et al, 1999; Mäkinen, 2007; Pan et 
al., 2009; Randøy & Nielsen, 2002).  
There are some studies which also revealed that foreign investors influence domestic 
firms to align their CEO‘s compensation with firm performance (Firth et al., 2007). 
Colpan and Yoshikawa (2012) also found that foreign investors moderate the 
relationship between firm profitability and CEO‘s bonus pay. Nonetheless, the 
regression results in Table 4.12 are in line with these prior studies. There is no 
significant moderating effect of foreign ownership on the relation between operating 
performance and CEO compensation (β = -0.111, p = 0.313) leading to rejection of 
H31. It is possible that foreign investors are ineffective in aligning operating 
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performance with CEO compensation due to their marginal representation on average 
in Pakistan (only 5.4 percent).  
Surprisingly, a contradictory results has been revealed for H32. Therefore, the results 
suggested that there is significant but negative moderating role of market performance 
and CEO compensation (β = -0.283, p = 0.021). It posits that foreign stockholders in 
Pakistan could weaken the link between market performance and CEO compensation. 
Probably, foreign investors in Pakistan cannot mitigate potential agency conflicts as 
they could only be interested in short-term returns as suggested by Sarkissian and 
Schill (2009) and Gozzi, Levine and Schmukler (2006). Although previous studies 
have not clearly indicated the negative impact of foreign ownership on pay-
performance relationship but the study by Balasubramanian, Barua and Karthik 
(2015) also suggested that foreign owners are ineffective in setting CEO‘s pay 
adequately. The results in Table 4.12 also show that there is no significant effect of 
foreign ownership between firm size and CEO compensation (β = -0.086, p = 0.485).  
Foreign ownership can also distort and weaken the link between growth opportunities 
and CEO compensation as the result for H34 is significant but negative (β = -0.205, p 
= 0.047). In Pakistan, CEO compensation is not aligned to growth opportunities yet so 
it is conceivable that foreign investors are the barriers in this context. However, the 
regression results are in the favor of the assumption that foreign ownership positively 
and significantly moderate the relationship between market share and CEO 
compensation (β = 0.443, p = 0.001). It is suggested that CEOs need to enhance the 
market share of the firm in order to get good compensation from foreign investors in 
Pakistan.  
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Overall, the results revealed that foreign investors in Pakistan are concerned more 
about aligning their CEO compensation with market share even at the cost of reduced 
shareholder value (WorldatWork, 2007, p. 298) as they want their CEOs to work on 
cost effective strategies (Ross et al., 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.13 
Regression Analysis for CEO Compensation Model (Direct and Moderating Effect of 
Dividend Policy) 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
    B        S.E.          Beta 
(Constant) -91.27 17.07  -5.35 0.000*** 
Dividend Payout -0.214 0.103 -0.101 -2.07 0.039** 
Dividend Yield 4.159 1.449 0.154 2.87 0.004*** 
OPDPR -0.193 0.144 -0.037 -1.339 0.181 
MPDPR 0.265 0.174 0.056 1.527 0.127 
SizeDPR -0.044 0.16 -0.01 -0.277 0.782 
GODPR -0.147 0.133 -0.033 -1.105 0.269 
MSDPR -0.342 0.144 -0.08 -2.375 0.018** 
OPDY -1.956 0.54 -0.146 -3.626 0.000*** 
MPDY -1.041 0.536 -0.099 -1.942 0.052* 
SizeDY -1.287 0.48 -0.113 -2.683 0.007*** 
GODY -0.757 0.477 -0.082 -1.586 0.113 
MSDY 1.638 0.436 0.128 3.757 0.000*** 
Note: OPDPR= Interaction of operating performance with dividend payout, MPDPR= 
Interaction of market performance with dividend payout, SizeDPR= Interaction of firm size 
with dividend payout, GODPR= Interaction of growth opportunities with dividend payout, 
MSDPR= Interaction of market share with dividend payout, OPDY= Interaction of operating 
performance with dividend yield, MPDY= Interaction of market performance with dividend 
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yield, SizeDY= Interaction of firm size with dividend yield, GODY= Interaction of growth 
opportunities with dividend yield, MSDY= Interaction of market share with dividend yield.        
* p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
4.4.11 Moderating Role of Dividend Policy (H36-H45) 
This study ensured the impact of dividend payout and dividend yield on CEO 
compensation. Table 4.13 shows that there is significant negative impact of dividend 
payout on CEO compensation (β = -0.214, p = 0.039) and significant positive impact 
of dividend yield on CEO compensation (β = 4.159, p = 0.004). In case of dividend 
payout, the result in this study is consistent with the Bhattacharyya et al. (2008) and 
Gaver and Gaver (1993) who also found negative association between dividend 
payout and CEO compensation. They suggested that managers with high productivity 
may retain earnings and rather distributing dividends to shareholders, they invest in 
positive NPV projects. Consequently, these high skilled CEOs demand more 
compensation.  
The result can also be interpreted by considering the postulation of DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo and Stulz (2004) that firms pay dividend to mitigate agency costs. The 
notion is also close to free cash flow hypothesis that firms pay dividend to diminish 
free cash flow so that executives would be unable to expropriate shareholder wealth 
through overinvestment or investment in impractical projects (Easterbrook, 1984; La 
Porta et al., 2000). It is also suggested that dividend payout can also constrain 
majority shareholders to exploit minority shareholders by withdrawing profits in 
terms of compensation (Hauser, Salomon, Shohet, & Tanhuma, 1996).  
Nonetheless, this study explores positive impact of dividend yield on CEO 
compensation. It is because dividend yield is less affected by managerial control and 
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more affected by vagaries of the stock market (Bhattacharyya et al., 2008). It can also 
be documented that firms who enjoy positive returns over the time pay their CEOs a 
higher compensation. Paying dividend for companies become mandatory if they want 
to maintain their share price (Milai, 2014). Moreover, some managers need to 
maintain their reputation by paying dividends or else they are less likely to be hired 
by other companies as outside directors (Kaplan & Reishus, 1990).  
Previous studies also proposed that dividend can be utilized as a substitute control 
when corporate governance provisions are not favorable for shareholders (Haye, 
2014). However, the results for the moderating role of dividend payout are 
insignificant for most of the performance indicators. For instance, the results revealed 
that there is insignificant moderating effect of dividend payout on the relationship 
between operating performance and CEO compensation (β = -0.193, p = 0.181), 
therefore, H36 is rejected. Similarly, dividend payout is also ineffective in aligning 
CEO‘s compensation with market performance (β = 0.265, p = 0.127), firm size (β = 
0.044, p = 0.782) and growth opportunities (β = -0.147, p = 0.269). Thus, this study 
also rejects H37, H38 and H39. Probably, the result from this study suggest that in 
Pakistan, the dividend policy is inefficient as it cannot be utilized as a substitute 
control when corporate governance mechanisms are weak (Haye, 2014). It is also 
possible that need of dividends as a means of reducing agency costs is decreased 
because most of the performance indicators are already aligned with CEO 
compensation (Lippert, Nixon, & Pilotte, 2000).  
Although, the results suggest significant moderating effect of dividend payout on the 
relationship between market share and CEO compensation but H40 is rejected due to 
negative sign. It is suggested that dividend payout in Pakistan can distort the link 
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between market share and CEO compensation. Although similar study is not available 
in prior academic literature, the results can be compared with the study of 
Emerenciana (2012) who found that dividend paying firms have lower pay-
performance sensitivity. It is also postulated that the dividend could not mitigate the 
agency conflicts and the effects of a weak governance structure. By the same token, it 
is purported that dividend yield is also ineffective pay alignment mechanism as there 
is significant but negative moderating effect of dividend yield on the relationship 
between operating performance and CEO compensation (β = -1.956, p = 0.000) 
resulting in the rejection of H41.  
This study also rejects H42 as the result is contrary to the study‘s hypothesis that 
dividend yield positively moderates the relationship between market performance and 
CEO compensation (β = -1.041, p = 0.052). Through regression results, H43 is also 
rejected as it indicates that there is significant negative moderating effect of dividend 
yield on the relationship between firm size and CEO compensation (β = -1.287, p = 
0.007). Dividend yield is also ineffectual in aligning the growth opportunities with 
CEO compensation (β = -0.757, p = 0.113). On the other hand, the result for H45 are 
surprisingly different as compared to other interaction effects of dividend policy. It is 
revealed that there is significant positive moderating effect of dividend yield between 
market share and CEO compensation (β = -0.757, p = 0.113). It is suggested that firms 
with high market share and high dividend yield pay their CEOs a higher 
compensation.  
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4.5 Summary of Hypotheses Testing Results 
In Table 4.14, hypotheses testing results for the pay-performance relationship are 
summarized. It is evaluated that CEO compensation in Pakistan is aligned with 
operating performance, market performance, firm size and market. However, the 
compensation of CEOs are not aligned with growth opportunities in the capital market 
of Pakistan. Thus, this study has accepted H1, H2, H3 and H5 but H4 is rejected.   
 
Table 4.14 
Summary of Hypotheses Testing Results (Direct Effect of Performance Measures on 
CEO Compensation) 
Hypothesis Hypothesis Statement Directions Findings 
H1 
Operating performance has a significant 
relationship with CEO Compensation 
+ Supported 
H2 
Market Performance has a significant 
relationship with CEO Compensation 
+ Supported 
H3 
Firm Size has a significant relationship 
with CEO Compensation 
+ Supported 
H4 
Growth opportunities have a significant 
relationship with CEO compensation 
Not Sig. 
Not 
Supported 
H5 
Market share has a significant relationship 
with CEO compensation 
+ Supported 
Table 4.15 summarize the results for the moderating effect of board characteristics on 
pay-performance relationship. In Pakistan Stock Exchange, board composed of 
independent directors are only efficient in aligning the compensation of CEO with 
operating performance. In fact, their presence could weaken the positive association 
between firm size and CEO compensation. Accordingly, this study accepts H6 but 
rejects H7, H8, H9, and H10. On the other hand, board size is capable of aligning the 
CEO compensation with operating performance in the capital market of Pakistan. 
Nonetheless, this result is not consistent with agency perspective. Results also show 
that they also incapable of strengthening the link between other performance 
measures and CEO compensation. 
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Therefore, the study rejects H11, H12, H13, H14 and H15. The study also examined 
that CEO duality distort pay-performance link. For instance, CEO duality can weaken 
the relationship of operating performance, firm size and growth opportunities with 
CEO compensation. Thus, the study accepts H16, H18 and H19 but as CEO duality is 
ineffective in developing or distorting link of CEO compensation with market 
performance and market share, so H17 and H20 are rejected.  
Table 4.15 
Summary of Hypotheses Testing Results (Moderating Effect of Board Characteristics) 
Hypothesis Hypothesis Statement Directions Findings 
H6 
Board independence positively moderates 
the relationship between operating 
performance and CEO compensation 
+ Supported 
H7 
Board independence positively moderates 
the relationship between market 
performance and CEO compensation 
Not Sig. 
Not 
Supported 
H8 
Board independence positively moderates 
the relationship between firm size and CEO 
compensation 
- 
Not 
Supported 
H9 
Board independence positively moderates 
the relationship between growth 
opportunities and CEO compensation 
Not Sig. 
Not 
Supported 
H10 
Board independence positively moderates 
the relationship between market share and 
CEO compensation 
Not Sig. 
Not 
Supported 
H11 
Board size negatively moderates the 
relationship between operating 
performance and CEO compensation 
+ 
Not 
Supported 
H12 
Board size negatively moderates the 
relationship between market performance 
and CEO compensation 
Not Sig. 
Not 
Supported 
H13 
Board size negatively moderates the 
relationship between firm size and CEO 
compensation 
Not Sig. 
Not 
Supported 
H14 
Board size negatively moderates the 
relationship between growth opportunities 
and CEO compensation 
Not Sig. 
Not 
Supported 
H15 
Board size negatively moderates the 
relationship between market share and 
CEO compensation 
Not Sig. 
Not 
Supported 
H16 
CEO duality negatively moderates the 
relationship between operating 
performance and CEO compensation 
- Supported 
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H17 
CEO duality negatively moderates the 
relationship between market performance 
and CEO compensation 
Not Sig. 
Not 
Supported 
H18 
CEO Duality negatively moderates the 
relationship between firm size and CEO 
compensation 
- Supported 
H19 
CEO duality negatively moderates the 
relationship between growth opportunities 
and CEO compensation 
- Supported 
H20 
CEO duality negatively moderates the 
relationship between market share and 
CEO compensation 
Not Sig. 
Not 
Supported 
Table 4.16 summarize the hypotheses results for the moderating effect of ownership 
structure. It is explored that family owners align their CEO‘s compensation with 
operating performance and institutional owners are capable of aligning the CEO 
compensation with market performance and firm size but both of these owners are not 
capable of aligning CEO compensation with other performance measures in Pakistan. 
Thus, H21, H27 and H28 are accepted but H22, H23, H24, H25, H26, H28, H29 and 
H30 are rejected.  
On the other hand, foreign investors could weaken the link of market performance and 
growth opportunities with CEO compensation. Moreover, they are ineffective in 
generating any association of operating performance and firm size with CEO 
compensation. In Pakistan, foreign investor pay their CEOs a high compensation only 
when they enhance the market share. Thus, only H35 is accepted and rest of the 
hypotheses (H31, H32, H33 and H34) are rejected.  
Table 4.16 
Summary of Hypotheses Testing Results (Moderating Effect of Ownership Structure) 
Hypothesis Hypothesis Statement Directions Findings 
H21 
Family ownership positively moderates 
the relationship between operating 
performance and CEO compensation 
+ Supported 
H22 
Family ownership positively moderates 
the relationship between market 
Not Sig. 
Not 
Supported 
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performance and CEO compensation 
H23 
Family ownership positively moderates 
the relationship between firm size and 
CEO compensation 
Not Sig. 
Not 
Supported 
H24 
Family ownership positively moderates 
the relationship between growth 
opportunities and CEO compensation 
Not Sig. 
Not 
Supported 
H25 
Family ownership positively moderates 
the relationship between market share and 
CEO compensation 
Not Sig. 
Not 
Supported 
H26 
Institutional ownership positively 
moderates the relationship between 
operating performance and CEO 
compensation 
Not Sig. 
Not 
Supported 
H27 
Institutional ownership positively 
moderates the relationship between market 
performance and CEO compensation 
+ Supported 
H28 
Institutional ownership positively 
moderates the relationship between firm 
size and CEO compensation 
+ Supported 
H29 
Institutional ownership positively 
moderates the relationship between 
growth opportunities and CEO 
compensation 
Not Sig. 
Not 
Supported 
H30 
Institutional ownership positively 
moderates the relationship between market 
share and CEO compensation 
- 
Not 
Supported 
H31 
Foreign ownership positively moderates 
the relationship between operating 
performance and CEO compensation 
Not Sig. 
Not 
Supported 
H32 
Foreign ownership positively moderates 
the relationship between market 
performance and CEO compensation 
- 
Not 
Supported 
H33 
Foreign ownership positively moderates 
the relationship between firm size and 
CEO compensation 
Not Sig. 
Not 
Supported 
H34 
Foreign ownership positively moderates 
the relationship between growth 
opportunities and CEO compensation 
- 
Not 
Supported 
H35 
Foreign ownership positively moderates 
the relationship between market share and 
CEO compensation 
+ Supported 
Table 4.17 exhibits the summary for the moderating effect of dividend policy on pay-
performance relationship. At large, this study argues that dividend policy in Pakistan 
is inefficient and cannot act as the substitute control device in the absence of strong 
corporate governance as it distorts the pay-performance link. Dividend payout 
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weakens the link between market share and CEO compensation in the capital market 
of Pakistan, however, it is ineffective in reinforcing or debilitating other performance 
measures link with CEO compensation. Thus, H36-40 are rejected. On the other hand, 
dividend yield can strengthen the link between market share and CEO compensation 
but it distorts the association of operating performance, market performance and firm 
size with CEO compensation. Thus, the study also rejects H41-H45.  
Table 4.17 
Summary of Hypotheses Testing Results (Moderating Effect of Dividend Policy) 
Hypothesis Hypothesis Statement Directions Findings 
H36 
Dividend payout ratio moderates the 
relationship between operating 
performance and CEO compensation 
Not Sig. 
Not 
Supported 
H37 
Dividend payout ratio moderates the 
relationship between market performance 
and CEO compensation 
Not Sig. 
Not 
Supported 
H38 
Dividend payout ratio moderates the 
relationship between firm size and CEO 
compensation 
Not Sig. 
Not 
Supported 
H39 
Dividend payout ratio moderates the 
relationship between growth opportunities 
and CEO compensation 
Not Sig. 
Not 
Supported 
H40 
Dividend payout ratio moderates the 
relationship between market share and 
CEO compensation 
- 
Not 
Supported 
H41 
Dividend yield moderates the relationship 
between operating performance and CEO 
compensation 
- 
Not 
Supported 
H42 
Dividend yield moderates the relationship 
between market performance and CEO 
compensation 
- 
Not 
Supported 
H43 
Dividend yield moderates the relationship 
between firm size and CEO compensation 
- 
Not 
Supported 
H44 
Dividend yield moderates the relationship 
between growth opportunities and CEO 
compensation 
Not Sig. 
Not 
Supported 
H45 
Dividend yield moderates the relationship 
between market share and CEO 
compensation 
+ Supported 
Dividend yield moderates the relationship 
H4 1 between operating performance and CEO Not - Supported 
compensation 
~iv ihend yield moderates the relationship 
H42 between market performance and CEO Not - Supported 
compensation 
H43 Dividend yield moderates the relationship - Not between firm size and CEO compensation Supported 
Dividend yield moderates the relationship 
H44 between growth opportunities and CEO Not 
compensation Not Sig' Supported 
Dividend yield moderates the relationship 
H45 between market share and CEO + Suppoi-ted 
compensation 
4.6 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter revolves around the results of the study. The data was collected for the 
companies listed in Pakistan Stock Exchange who have given complete and adequate 
data. In addition, prior to analyzing data through regression, data screening and validity 
was ensured. The chapter highlighted the satisfaction of various assumptions, i.e. 
identification of outliers, identification of Multicollinearity, normality, linearity, no 
autocorrelation and no heteroscedasticity. Furthermore, through regression analysis, 
hypotheses have been tested. It is evaluated that out of 45 hypotheses, only 13 
hypothesis are significant. Results are presented in the cultural context of Pakistan. 
CEO compensation in Pakistan is aligned to all performance indicators except growth 
opportunities. Moreover, it is purported that the corporate governance structures in 
Pakistan are still weak and need to be improved. Additionally, dividend policy cannot 
work as the substitute control device or alignment mechanism in the capital market of 
Pakistan. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
5.0 Introduction 
The main puspose of this chapter is to discuss and summarize the main results of the 
study. This chapter provides additional insights and debate on the effect of finn 
perfoimance and firm characteristics on CEO Compensation along with the role of 
different moderators in Pakistan Stock Exchange. This chapter is also divided into 
various sections. Section 5.1 describes an overview of the research. Section 5.2 
concisely discusses the main results of the study. Section 5.3 describes the outcomes of 
the moderating role of corporate governance and dividend policy. Section 5.4 provides 
the implication and Section 5.5 discusses the limitation of the study. Suggestions for 
the further research in this domain is provided in Section 5.6 and lastly, in Section 5.8, 
conclusion is concisely presented. 
5.1 Overview of the Study 
CEO compensation has become a controversial issue due to excessive increase in 
compensation of CEOs in tern of cash and stock bonuses. Consequently, the perception 
of public regarding CEO remuneration is evidently unfair which ful-ther leads to agency 
conflicts. Therefore, this study has tested the propositions of agency theory and 
examined this issue to ensure if the opinion of public is factual or the CEO 
compensation in Pakistan is aligned to the perfosmance measures indicators. In 
addition, various factors has also incorporated as moderators to identify either they 
strengthen or distort the pay-performance link. The academic literature with regard to 
this issue in Pakistan is very scarce and these study has not specified any precise 
explanation regarding the matter of CEO compensation. Hence, the need to examine 
this issue is motivated by the current status of CEO compensation in Pakistani films 
that are still at an emergent level. 
The main objective of this study is to examine if CEO compensation is aligned to finn 
performance and finn characteristics in the companies listed on Pakistan Stock 
Exchange. This research tries to identify and mitigate agency conflicts that arise fi-om 
CEO compensation which could further affect the firm perfoimance. In addition, 
different moderating variables are considered in the study which either promote agency 
conflicts or mitigate them. This study investigated the effect of operating performance, 
market performance, firm size, growth opportunities and market share on CEO 
compensation. Additionally, moderating role of corporate governance mechanisms 
(board independence, board size, CEO duality, family ownership, institutional 
ownership and foreign ownership) and dividend policy are assessed. 
This study statistically test the hypotheses with Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
(SPSS) software. Initially, all companies listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange were 
designated, however, after data cleaning, 284 companies over the period of 2010-2014 
were selected. Although previous studies in the context of Pakistan tried to link firm 
performance and fm size with CEO compensation but they omitted other crucial 
performance measure indicators. Furthermore, this study made an attempt to fill the gap 
in academic literature by considering the moderating effect of board independence, 
board size, CEO duality, family ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership 
and dividend policy. This study has also validated the effectiveness and inefficiency of 
corporate governance mechanisms and dividend policy in the context of Pakistan. 
Moreover, the study also proposed different solutions for the mitigation of agency 
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agency conflicts or mitigate them. This study investigated the effect of operating 
performance, market performance, firm size, growth opportunities and market share 
on CEO compensation. Additionally, moderating role of corporate governance 
mechanisms (board independence, board size, CEO duality, family ownership, 
institutional ownership and foreign ownership) and dividend policy are assessed.  
This study statistically test the hypotheses with Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
(SPSS) software. Initially, all companies listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange were 
designated, however, after data cleaning, 284 companies over the period of 2010-2014 
were selected. Although previous studies in the context of Pakistan tried to link firm 
performance and firm size with CEO compensation but they omitted other crucial 
performance measure indicators. Furthermore, this study made an attempt to fill the 
gap in academic literature by considering the moderating effect of board 
independence, board size, CEO duality, family ownership, institutional ownership, 
foreign ownership and dividend policy. This study has also validated the effectiveness 
and inefficiency of corporate governance mechanisms and dividend policy in the 
context of Pakistan. Moreover, the study also proposed different solutions for the 
mitigation of agency conflicts and guide the researchers to pursue research in this 
area. Additionally, the implications and contribution of the study further elaborated 
who this study will help managers, shareholders, directors, policymakers and 
organizations.  
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5.2 Discussion of Hypotheses 
5.2.1 Firm Performance 
Consistent with agency theory, the results revealed that CEO compensation is aligned 
to both operating and market performance in Pakistan. The orthodox economic 
theorists argued that managers are hired in order to act in the best interest of 
shareholders but usually these managers work in their self-interest if their interests are 
not aligned with the interests of shareholders (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991; Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). In accordance with the results, it is 
purported that companies listed on Pakistan stock exchange have tried to align the 
CEO‘s interest with those of shareholders by strengthening the pay-performance link. 
The improved corporate governance regulations of SECP also play a vital role in 
mitigating principal-agent problem. Although there is a wide range of academic 
literature on the relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation, 
nonetheless, researchers have not yet reached to an absolute conclusion (see Cohen, 
Hall, & Viceira, 2000; Cooper et al., 2010; Crumley, 2008; Gu & Kim, 2009).  
According to researcher‘s best knowledge, previous studies in the context of Pakistan 
have measured firm performance with accounting-based measures and did not find its 
positive alignment with CEO compensation (e.g. Anjam, 2010; Lone et al., 2015; 
Shah et al., 2009; Usman et al., 2015; Younas et al., 2012). Nonetheless, researchers 
argued that aligning CEO compensation with operating performance or accounting-
based measures is not enough because CEOs more likely to have direct influence over 
operating performance (Donatiello, Larcker, & Tayan, 2016). Therefore, directors or 
principals should also pay their CEOs according to fluctuation in market performance 
of the firm. Nonetheless, previous studies in the perspective of Pakistan have not 
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tested the relationship between market-based measure and CEO compensation. There 
is only one study by Yahya and Ghazali (2015) who ensured positive and significant 
effect of operating and market performance on CEO compensation.  
Overall, the results are supporting the agency theory that CEO compensation should 
be aligned to firm performance. However, still the regulatory bodies need to improve 
the compensation policies because the effect size of market performance is very little 
as compared to operating performance. For instance, a considerable amount of 
compensation will be increased with the increase in market performance but a little 
increase in operating performance leads to very high level of remuneration and vice 
versa.  
5.2.2 Firm Characteristics   
Matolcsy and Wright (2011) argued that companies who pay their CEOs consistent 
with firm characteristics may perform better as compared to those who do not. A set 
of researches and theories postulated that optimal level of pay and incentives has 
maintained by many corporations due to changes in firm characteristics. Owing to 
these changes, CEOs induce more talent and effort to enhance the firm value. For 
instance, researchers proposed that an increase in the size of firm enhance the optimal 
level of CEO effort and thereby increase the CEO incentives (Baker & Hall 2004; 
Himmelberg & Hubbard 2000). According to Gayle and Miller (2009), the firms 
should increase the incentives and pay of CEOs with the growth of firm size or else 
they will face the issue of moral hazard.  
Consistent with this argument, this study also found significant and positive effect of 
firm size on CEO compensation. Similar results were evaluated by most of the former 
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and recent studies (see Gayle, Golan, & Miller, 2015; Lone et al., 2015; Mendez et al., 
2011; Usman et al., 2015, van Essen et al., 2015; Vemala et al., 2014; Yahya & 
Ghazali, 2015). Nonetheless, some theorists argued that firm size should not be a 
major determinant of CEO compensation because CEOs might involve themselves in 
rent extraction which leads to principal-agent problem (Murphy, 1985). Thus, this 
study did not find any evidence that CEO compensation in Pakistan is 
disproportionately explained by firm size.  
Contrary to the agency theory assumptions, this study found that CEO compensation 
in Pakistan is not explained by growth opportunities. This result is similar to the study 
of Abrahamson and De Ridder (2010) but comparatively different from other previous 
academic literature (Barnes et al., 2006; Conyon & He, 2008; Gabaix & Landier, 
2008; Yahya & Ghazali, 2015). From the agency theory point of view, CEO 
compensation should also be aligned to growth opportunities or else they will exploit 
free cash flow in value-destroying activities (Chung et al., 2005). Thus, efficient 
compensation structure can be achieved if companies in Pakistan also align their 
CEO‘s compensation with growth or investment opportunities. Furthermore, 
compensating CEOs higher with the increase in market share could mitigate agency 
conflicts. Owing to the higher level of volatility in business market, development in 
communication technologies and powerful competition by foreign corporations, the 
productivity of managerial talent and effort may have elevated (Cuñat & Guadalupe 
2009; Frydman, & Jenter, 2010; Hubbard & Palia, 1995).  
Therefore, compensation of CEOs should also be aligned to market share and they 
should incentivized highly if they have the capability to increase market share. 
Consistent with the argument of efficient labor market, if companies will not pay 
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these CEOs a high compensation, they may move to another organization. In the 
relevance of current study, there is a significant and positive effect of market share on 
CEO compensation. Previously, this relationship with same results was tested by 
Yahya and Ghazali (2015). It is a good indicator that CEO compensation in Pakistan 
is aligned to market share.  
5.2.3 Corporate Governance   
Agency theory argued that CEOs may receive lower or higher remuneration on the 
basis of the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms (Malmendier & Tate, 
2009). In addition, high discretion and power of CEOs can be counteracted by high 
monitoring or else they may acquire additional awards and recognition in case of 
weak corporate governance systems which eventually degrade the firm performance 
and shareholder value (Bebchuk et al., 2002). Through the reduction of agency costs 
and adoption of shareholder-friendly policies, strong corporate governance 
mechanisms enhance shareholder wealth as well as financial performance of the firm 
(Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2010).  
Additionally, good corporate governance structures can align the interests of 
managers with that of shareholders (Holmstrom, 1979; Murphy, 1986). Therefore, van 
Essen et al. (2015) proposed various corporate governance mechanisms that can align 
the CEO compensation with firm performance. This study tested these propositions 
and mechanisms in the context of Pakistan‘s capital market. First of all, the 
monitoring and supervising role of independent directors was ensured. The results 
ratified the postulation that independent directors restrict CEOs to extract high level 
of remuneration (Core et al., 1999; Fallatah, 2015; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 1998) as there is negative effect of board independence on CEO 
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compensation. However, the role of independent directors in Pakistan is partially 
consistent with agency perspective.  
Independent directors are capable of aligning CEO‘s compensation with operating 
performance but ineffective as an alignment mechanism to market performance and 
CEO compensation. This result is partially supported by the postulations of van Essen 
et al. (2015). The results also did not support the evidence that independent directors 
moderate the relationship between growth opportunities and CEO compensation or 
market share and CEO compensation. Prior studies purported that the percentage of 
independent directors less than 50 percent could be ineffective in aligning the interests 
of managers with shareholders‘ interests (Weisbach, 1988; Chee-Wooi & Chwee-
Ming, 2010). Nonetheless, negative moderating role of independent directors between 
firm size and CEO compensation has revealed. CEOs may manipulate firm size 
indicators and could increase their compensation accordingly (Murphy, 1985). 
Therefore, independent directors resist these CEOs from attaining excessive 
compensation through elevation of firm size.  
The second dimension of corporate governance which was taken under investigation 
was board size due to its prominence in CEO compensation academic literature (Abed 
et al., 2014; Cahan et al., 2005; Core et al., 1999; Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; 
Fallatah, 2015; Jensen, 1993; Lee & Chen, 2011). Agency theorists argued that large 
board size could become inefficient in monitoring or controlling CEO‘s apprehensive 
activities. Nonetheless, the results of this study posited negative effect of board size 
on CEO compensation as the average board size in Pakistan is not outsized, therefore, 
it is contended that board of directors could also constrain excess compensation.  
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However, there is also another justification for this outcome. Companies with larger 
board size may distribute imbursements to all board members, leaving lesser 
compensation for CEOs. Prior studies have also given very less attention to board size 
as an alignment mechanism. Nevertheless, this study revealed significant and positive 
moderating effect of board size on the relationship between operating performance 
and CEO compensation supporting the proposition of van Essen et al. (2015) but 
contrary to the results of Ozkan (2007) and Fahlenbrach (2009). It is also evaluated 
that board size is ineffective in aligning any other performance indicator with CEO 
compensation.  
CEO duality is the third board attribute considered in this study as it is one of the 
important corporate governance mechanism. Agency theory condemn the existence of 
CEO duality in corporate governance structures. Owing to the higher inherent risk and 
CEO entrenchment, CEO duality is considered as ineffective governance mechanism 
(Dickins, 2010; Kim et al., 2009). In contrast with the perspective of agency theory, 
this study evaluates negative effect of CEO duality on CEO compensation. There 
could be two reasons for this outcome, 1) CEOs with duality of positions in Pakistan 
are stewards who act in the best of shareholders rather than extracting excessive 
compensation, 2) the companies with CEO duality have lower profitability as there is 
negative relationship of CEO duality with operating performance, market 
performance, firm size and market share. 
 Through moderating effect of CEO duality, it is analyzed that CEO duality has either 
negative or no effect on pay-performance link. These results are aligned to the 
perspectives of agency theory that CEO duality is incapable of sustaining pay-
performance link. This study evaluated negative moderating effect of CEO duality 
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between operating performance and CEO compensation. The results also 
demonstrated negative impact on size-pay and growth-pay link. Nonetheless, no 
statistically significant moderating effect of CEO duality between market 
performance and CEO compensation was found. Similar results were purported for 
market share and compensation link.  
In a previous study by Fahlenbrach (2009), adverse effect of CEO duality on pay-
performance link was found but contrary results were postulated by Aiyesha et al. 
(2011) and Dorata and Petra (2008). The meta-analysis by van Essen et al. (2015) is 
also in the favor of notion that CEO duality does not moderate the relationship 
between firm performance and CEO compensation. In general, it is assessed that CEO 
duality is not efficient alignment mechanism of corporate governance. Consistent with 
managerial power theory, this study also argued that CEO duality induce power and 
mandate which eventually leads to influence over the pay setting process (Ungson & 
Steers, 1984). It can also be posited that CEOs with duality of position in Pakistan 
resist performance related pay or pay-performance sensitivity.   
Ownership structure is also one of the crucial part of corporate governance 
mechanisms. Three types of ownerships were taken to investigate in this study 
including family, institutional and foreign ownership. Previous studies found 
inconsistent results regarding the role of family owners in setting CEO‘s 
remuneration. Some revealed positive (Cheung et al., 2005; Haid & Yurtoglu, 2008) 
while some assessed negative impact of family ownership on CEO compensation 
(Block, 2008; Croci et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003; McConaughy, 2000; 
Palmberg, 2009). However, due to dominance of institutional ownership in the capital 
market of Pakistan, this study did not find any significant effect of family ownership 
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on CEO compensation. The results are similar to the studies of Gabaix and Landier 
(2008) and Oreland (2008) who also did not evaluate any association between CEO 
compensation and family ownership. Despite of inactive participation of family 
owners in setting CEO‘s pay, the study found significant and positive moderating role 
of family ownership on the relationship between operating performance and CEO 
compensation.  
Although agency theorists argued that pay-performance sensitivity is not relevant in 
family firms but Michiels et al. (2013) also asserted positive moderating effect of 
family ownership on pay-performance link. Family owners align the CEO‘s 
remuneration with performance to eradicate self-control or parental altruism issue 
(Lubatkin et al., 2005; Schulze et al., 2003). Nonetheless, the study did not evaluated 
any significant moderating effect of family ownership for other performance 
indicators.  
This study also examined the direct and moderating effect of institutional ownership 
on CEO compensation. The regression results found positive and significant effect of 
institutional ownership on CEO compensation suggested that institutional investors 
promote talent and pay their CEOs according to their efforts. These results are 
consistent with the recent studies by Croci et al. (2012), Fernandes et al. (2012); Khan 
et al. (2015) and Victoravich, Xu and Gan (2013). On the other hand, some studies 
assessed negative impact of instructional ownership on CEO compensation and 
argued that institutional investor may restrict CEOs to extract excessive compensation 
(see Chen & Firth, 2005; Khalatyan & Jouri, 2010; van Essen et al., 2015). Previous 
studies also purported that institutional investors play efficient monitoring role in an 
organization as they positively affect the pay-performance sensitivity. Nonetheless, 
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this study asserted that institutional investors in Pakistan are not actively contributing 
in aligning CEOs remuneration with operating performance, growth opportunities and 
market share. Indeed, they weaken the link between market share and CEO 
compensation. They are emphasizing only on aligning market performance and firm 
size with CEO compensation. The monitoring role of institutional investors could 
become ineffective if most of them are passive institutional investors (Almazan et al., 
2005) or if they have political connections (Wahab & Rahman, 2009).  
Last but not the least, this study also investigated the empirical relationship of foreign 
ownership with CEO compensation. Most of the previous studies argued that foreign 
investors are more concerned about enhancing their profitability and thereby, hire 
talented individual who could fulfil their monetary objectives. CEOs who possess 
efficient skills, knowledge and experience may demand higher compensation. 
Therefore, studies found positive association between foreign shareholding and CEO 
compensation (Cao et al., 2011; Huang, 2010; Lipsey, Mäkinen, 2007; Pan et al., 
2009). Nevertheless, the results of this study are not similar to these researches. It is 
postulated that foreign investors in Pakistan are not in the favor of paying a higher 
remuneration to CEOs, therefore, negative effect of foreign ownership on CEO 
compensation is observed. Furthermore, they are actively participating in pay-setting 
process of the CEOs despite of their least representation in capital market of Pakistan.  
Nevertheless, foreign investor did not exhibit any concern in aligning the CEO‘s 
remuneration with accounting-based measures (operating performance and firm size). 
They also discourage the alignment of CEO‘s compensation with market performance 
and growth opportunities. Foreign investors in Pakistan are only interested in aligning 
their CEO‘s compensation with market share. In Pakistan, foreign investors want their 
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CEO‘s to work on cost effective strategies (Ross et al., 2008) to increase market share 
in order to receive substantial raise in the compensation package.  
5.2.4 Dividend Policy  
Agency theory argued that free cash flows are also one the main cause of principal-
agent problem (Jensen, 1986). Managers seek rent extraction from these cash flows, 
while the shareholders want to get benefit of these free cash flows in terms of 
dividends. Furthermore, according to optimal contracting theory, directors utilize 
executive compensation along with dividends to mitigate agency conflicts (DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, & Stulz, 2004; Minnick & Rosenthal, 2014). Furthermore, dividend can 
also be utilized as a substitute control when corporate governance provisions are not 
favorable for shareholders (Haye, 2014). Therefore, dividend policy is also examined 
with CEO compensation in this study. The results revealed that there is negative effect 
of dividend pay-out and positive effect of dividend yield on CEO compensation.  
A coherent theoretical explanation for the association between dividend pay-out and 
CEO‘s compensation was purported by Bhattacharyya et al. (2008) and Gaver and 
Gaver (1993). They also found negative relationship between dividend pay-out and 
CEO compensation and argued that managers with higher skills and productivity 
retain earnings rather distributing it to shareholders in terms of dividends. They 
demand high compensation because of their ability to find and invest in positive NPV 
projects.  
On the other hand, the positive effect of dividend yield on CEO compensation is 
perceived. According to Bhattacharyya et al. (2008), dividend yields are more 
influenced by the stock market fluctuation and less in control by managers. 
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Furthermore, dividend yield is positively associated to firm size and thereby, large 
firms pay higher compensation to their CEOs. There are also some other reasons of 
paying dividend by company such as sustaining share price (Milai, 2014) and 
maintaining reputation (Kaplan & Reishus, 1990).  
In the absence of efficient corporate governance mechanisms, dividend can be utilized 
as a substitute control device (Haye, 2014). However, this proposition is not 
applicable in the capital market of Pakistan as results show ineffective moderating 
role of dividend pay-out in aligning the interest of shareholders with that of CEOs. 
For instance, dividend pay-out is not an effective mechanism in aligning CEO 
compensation with operating performance, market performance, firm size and growth 
opportunities. Additionally, dividend payout can weaken the positive relationship 
between market share and CEO compensation.  
Previously, Emerenciana (2012) also argued that there are higher agency conflicts and 
lower pay-performance sensitivity in dividend paying firms. Similarly, the results for 
dividend yield are also contrary to its role as pay alignment mechanism. Dividend 
yield in Pakistan distort and weaken the link of firm performance and size with CEO 
compensation. Additionally, it is incapable of aligning growth opportunities with 
CEO compensation. However, the results revealed the positive and significant 
moderating effect of dividend yield on the relationship between market share and 
CEO compensation. Companies with market share also possess higher dividend yield 
and eventually they pay higher to their CEOs. Overall, it is posited that capital market 
of Pakistan need to strengthen its dividend policy.  
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5.3 Implications of the Study  
There several crucial implications of the study especially for policy makers, 
regulatory bodies, academia, theorists and researchers. Therefore, this study has 
divided this part into two sections, i.e. theoretical implications and practical 
implications.  
5.3.1 Theoretical Implications   
Several previous studies who investigate agency issues usually utilized various 
corporate governance mechanisms including ownership structure, board attributes, 
audit committee characteristics and compensation packages to overcome these 
conflicts within organizations. The general contribution of this study can be perceived 
from both empirical and theoretical viewpoint. This research incorporates an 
extensive range of studies from the field of corporate governance, dividend policy, 
CEO compensation and pay-performance sensitivity. Furthermore, the research has 
enlarged the usual concept of agency theory in the context of Pakistan by utilizing 
contemporary performance measures, moderating role of corporate governance and 
dividend policy. The study partially support agency theory as some of the results are 
consistent with the agency theory and some of them are aligned to stewardship theory 
and managerial power perspective. This study extend the pay-performance notion 
especially in the capital market of Pakistan. The results of the study provide several 
empirical evidences that will assist academic researchers to conduct further studies 
relating to agency conflicts especially in a developing country like Pakistan.    
Owing to the weak corporate governance structures and inefficient dividend policy in 
Pakistan, some results are not consistent with agency theory. Although agency theory 
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suggested that performance indicators should be aligned to executive compensation 
but it did not propose any specific measures. Previous studies have examined the 
effect of firm performance, firm size and growth opportunities on CEO compensation 
but there is no empirical study in the past which tested the effect of market share on 
CEO compensation. Consistent with agency theory, the results show that the revised 
Code of Corporate Governance (2012) has tried to align the CEO compensation with 
various performance indicators except growth opportunities. Nonetheless, there is 
enough room for improvement in corporate governance mechanisms. For instance, 
monitoring role of independent directors is not very effective in aligning the interest 
of CEO‘s with that of shareholders.  
Regulatory bodies need to enhance the representation of independent directors so that 
they will be able to actively participate in setting performance related pay. Agency 
theory partially holds in the context of independent directors in Pakistan as they have 
the capability to align their CEO‘s compensation with operating performance and to 
restrain the CEOs to extract excessive compensation. Nonetheless, they have no 
influence over other accounting and market based performance measures. There is a 
possibility that either independent directors lack essential monitoring skills or they 
have less power to influence over corporate management decisions. In case of board 
size, the study also presented some results contradictory to agency theory. The results 
demonstrate negative impact of board size on CEO compensation and its positive 
moderating effect on the relationship between operating performance and CEO 
compensation. Agency theory argued that larger board can distort the pay-
performance link and managers can manipulate larger board size in order to extract 
excessive compensation. However, agency theory is aligned to the rest of results that 
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larger board size is ineffective in linking CEO‘s pay with other performance 
measures.  
In the context of CEO duality, results are not consistent with agency theory regarding 
the direct relationship of CEO duality with CEO compensation but the outcomes for 
pay-performance hypotheses are supported by agency theory. The study also 
contribute significantly by employing family ownership in agency perspective. 
Agency theory did not explain much regarding family ownership but this study argued 
that family ownership can strengthen the link between operating performance and 
CEO compensation, however, rest of the related hypotheses are consistent with 
agency viewpoint. Additionally, the study reveals that institutional owners are capable 
of aligning market performance and firm size with CEO compensation and foreign 
investors can align market share with compensation. This is a vital theoretical 
contribution of the study that all types of investors in an ownership structures play 
important role in setting performance-related pay. Lastly, this study contradicts the 
previous theoretical arguments that dividend policy can be utilized as substitute 
control device in the absence of strong corporate governance structures.  
5.3.2 Practical Implications  
The revised Code of Corporate Governance (2012) in Pakistan was designed and 
implemented by Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) to develop 
the governance structures in companies for the accountability and improvement of 
capital market. This code tried to improve the corporate governance mechanisms up 
to the standards of developed economies. However, this study observed some 
deficiencies in the Code which need to be improved. It is evident that corporate 
structure, business culture and legal systems of developing countries are different 
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from developed countries and the improvement in capital market cannot be made 
suddenly, however, refinement of the corporate mechanisms gradually is mandatory.  
This study identified that the regulatory bodies have tried to align the performance 
indicators with CEO compensation except growth opportunities. Companies should 
also be advised to align their CEO‘s compensation with growth opportunities.  
Moreover, there is only 10 percent representation of independent directors in capital 
market of Pakistan, therefore, their role in setting performance related pay is not very 
effective. Previous studies and theorists suggested that there should be at least 50 
percent independent directors on the board to enhance their monitoring capability. 
Thus, regulatory bodies should enforce the corporations to include at least 50 percent 
independent directors on their board.  
Furthermore, the results for the moderating role of board size can also help 
practitioners and policy makers to make any amendments in the board size to decrease 
agency conflicts. It is also indicated that some CEO duality have destructive role in 
aligning CEO‘s pay with performance. Although the revised Code of Corporate 
Governance (2012) has bound all companies to eliminate CEO duality from their 
governance structure but still some companies are practicing it illegally in Pakistan. 
SECP should take any action against these companies to completely remove duality of 
positions from capital market of Pakistan.  
The diversification of ownership structures are also very important for strong 
corporate governance as elaborated by the results of this study. A single or 
concentrated ownership cannot resolve the agency conflict, therefore, it is suggested 
that regulatory bodies should compel the organizations to include well-diversified 
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ownership structures. The investors who are spoiling the long-term performance of 
the company for their short-term gains should be monitored prudently. The study also 
identified that the dividend policy of Pakistan cannot be utilized as substitute control 
device in case of weak corporate governance structures. Therefore, the dividend 
policy should also be improved so that in the absence of strong corporate governance, 
it could mitigate agency conflicts. Additionally, this study provides understanding and 
awareness among the regulatory bodies, policy makers, practitioners, managers, 
shareholders and general public regarding the expected outcome produce by the 
current practices of corporate governance in capital market of Pakistan. This study 
also serves as an approach to regulators and policy makers in formulating strategies 
and policies with regard to compensation packages and agency conflicts. 
5.4 Limitations of the Study  
This research tried to provide a coherent view of the determinants of CEO 
compensation, how corporate governance and dividend policy influence pay-
performance link. Nonetheless, every study has its limitations and to fulfil the ethical 
considerations, these limitations should be stated in order to reveal a rational 
explanation of the outcomes.  
1. Owing to the lack of disclosure and transparency in the capital market of 
Pakistan, this study was not able to include all types of ownership structures, 
CEO‘s socio-psychological characteristics and board attributes (e.g. CEO 
tenure, CEO age, CEO education, board financial expertise, board activity, 
institutional owners‘ activism etc.). Acquiring this data is very difficult 
because it is not available publicly as a secondary source. Therefore, this study 
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examined relationships for which data was publically available in annual 
reports of the companies.  
2. This study examines the determinants of CEO compensation and moderating 
role of corporate governance and dividend policy among Pakistani listed firms 
for all sectors over the period of 2010 to 2014. Therefore, the study is not 
capable of generalizing the results for any specific sector to identify the 
dominancy of agency conflicts in any particular sector.  
5.5 Future Recommendations  
This study provide crucial thoughts on the present phase of this academic literature 
and offer comprehensible propositions to guide future research.  
1. Future research is required to offer further in-depth body of knowledge into 
the determinants of CEO compensation along with various other moderators in 
the context of Pakistan. In addition, the study can be further explored to other 
Asian countries to reveal the applicability of the current model on other capital 
markets. Furthermore, sector-wise analysis is also possible within the 
reference of Pakistan.  
2. The current study investigate only specific performance measures with CEO 
compensation. The study could become more valuable if researchers will test 
the model with some other accounting and marketing-based performance 
measures (especially Economic Value Added (EVA) and Tobin's Q). In 
addition, some other moderators should also be tested in this context to ensure 
their role in aligning pay-performance link. Although this study has 
investigated important types of ownerships but future researchers should also 
incorporate managerial ownership, governmental ownership and ownership 
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concentration. Furthermore, as soon as SECP will improve the disclosure and 
transparency policy among companies then other corporate governance 
mechanisms should be tested with the model.  
3. This study has not considered some other crucial corporate governance 
mechanisms as the pay-performance model was already extensive. Therefore, 
it is recommended that future studies should also test the moderating role of 
audit committee characteristics and audit quality to provide deeper 
understanding of pay-performance link especially in the perspective of the 
capital market of Pakistan.  
4. The present study has not analyzed the CEO‘s basic pay, bonuses and stock 
options separately because this data was available for only few companies in 
Pakistan. Nonetheless, pay-performance link can also be tested by considering 
these remuneration packages separately.   
5. The study has not considered the segmented market capitalization group of 
large cap, medium cap and small cap companies. Therefore, future researchers 
should continue research in this area by analyzing these groups distinctly.   
6. This study have used OLS model to test the hypotheses of the study. 
Nonetheless, panel data analysis could provide more realistic behavioral 
models by incorporating both cross-sectional and time series observations. 
This technique also control firm‘s heterogeneity, increase the degree of 
freedom and decrease the multicollinearity and endogeneity issue. Therefore, 
future studies should test the model of this study with wide range of panel data 
techniques in order to remove potential biases.  
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5.6 Conclusion  
There are several parts of this thesis. Firstly, this study examined the effect of firm 
performance and characteristics on CEO compensation. Secondly, this study 
employed the moderating effect of corporate governance and dividend policy to 
ensure their role in aligning pay with performance. The results purported that all firm 
performance (operating and market) and firm characteristics (firm size and market 
share) are aligned with CEO compensation in Pakistan except growth opportunities. 
These results indicated the presence of agency theory propositions in the capital 
market of Pakistan. Corporate governance and dividend policy are incorporated in the 
pay-performance model as moderators to validate their role in resolving agency 
problems. The role of independent directors as an alignment mechanism to operating 
performance and CEO compensation is evident but due to their lower level of 
representation on the board, they have no influence over other accounting and market 
based performance metrics.  
Independent directors may also weaken the size-pay link because CEOs may involve 
themselves in rent-extraction by increasing the firm size for a short tenure. In case of 
board size, they may align and strengthen the link between operating performance and 
CEO compensation, however, they are not capable of aligning any other performance 
indicator with CEO compensation. The study also contributes to the existing literature 
by providing a comprehensive understanding regarding the role of CEO duality in 
setting performance related pay. The results asserted that CEO duality could distort 
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the pay-performance link. This outcome is consistent with the assumptions of agency 
theory.  
The results for the moderating role of ownership structure also provide interesting in-
depth knowledge. The study concludes the results of three types of ownerships, i.e. 
family ownership, institutional ownership and foreign ownership. Although theorists 
argued that pay-performance or agency conflicts are not relevant for family ownership 
but this study find positive moderating role of family ownership between operating 
performance and firm performance. However, they are ineffective in aligning other 
performance measures with CEO compensation. On the other hand, institutional 
investors align CEO‘s compensation with market performance and firm size but 
foreign investors align the pay with market share. Therefore, diversification of 
ownership in a firm is important as every type of ownership has separate criteria and 
goals for setting CEO‘s remuneration. The study also revealed that dividend policy in 
Pakistan is inefficient in aligning pay-performance link. The results are contrary to the 
previous theoretical argument that dividend policy can act as substitute control device 
in the absence of strong corporate governance structures. 
Overall, the study has contributed in the field of CEO compensation, especially 
regarding the determinants of CEO compensation and the role of corporate 
governance and dividend policy in aligning performance related pay. The study opens 
doors for researchers to continue further research in this perspective. Furthermore, the 
study also highlighted issues and the current position of corporate governance in 
Pakistan which can help Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) to 
fortify the governance systems within capital market of Pakistan.  
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